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Abstract
Our understanding of the psychology of food choice and eating has gaps when it 
comes to the understanding at the basic cognitive level. This thesis aimed to address 
this gap, applying theories and methods not previously used with the sense of taste. 
This would include investigating taste perception and taste buds. Additionally the 
nature of tastant categories and the mnemophysics of flavour will also be 
investigated.
Research has shown that papillae numbers affect perception ability; i.e., whether 
someone is a non-taster, taster or super-taster. This thesis has shown that this effect 
does not extend to effecting memory performance. The number of papillae does not 
relate to memory performance.
Levels of processing, which was the most influential theory and methodological 
framework of memory during the last century was applied to taste for the first time in 
this PhD. The theory states that memory is dependent on the depth of processing. The 
first study used liking (deep) and pulpiness (shallow) as orientating tasks. The second 
study used liking by a significant other (deepest), liking (deep) and sip size as 
orientating tasks. Despite best efforts no LOP effect could be found for flavour using 
orange juice as the stimuli the issue of power was identified as a substantial caveat to 
this conclusion.
The second half of the thesis investigated whether there was a CP effect for flavour 
and whether the traditional CP account, or Shift Toward Prototype (STP) or
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Perceptual Magnet theory could account for the effect. A categorical perception 
effect for flavour was indentified in all three binary tastant mixtures, comprising 
mixtures of orange, lemon or blackcurrant. The effect was replicated three times for 
the orange-lemon tastant mixtures.
A ‘prototype effect’ was also identified at the orange, lemon and blackcurrant 100% 
concentrations. The pattern of results at the prototype resembled the pattern at the 
category boundary. This does not support perceptual magnet theory. It may support 
novel tastant detection as demonstrated by Mojet and Koste (2005).
While there was evidence for a CP effect this seemed to diminish with time. This 
contradicted the STP account. The role of memory is given consideration and the idea 
of prototypes in the studies is evaluated.
A critical evaluation of the research and possible future directions are included.
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Section One 
Chapter One: Introduction
Food choice and the psychology o f eating
The popular press whether printed, broadcasted or cyber is full of articles, 
programmes and advertisements, all obsessed with diet and food. The general public 
is also being swept along, willingly or not, into this Zeitgeist of food and diet. The 
importance of dieting and healthy eating has become of critical importance both for 
its fashion and ‘aesthetic’ obsession with ‘the body beautiful’ and for its role in 
health. Ogden (2003), reported that the biggest threat to health in the western world is 
no longer a lack of food and water or infectious disease, but chronic conditions related 
to lifestyle and diet. While the factors of biology cannot be ignored, it has become 
clear that our dietary behaviour has a dramatic effect on health. Having a bad diet can 
cause or worsen atherosclerosis, thrombosis resulting in coronary heart disorders and 
even death (Ogden, 2003). Diets high in salt can precipitate lethal blood pressure 
levels. Alcohol in excessive doses can increase risks of high blood pressure (Tortora 
& Grabowski, 2003). High levels of alcohol consumption also put a person at the risks 
associated with alcoholism including: liver cirrhosis, memory impairment and self 
harm (Smith & Kraus, 1988). An unbalanced diet increases the risk and incidence of 
all cancers. Interestingly, Doll and Peto (1981) reported that diets influence on cancer 
was more dramatic than smoking. The cancers shown to be most related to dietary 
habits are oesophageal cancer, stomach and large intestine.
Dietary behaviours not only influence your chances of living or dying, it can also 
have an impact on quality of life. Poor diets can leave people suffering from 
gallstones and stones of the urinary tract (Ogden, 2003). An excessive amount of food 
intake can also result in obesity which in addition to being uncomfortable and 
frowned on by society, also dramatically increases the risk of the above disorders.
Diabetes mellitus, or more specifically Diabetes mellitus type two, which is referred 
to as diet related diabetes, or late onset diabetes is also related to obesity. Diabetes can 
be a serious condition, and can put a person at serious risk of blindness and even 
insulin induces coma (Tortora & Grabowski, 2003). Psychologists such as Ogden 
(2003) have noted that the government and health agencies are now increasingly 
facing up to the importance of behaviour (and psychology) in medical practice. No 
wonder drug is likely to be able to make an individual eat a sensible diet, because our 
dietary behaviour is influenced by an accumulation of biological psychological and 
social factors which as yet we do not fully understand. Even when we gain more 
insight into these factors and mechanisms, it will take further time to be able to use 
this knowledge to influence future health care strategies and treatments.
The importance of eating and diet extend beyond the realm of medicine and into the 
multibillion dollar world of industry. The food industry is aware how difficult it is to 
change a person’s behaviour let alone a nation’s behaviour. The food industry has 
responded to the public’s and government’s concerns over dietary habits, with 
healthier foods, low in salts, sugars and fats. Recent developments have included pro­
biotic drinks and yogurts and cholesterol reducing products (Ogden, 2003). These
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foods will hopefully be able to have a positive effect on human health without 
considerable changes in behaviour. However if the mechanism driving food choice 
were understood our ability to manipulate eating cognitions and behaviours for the 
better would be enhanced. The food industry has a long tradition of research and 
development units who spend considerable time, effort and money on developing new 
foods and influencing the consumability of a product. The food industry has become 
increasingly aware that to be more profitable they need to know more than whether a 
food tastes good. For example, what are the attitudes (complex cognitions) relating to 
the food, for instance genetically modified foods? Additionally how is food liking 
acquired, is it fast or slow? Can it be manipulated? Can the ingredient in a food be 
altered (to make it healthier) without being detectably less flavourful? With sugars for 
example, some people can taste artificial sweeteners as a bitter taste and therefore the 
substitution will not go unnoticed. What is the role of memory while eating and while 
shopping? Does iced tea not sell in the UK because our concept of cold tea is far 
removed fi*om our beliefs on what a ‘tea’ should be? Are all properties of a food or 
dinner equally remembered? Two things are clear; firstly these questions have no 
clear answer yet and secondly, that these questions are clearly psychological and are 
similar to questions posed in other arenas of psychological inquiry.
Going beyond the practical benefits to medicine and industry in gaining better 
understanding of eating behaviour and food choice there is also an invaluable reward 
for theoreticians. This area of research is largely new with a wide scope of potential 
examination. Firstly our models of eating psychology and food choice are somewhat 
limited and secondly the models have not as yet benefited from the contributions of
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cognitive psychology which has dramatically increased our understanding in almost 
all other branches of psychological inquiry after the demise of behaviourism.
Why then has this area of research been ignored? The truth is that it has not been 
completely ignored; consumer and market researchers have made considerable efforts 
in the area, although their methods have not always been as strictly controlled as those 
in mainstream psychology. The research is often published outside of traditional 
psychological journals making its findings unknown to most psychologists. Therefore 
it is of no surprise that the research has also not been driven by any large extent by the 
developments in mainstream psychology. Two useful and recent resources that cover 
this literature in a manner familiar to psychologists are Ogden’s (2003) The 
psychology of eating and The Psychology of Food Choice, edited by Shepherd and 
Raats (2006).
Despite a key interest in eating psychology by the founding fathers such as Freud and 
behaviourists such as Pavlov the interest in eating psychology largely diminished as a 
mainstream psychology topic. Experimental (cognitive) psychology has developed in 
the laboratory with an emphasis on control and on ‘basic cognitions’; sensation, 
perception, attention and memory. In the ‘real world’ all this research seemed rather 
abstract and maybe too reductive to be beneficial to the consumer researcher. More 
importantly, psychology had almost completely ignored the chemical senses, which 
indubitably have to play a significant role in the psychology of eating. Until we 
acknowledge the chemical senses our understanding of eating will always be skewed. 
Sekuler and Blake (1994) argue that this ignorance of taste and smell is due to the
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chemical senses being overlooked as minor senses compared to their dominant 
relatives, vision and hearing. It is true human perception is dominated by sight and 
sound (and touch); the amount of cortex dedicated to each sense also highlights this 
relative dominance. Visual processing dominates all of the occipital lobes while taste 
processing is tucked away in the insula (not much larger than a large stamp). The 
other major factor is that of experimental control, computers have allowed highly 
precise levels of control over experiments which have proved very tempting and 
useful to the experimental method. Computers however can not provide this benefit to 
studies on the chemical senses which are inherently more difficult to control. Stimuli 
are difficult to produce and store, often requiring a chef or a chemist and a well 
resourced kitchen and refrigeration facilities. Additionally tastants and odorant 
stimuli are difficult to administer, especially in a controlled fashion. The after effects 
such as aftertaste are also longer lasting and awkward to overcome experimentally. 
Furthermore and very importantly the amount of trials that a person can endure is far 
smaller than with the visual or auditory senses. Testing the chemical senses is 
therefore a practically difficult, slow and messy affair. All this ultimately results in 
the chemical senses being largely ignored by mainstream psychology and hence the 
value of psychological understanding to industry has also been limited.
A gap in our understanding
While research on the chemical senses is relatively impoverished, general models of 
eating psychology have been developed over the years and innumerable factors have 
been identified as being involved in food choice. Numerous models exist either 
focusing on specific aspects of food choice or at a more integrated level (Shepherd &
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Raats 1996) reflecting the complex array of factors involved, including beliefs, 
expectations and attitudes. Ogden (2003) provides a straightforward model which she 
divides into three camps; psychophysiological, cognitive and developmental. This 
approach is not necessarily the most valid or explanatory approach but it is sufficient 
for our current purpose. Interested readers may wish to consult Sobal, Bisogni, 
Devine & Jastran, (2006), or Rozin (2006), for more in-depth coverage.
The psychophysiological approach focuses on the biological aspects of hunger and 
satiety and the role of neurotransmitters and hormones. This area of research has been 
highly finitful but, as already mentioned, suffers from issues of control. The research 
conducted on animals has greater levels of control. Research in this area has reliably 
shown a preference for sweet foods (Mattes and Mela, 1986), and preferences for 
creamy foods, such as the consumption of full fat milk (Pangbom, Bos and Stem, 
1985). However, Shepherd and Farleigh, (1986) point out that unfortunately research 
in this area (on humans) while finitful has also been rather equivocal and 
contradictory, due to differing measures of sensory attributes being employed and that 
while preferences are a useful proxy measure for sensory responses to foods it is 
conceivable that it is also related to many other non-controlled factors, such as satiety, 
and mood even the method of administration. A food could be evaluated considerably 
different in pleasantness based on how it is served and the environment in which it is 
being consumed.
The psychophysical approach also suffers from being primarily laboratory based (low 
ecological validity) and most often using animals, and it is questionable how well any
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conclusions can be transferred to human behaviour. Firstly our biology is 
considerably different to a rat or a pigeon, plus we are capable of complex cognition 
that is influenced by leaning and the environment. It could be argued that the quality 
and quantity of these factors in humans and non human animals is substantially 
different. These models ignore social and developmental factors, and over emphasise 
the role of hunger and satiety. It is difficult to believe that modem humans in the 
developed world are mainly driven by hunger and satiety feelings in their eating 
behaviour. We often ignore feelings of hunger to lose weight or overeat because we 
are bored or unhappy or just due to habit. For example, humans often eat because it is 
Tunchtime’ rather than any real hunger. Also it does not explain why a person would 
prefer a Big Mac over a standard regular burger, or why so many of us eat turkey at 
Christmas but far less throughout the rest of the year; despite the fact turkeys can be 
farmed and purchased throughout the year.
The psychophysiological approach also and somewhat surprisingly has ignored 
cognitive factors despite many theorists in other areas of research linking cognition to 
biology. One area where the psychophysiological approach has been very useful has 
been on studies of the pathway, fi"om the chemical senses and the sense organs 
through to relevant brain regions (Rolls, 2002). Some of this research shall be 
discussed later in Chapter Two. Other interesting research from the
psychophysiological approach is offered by Westerterp (2006), Pliner & Salvy (2006) 
and Gibson (2006a and 2006b). At the other end of the spectmm are
sociodevelopmental models. These models of eating psychology and food choice 
include such factors as exposure, social leaming and associative teaming. They 
emphasise the importance of leaming and exposure (Birch, 1989).
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The sociodevelopmetal perspective asks such questions as is it possible that exposure 
enables a person to know that a food is safe? Despite being omnivorous, children 
often show neophobia- avoidance of new foods. Neophobia has been shown to 
decrease with exposure, which is repeated tasting of a food. Preferences have also 
been linked to exposure. It is not difficult to see this as evolutionarily adaptive for an 
organism as eating something dangerous could be life threatening. It is important to 
remember that our chemical senses developed to allow us to react safely and 
adaptively to our environment. Taste evolved as a safety food detector to keep us safe 
and not as a tool to appreciate the subtleties of flavour of haute cuisine. The ability of 
a wine taster is most likely an acquired, learnt skill reflecting leaming as opposed to 
an innate ability, this ability is almost certainly a by-product of the system. Being 
exposed to a food and the ability to leam from the experience is presumably a key 
component of food choice, knowing what is safe and what is not, and what is pleasant 
and what is not.
Social leaming and associative leaming are also essential components to human food 
choice; it should not be surprising that children show preferences for foods eaten by 
their peers and family, such that Indian children show preferences for spicy foods 
before their European counterparts. Nor is it surprising that foods associated with 
rewards are preferred to those that are negatively associated (Ogden, 2003). Research 
in this tradition has on the whole been less contradictory than the psychophysiological 
research on humans. However much of this research has taken place in laboratories to 
provide higher levels of control and hence they potentially suffer a lack of ecological 
validity. While the models emphasise the ‘real world’ meaning and values associated
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with food, it has only recently been researched beyond the laboratory. These 
meaningfulness qualities include such factors as, power, sexuality, culture and the 
media. Interesting current work from this perspective include Reilly (2006), Caraher 
and Landon (2006), and Brown (2006).
The sociodevelopmental approaches have two main further limitations, they ignore 
the facts that children do seem to be bom with some prenatal instincts and preferences 
for certain tastes such as sweet (Desor, Mallor, and Tumer, 1973), salt (Denton, 
1982) and away from others such as bitter (Geldard, 1972). This line of evidence has 
been very well replicated and cannot be ignored. The other main caveat of 
developmental perspectives is that while they implicitly suggest a role for cognition 
the exact role is left unclear. It is therefore clear these developmental perspectives 
disregard the cognitive processing in a similar manner as the psychophysiological 
approaches.
The third batteries of models are cognitive; these include attitudes, social norms, 
perceived control and ambivalence (Ogden, 2003). These models have been largely 
influenced by such influential theories as the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and 
Ajzen, 1975) and theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985). These approaches are 
invaluable as they forge a link between the socio-developmental and the biological 
(Rozin, 2006). These approaches are neither biased against nativism (biology and 
instinct) or empiricism (experience and leaming). The cognitive approach forges links 
between biology and our psychosocial world and therefore is an important way 
forward. However these approaches do have their weaknesses. Research from this
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tradition has tended to assume that eating behaviour is a consequence of rational 
planned thinking, and ignore emotions such as the despair of being overweight, the 
misery of illness associated to obesity, of a bad body image or feelings of guilt from 
eating too much food, or the positive emotions of pleasure which must play a key role 
in our eating and food choice (Conner and Armitage, 2006). This bias to considering 
humans as rational agents is not surprising given the theories it is based on. 
Fortunately this caveat is well known.
Ogden (2003), also points out that cognitive models often can suffer tautologically 
such that independent variables do not seem to be clearly distinct from the dependant 
variables they are meant to predict e.g. T am confident I can eat finit and vegetables’ 
from T intend to eat fruit and vegetables’. As we will see, this issue will crop up again 
later.
Interestingly, the cognitive models have been also shown to be very poor predictors of 
behaviour. Again this is similar to the results on predictability of behaviour generally 
based on the theory of reasoned action and theory of planned behaviour (Conner & 
Armitage, 1998, Conner & Armitage, 2002.
All the cognitive approaches have focused on what can be called ‘complex 
cognitions’ relating to such things as beliefs and attitudes. Few have paid much, if 
any, attention to the basic cognitions: sensation, perception, attention and memory 
which form the bedrock of mainstream cognitive psychology. Ignoring the role of 
such basic cognitions seems rather short-sighted, as it fails to ask fundamental
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questions such as how do we sense foods, what are the sensory qualities of a food, 
how do we perceive and categorise foods, how do we leam to distinguish foods and 
develop our food preferences? Additionally how does our biology actually express 
itself at the level of functioning i.e. cognition? Where and how are our beliefs and 
attitudes, and preferences stored and processed? Are they subject to the same mles as 
those found elsewhere in cognitive psychology? To ignore the hasic cognitions is like 
building a house and not paying attention to the building materials being used, the sort 
of house that could be built from straw, wood or bricks would be very different from 
each other.
In combining all these models, biological through to the psycho-developmental the 
majority of factors are being taken into account. However the role of the basic 
cognitions, such as perception and memory, must be included to fully appreciate the 
psychology of eating.
From ancient times we have known that humans need to eat and that we eat with the 
mouth and that we defecate via the anus. The understanding of the anatomy and 
physiology involved in digestion required many hundreds of years of investigation. At 
this point in time we have a clear and accurate understanding of all steps involved in 
digestion from the first moments of ingestion, through all the stages of mixing and 
propulsion, digestion and absorption that take place before the final act of expulsion. 
In comparison the processes and anatomy involved in eating behaviour and food 
choice are despite researcher’s efforts far more mdimentarily understood. Of these, 
our knowledge of tasting (sensing) basic tastants is fairly adequate, so too, is our 
knowledge of the effect of diet and eating on other factors, such as health. Our
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knowledge of the intermediate processing is minimal; relativally little is known about 
perception, dramatically less about the role of attention or memory in eating 
behaviour. To understand digestion it was essential to fully understand physiological 
digestion, to understand the psychology of eating it is equally essential to understand 
the anatomy (structure) and processes (functioning) of the mind.
Understanding the roie of cognition in the psychoiogy of 
eating 
Aims
The purpose of this thesis is firstly to acknowledge that there is a massive gap in our 
understanding of the psychology of eating. This gap is at the cognitive level, 
specifically at the basic cognitive level, i.e. perception, attention, memory (language).
Secondly, the thesis aims to ascertain whether the evidence and theories of 
mainstream cognitive psychology are transferable to the psychology of eating and the 
chemical senses.
Focus
The focus of the thesis shall be at a basic cognitive level, investigating the cognitive 
processes involved in the psychology of eating. The majority of past research into the 
basic cognitions has focused at the level of sensation, as has been customary in 
psychophysics, and as such the thesis focus will go beyond sensation specifically at
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the level of perception and memory for foods. The main topic areas to be covered 
are:
Is there an effect of papillae density on the memory for tastants?
Is there a categorical perception effect?
Is the apparent ‘categorical perception’ effect primarily perceptual or does memory 
have a substantial role?
Is the traditional categorical perception effect sufficient an explanation or do shift 
towards prototype or perceptual magnet have something to offer?
Is there a prototype effect?
What happens to any possible categorical perception effect following a time delay?
Is there a levels of processing effect for tastants as there are for other modalities?
Structure
The thesis shall be presented in four sections.
Section One is a general introduction, where the aims, rationale and background 
literature will be discussed.
Section Two focuses primarily on whether there is a levels of processing effect for 
taste. Additionally Section Two presents the investigation into the role of papillae on 
taste memory. This section describes two experiments and their results, plus a brief 
discussion will also be presented.
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Section Three focuses on whether there is a categorical perception effect for taste. 
This section includes the description of three experiments and their results. A section 
summary will also be presented.
Section Four critically discusses the research presented within the thesis and its 
impact on filling the gap in our understanding of the cognitive, in eating behaviour. 
This will include theoretical issues and issues of methodology. The contribution to the 
subject area and a discussion of limitations will also be discussed. Suggestions for 
future research will also be presented here.
Chapter Two will provide an overview of the literature alluded to in this chapter. The 
chapter is the main literature review chapter of the thesis and presents the information 
relevant to understanding the psychology of eating beyond the level of sensation. 
Specifically the chemical senses will be introduced and the essentials of the biology 
presented including the taste pathways through the brain and the role of the tongue 
and the papillae that house the taste buds. Issues relating to perception and sensation 
will be introduced and the notion of categorical perception presented. The main 
discussion of the categorical perception literature will however be presented more 
conveniently in Section Three. The main emphasis of Chapter Two will focus on taste 
memory and specifically levels of processing. Methodological and theoretical issues 
will be considered also.
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Next I feel I should advice the reader on the ‘journey’ ahead. Many PhD’s focus on 
very clear differences in theory on easy to control and well understood stimuli such as 
categorical perception studies conducted on a computer on colour, or maybe 
comparing levels of processing and transfer appropriate processing for words, again 
presented with the invaluable aid of a computer. Such studies require a very focused 
and limited literature and much of the background behind it will be familiar to many 
psychologists. Similarly the methodologies will often be well established and if 
computer aided will allow for excellent control and fast and efficient data collection. 
Many trials on numerous stimuli can be tested within minutes with no more effort 
from the psychologist than placing the participant in front of the computer. Initially 
the focus of this thesis was to have been purely on memory for food and specifically 
the role of levels of processing. As soon as the second study was conducted it was 
clear that a change of direction was needed. This unfortunately required redirecting 
the PhD further, inevitably broadening it to its current state of a broader investigation 
of basic cognition in eating psychology. Firstly I could not assume the reader will be 
familiar with taste anatomy, physiology and pathways, nor could I assume the reader 
had much of knowledge of the psychology of eating as already stated these are not 
familiar to most psychologists. Those familiar with taste anatomy and levels of 
processing can skip ahead to Chapter Four. The main points of the next chapters will 
be introducing levels of processing (theory and framework for methodology) and the 
anatomy and physiology of taste and flavour. By the end of chapters Five and Six it 
will be clear that a change of research direction was required. This will require us to 
leave behind levels of processing, and onto exploring another issue of basic cognition: 
categorical perception.
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I hope that with the above ‘signposts’ and directions provided, it should make the 
reader feel more prepared for the journey ahead and an easier ride following the 
‘golden thread’ of my investigations. I say a ‘brave journey’ as this thesis is not 
simply limited to one or two issues of levels of processing or categorical perception. It 
is about exploring the almost undiscovered realm of basic cognitive psychology in the 
world of Taste. This journey will require a considerable amount of literature. It will 
also utilise methods and theorises previously never used in this area. Along the way I 
can promise the reader some unexpected failures of well established theories 
(developed within the primary senses of sign and hearing) in this new area of taste. 
Furthermore other effects found with the primary senses will be established as 
phenomena in this new domain.
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Chapter Two: Beyond Sensation
In Chapter One, three main theoretical perspectives were presented relating to the 
psychology of eating: biological, cognitive and socio-developmental. It was 
highlighted that that there is a substantial gap in the understanding of the psychology 
of eating. This gap is found to be most pronounced at the cognitive level, which to 
date has focused on complex cognition such as attitudes and beliefs. The gap relates 
to the absence of an understanding of the role of the basic cognitions. While taste 
sensation is relatively well understood, our understanding of taste perception is still 
rather incomplete and our understanding of the role of memory is largely nonexistent. 
To fully understand the psychology of eating a bio-psycho-social approach must be 
employed. This thesis will focus at the basic cognitive level.
To understand the work presented herein, it is essential to have an understanding of 
the basics of the anatomy of taste (and smell) and its role in taste sensation and 
perception. Following this, perception will be discussed and the idea of categorical 
perception will be briefly introduced (a more thorough coverage will be presented in 
section three). Subsequently taste memory will be discussed. Beyond this a review of 
the levels of processing literature will be presented. The levels of processing 
framework is one of the most successful memory theories and methods around for 
studying memory.
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Anatomy and physiology
Bear, Connors and Paradiso (2006) point out that life on earth was conceived in the 
primordial seas- a soup of noxious and necessary chemicals. Some of these chemicals 
acted as signals for food, power, sex and even death (in the form of poisons). Three 
point eight five billion years on (or there about) we still use our chemical senses in a 
similar way, although undoubtedly altered by social factors and environment. It would 
be wrong to assume our chemical senses evolved to appreciate Nouvelle cuisine but it 
is clear they developed to aid our survival; identifying foods full of energy and 
necessary salts and avoidance from poisons (often bitter tasting).
Our chemical senses along with most of the animal kingdom, include the tongue and 
the nose. The ability of the tongue and the oral cavity to sense, are strictly called the 
gustatory sense; that is they are involved in taste. The nose detects odours and is the 
smell (olfactory) organ. What we think of as ‘taste’ is technically defined as ‘flavour’ 
i.e. the combined perception of a food or drink perceived using sensory information 
both from the nose and tongue. If the nose is blocked experimentally or due to illness 
we often lose our ability to appreciate flavour. If a person is blindfolded and has their 
nose blocked an apple and an onion becomes indistinguishable (Logue, 2004). The 
studies presented in Section Two and Three, all strictly relate to flavour, the combined 
representation of taste and smell stimuli and not just taste alone. This is because 
normal tasting involves both the tongue and the nose and is strictly flavour and not 
taste. Despite this the term ‘tasting’ will be used as it is in everyday language and the 
terms ‘flavour’ and ‘taste’ may be used interchangeably. When it is important to 
clarify which one is meant the correct term will be used.
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The taste organs and papillae power
We commonly believe that we taste with our tongue, this is only partially true, other 
areas of the oral cavity including the palate, pharynx and epiglottis are also involved 
(Figure 2.1).
MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
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Odour from the food we eat flows through the pharynx into the nasal cavity, or 
directly via the nasal passage. There the odour chemicals can then be detected by 
olfactory detectors. The surface of the tongue is sensitive to all basic tastes; however 
some areas are especially equipped to detect certain tastes, sweet at the front, bitter at 
the back, sour and salt along the sides. The dorsal surface of the tongue is covered like 
a cobbled street with little bumps or papillae (Figure 2.2). These include foliate 
papillae (formed in ridges), vallate papillae, shaped like pimples, or fungiform 
mushroom like (Bear et al. 2006).
MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
These papillae contain the taste buds that contain the taste cells. Duffy, Davidson, 
Kidd, Kidd,, Speed, Pakstis, Reed, Snyder, and Bartoshuk (2004), amongst others has
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shown that people with few taste buds are ‘non tasters’ and people with many are 
‘supertasters’, ‘the first living in a pastel world of taste and the latter living in a neon 
world of taste’. It is therefore clear everyone has a unique taste perception and that 
individual differences abound. We should not forget that food perception is not only 
achieved via the chemical senses. Other factors such as sound, such as the ‘crispiness’ 
sound of crisps or the sight of a food also dramatically influence our taste perception 
(Sekuler and Blake, 1994).
The brain's control of eating
Anand and Brobeck (1951) report that from the beginning of the twentieth century it 
has become clear those patients with damaged brains, particularly along the anterior 
ventral surface, demonstrated unusual eating habits and changes in body weight. Later 
the ventromedial hypothalamus was specifically implicated, bilateral lesions led to 
hyperphagia (overeating) and subsequently obesity in non human animals (Grossman, 
1973). Additionally Anand and Brobeck (1951) showed that bilateral damage in the 
lateral hypothalamus can have the opposite effects. This resulted in a dual centre 
hypothesis of eating behaviour. However it quickly became apparent that the 
ventomedial hypothalamus was not a satiety centre per se, but rather only part of the 
system that regulates the levels of hormones such as insulin, which has been 
demonstrated to have an effect on body weight (Rolls, 1999, Tortora & Grabowski, 
2003).
Rolls (1994) reports that when the research into the lateral hypothalamus was 
followed up and fine tuned, it was noted that nearby fibres were also damaged such as
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the domiimergic nigro-striatal bundle. When these pathways were damaged it leads to 
both sensory and motor deficits. This is due to impairment in the normal functioning 
of the basal ganglia (globus pallidus and striatum) which involve and control 
movement and actions (Bear et al, 2006). However newer research using neurotoxins 
such as ibotenic acid or N-methyl-D-asparate have been utilised to lesion the lateral 
hypothalamus without damaging proximal fibres. This research shows that it does 
have an effect on food intake. The evidence has thus mounted up, that the 
hypothalamus plays a significant role in eating and body weight Marshall, J.F., 
Richardson, J.S. and Teitelbaum (1974). However it is less clear what the ‘exact’ 
role of the organ is. Improvements in single cell methods (in the 1980s and 1990s) 
within and around the vicinity of the hypothalamus would reveal more light on the 
matter. This work has largely been conducted on primates as their neural circuits are 
most akin to our own (Rolls, 1999).
A considerable amount of the attention on the neural activity during eating has 
continued to be focused on the hypothalamus. Rolls (1999) reports that some neurons 
within the lateral hypothalamus respond to the sight and /or taste of foods. Some 
neurons respond only to taste alone (4.3%), some to the sight of food (11.8%), with 
(2.5%) responding to both sight and taste signals. This clearly demonstrates that food 
perception is mutltisensory, and that just studying taste is not sufficient. Further 
studies have looked at the effect of hunger. One example of this is that monkeys fed 
to satiety on a glucose drink become satiated, but this satiety did not extend to other 
foods which the monkeys were still happy to consume (Rolls, 1986). Rolls 
investigated whether hunger modulates neural responses in parts of the visual system 
(which provides the the hypothalamus with visual based information), by measuring
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the activity of neurons in the visual inferior temporal lobes. It was shown that the 
neural responses to visual stimuli were not dependent on hunger nor were the 
responses of an initial collection of neurons in the amygdala, which connects the 
inferior cortex to the hypothalamus. However, in the orbitoffontal cortex (which 
receive information from the inferior temporal visual cortex and from there projects 
to the hypothalamus), neurons with visual responses to food were found and these 
were modulated by hunger and satiety levels. Thus, for the visual modality’s role in 
eating, neural responsiveness only enter the processing at a late stage of sensory 
processing and in the hypothalamus have been modulated by hunger. The activity 
generated by tastants will be discussed shortly.
Rolls (2005) report that the response of hypothalamic neurons in primates to the 
visual presentation of foods seems to be a product of learning and development. 
Experiments show that when a stimulus is paired with eating (such as Pavlov’s classic 
work), neural activity will occur even to novel stimuli such as a food syringe (which 
could not have been pre-programmed by evolution), when the food is then presented 
without the syringe the learning will become extinguished and no longer elicit a 
neural reaction. This suggests that the hypothalamus has a role in the reward value 
processing of a stimulus. This is advantageous as it will allow an organism to 
associate environmental stimuli that are linked to pleasant and nutritious foods (Rolls, 
2005, 2006). It is most likely these neurons that became activated in Pavlov’s famous 
dogs.
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The sense of taste is served by cranial nerves VII, DC, and X. These feed into the 
geniculate ganglion (Tortora & Grabowski, 2003). These axons then bond to the brain 
stem in the nervus intermedins and circle caudally in the solitary tract. The facial 
nerve fibres in the fasiculus are fixed more caudally by gustatory axons form the 
vagus and glossopharyngeal nerves. All fibres then end in the soliatary nucleus 
(Rolls, 2006). Fibres from the gustatory nucleus run rostrally in the ipsolateral central 
tract through the mid brain and subthalamic structures to their site of termination in 
the ventral posterior nucleus of the thalamus. This then projects to the taste cortex of 
the insula and frontal operculum. The whole central pathway for taste is completely 
ipsilateral, (Tortora and Grabowski (2003), Bear MF, Connors B, Paradiso MA 
(2006). A very simplified diagram of this pathway is illustrated in Figure 2.3
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MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
Bear, Conner and Paradiso (2001) point out the neurons of the olfactory bulb supply 
the sense of smell. Their axons fonn the olfactory tract. This follows the ventral face 
of the fontal lobes and tenninates in the olfactory trigone, rostral to the anterior 
perforated substance (Rolls, 2006). The majority of the axons of the olfactory tract 
follow the lateral olfactory stria and terminate in the lateral olfactory area within the 
uncus, entorhinal, limen insulae and corticmedial nucleus of the amygdaloid body
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(Rolls, 2005). The regions in which the fibres of the olfactory track terminate are 
attached directly and indirectly, with the prefrontal cortex, limbic system and 
hypothalamus, along with the reticular activation system and brain stem (Rolls, 2005).
Rolls (2006) has been able to compile the literature on the biology of taste, based on 
neurophysiological recordings from monkeys along with human brain scan data to 
produce an interesting schematic of the brain mechanisms underlying flavour and 
appetite. His model is purely biopsychological. The schematic involves taste, and 
olfactory inputs along with touch (oral texture) and vision. Rolls (2005, 2006) 
provides a comprehensive description of these pathways, which is illustrated in Figure 
2.4.
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MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
To appreciate eating psychology it is crucial to understand the neural mechanisms that 
underlie it, both in terms of the anatomy and functioning. For our current purpose 
however it is only important to have a general idea of what has been discovered. The 
interested reader may wish to refer to Rolls (2006) for more detail. Rolls conclude 
with the following main points: The reward value of a food, and its related subjective 
component, the ‘affective pleasantness’ of food, is decoded in people (and other non 
human apes), only following a number of levels of preceding processing (Rolls and 
Eysenck, 1998). Firstly, the representation is identified and its intensity is processed. 
It is at a later stage in the orbitoffontal cortex that the reward value is made clear and 
added to the representation. Also in the orbitoffontal region satiety signals have been
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found to modulate the response to both taste and flavour (Rolls, 2006). Essentially 
the pathway reveals different stages or levels of processing; from simple perceptual to 
what could be called deeper levels of hedonic appreciation Thus Rolls argues the 
regulation of the consuming of food. The reward value is only represented in specific 
brain areas and these occur after basic sensory analysis. The orbitofrontal cortex is 
where multimodal representations are constructed which has been shown to include 
taste, olfactory, oral texture/touch and visual inputs. The signals of satiety are 
complex, and include sensory specific satiety (such as for sweet or salt), this is 
worked out in the orbitofrontal cortex and include inputs from gastric distension 
sensors , plasma glucose levels and levels of leptin and insulin, (Rolls, 1999).
Rolls (2005), reports that representations of the texture and taste of foods have been 
discovered in monkeys and other primates including humans. The primate 
orbitofrontal cortex is more attuned to the changing affective value (pleasantness) of 
food than the amygdala (which was first shown by Sanghera, Rolls, Roper-Hall, 
1979) in that the orbitofrontal cortex demonstrates responses that reduce to zero as the 
reward reduces to zero, as satiety is reached. The orbitofrontal cortex is also likely to 
be influenced by stimulus -reinforcer learning (Rolls and Eysenck, 1998).
The hedonic, pleasantness (liking) value of a smell and taste are processed in regions 
proximal to those that process emotions (Rolls and Eysenck, 1998). Rolls (1995, 
2005) defines emotions as the ‘states elicited by a reward or punisher and that taste 
and olfactory stimuli are stimuli that can be rewarding or punishing’. Francis, Rolls, 
Bowtell, McGlone, O’Doherty, Browning, Clare, and Smith (1999) have shown that
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the orbitofrontal cortex plays a key role in emotion in that it represents some unlearnt 
rewards and punishers and that it can learn the associations between neutral stimuli 
and reinforcers and therefore is an indispensable component in emotional learning 
(Rolls, 2006). Gibson (2006a, 2006b) covers the issue of mood, emotions and food 
choice in more detail than is required here, additionally Yeomans’ (2006) discussion 
on the role of learning is very interesting.
The orbito frontal cortex has been shown to have outputs that reach the striatum, 
cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Rolls and Eysenck, 1998). Where 
behavioural responses to foods may be generated as these areas are known to be 
involved in goal generation (Rolls, 2005). Additionally outputs from the amygdala 
and orbitofrontal cortex, via the hypothalamus may be involved in the control of the 
hormonal response to foods and eating (Rolls, 2006).
The biological evidence delivered to us by psycho -physiological recording and 
scanning has started to illuminate the biological mechanisms involved in eating. The 
research has provided a clear understanding of the basic processing involved and the 
order in which representations are constructed and what brain structures are involved 
in the process. What is clear and important to us is that basic sensory processing 
occurs before any hedonic value of pleasantness is added. Similarly satiety feelings 
only enter the processing fairly late. This makes intuitive sense, as we do not become 
taste blind after eating too much, all that happens is that the hedonic response is 
reduced or potentially reversed, i.e. the food becomes less appealing and pleasant so 
we do not wish to carry on eating. The food representation is built on multimodal
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information, taste plus olfaction creating flavour, but also texture and visual 
information is also involved in the complete representation. A full understanding of 
eating psychology must take into account all of these sensory inputs. Additionally it 
is clear that the processing can be modified by experience and learning but this occurs 
after basic processing has occurred.
Sensation and perception
An amateur philosopher and keen physicist by the name of Gustav Theodor Fechner 
was the first person to formalise research into perception and sensation in his new 
science of psychophysics (Eysenck, 1998). The majority of his work was on vision on 
hearing. Since Fechner the interest in sensation and perception has continued, but 
with a continued lack of curiosity about the chemical senses. This lack of interest has 
not been complete however. A substantial amount of research has been conducted into 
taste and smell but relatively less than for the other senses. One of the main areas of 
research was to classify the basic tastes, in the same way colour had been, such as, 
red, green, blue, yellow. Aristotle believed there were seven basic tastes, sweet, salt, 
bitter and sour, plus pungent, harsh, and astringent.
Bartoshuk, Murphy, Cleveland, C.T., (1978) points out that this list has since been 
extended and contracted numerous times, for example viscosity and fatty have been 
added by some researchers. Henning (1916) was the first to classify the basic tastes 
and odours in a way similar to the colour wheel. Hennings placed sweet, salt, sour and 
bitter within a taste tetrahedron space, with each taste quality being assigned a comer. 
This method was akin to the geometric arrangements of colours in the colour wheel. 
Since Hennings time the classification of the basic tastes and whether they can be
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‘atomised’ as clear and distinct categories of tastes has been a matter of much debate 
and disagreement. Schiffinan and Erikson (1980), for example, strongly disagree with 
the idea that the basic tastes can be fully distinguished and separated. Despite this 
many researchers still hold onto the idea of taste primaries at least for pragmatic 
reasons if nothing else. Additionally almost all text books include the basic tastes as 
sweet, sour, salt and bitter as their starting point in their coverage of taste. Most also 
now include the basic taste umami. Bear, Conner and Paradiso (2001) provides a good 
coverage of the basic tastes including umami, and describe evidence about the 
different processing that seems to be involved with each taste at the level of the 
tongue. This includes evidence that different areas of the tongue seem to be better 
adapted at detecting certain tastes at lower intensity levels.
Collings (1974) showed the tongue was selectively attuned to different basic tastes. 
Since Collings, research interested in taste sensitivity has continued. Of the four basic 
tastes, research shows that people can detect bitter at even lower levels than the other 
three basic tastes. This is not surprising as already mentioned poisonous foods often 
taste bitter. Ability to avoid poisons is thus evolutionarily adaptive. However 
Bartoshuk,. (2000) reiterated her previous reports, that it has been demonstrated that 
some people are weak at identifying bitter tastes. Phenylothiocarbamide (PTC) tastes 
bitter to about two thirds of people, but to one third it can not be tasted. The same is 
true of other bitter chemicals including propylthiouracil (abbreviated to PROP). 
Research shows that the ability to taste these bitter chemicals is inherited and thus 
genetic (Sekuler and Blake, 1994). Individuals who are unable to taste bitter (non 
tasters) have two recessive genes for this trait compared to tasters who have one or 
more dominant genes. Neither PROP nor PTC are commonly found in foods, so the
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ability to detect them seemed at first to many to be largely inconsequential. Linda 
Bartoshuk and colleagues however have shown that the people who are insensitive to 
PROP are also insensitive to the bitterness in real food. One example by Miller and 
Bartoshuk (1991) illustrates this. Saccharin (an ingredient in many diet soft drinks) 
and caffeine (one of the bitter components of coffee) were detected by tasters but not 
by non-tasters. Additionally the caffeine in a cup of coffee is not perceived as bitter 
by non-tasters, although it is by tasters (Hall, Bartoshuk, Cain, and Stevens, 1975). 
Additionally differences have been found between tasters and non tasters in terms of 
the number of papillae they have on their tongues. There is no disagreement that the 
number of papillae people have (and therefore tastebuds) can vary considerably. 
Numbers of taste buds typically vary between 2000 and 5000, some people (the non 
tasters) can have as few as 500 (Bear et al, 2006). More controversial is the research 
that shows that tasters and non tasters eat different foods and their hedonic responses 
are different. Generally, tasters are more finicky about their food preferences, 
expressing dislike for numerous foods. Anliker, Bartoshuk, Ferris and Hook (1991) 
summarised this research to find that adults with normal bitter sensitivity tend to 
avoid certain strong tasting foods, strong blue cheese, spinach, turnips and sauerkraut. 
Anliker and her colleagues also made observations on the preferences made by 
children aged five to seven years and found the same results. It is thus clear that 
alongside social, moral and cultural influences our genetics have an effect on our food 
preferences (Atkins and Bowler 2001, Ogden 2003, Rozin, 1990). Additionally 
Bartoshuk amongst others has shown that smokers and heavy drinkers tend to be non­
tasters with few papillae. These papillae could have been killed off by the toxins in 
drink and smoke but they show the characteristic recessive genes of the non-tasters. 
This shows that the number of papillae (as an expression of the genes i.e phenotype)
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may have an effect beyond hedonics and have an influence on health too (Bartoshuk, 
Duffy, Chapo, Fast, Yiee, Hoffman, Ko, and Snyder, 2004). The influence on health 
due to papillae related food consumption will not be discussed here.
One of the areas of work on tasters and non tasters which has not been investigated so 
far is whether people who are perceiving taste differently also have different memory 
for foods. Could it be that people who are perceptually stronger also can also 
remember more about the food they tasted?
The research starting from the work on the basic tastes through to the work on 
papillae and tasters and non-tasters has revealed many interesting results and as many 
as yet unanswered questions. The theoretical questions and debates involved in the 
chemical senses have mirrored those of the dominant senses. Such issues have 
involved control versus ecological validity. It is one thing to test a stimulus in the 
laboratory, but it does not mean that the results will extend to the real world. The 
research on PROP for example was an interesting curiosity until it was applied to real 
foods and people’s perception and hedonic ‘perception’ of them. Additionally while 
the ‘fundemental’ research on the basic tastes is interesting, research using real world 
stimuli, real food and drinks (and not salt and sugar solutions that characterise much 
of the research) will provide interesting and in someway more practically useful 
information. However, unlike general perception research, research in the chemical 
senses cannot make use of computers to exercise control in their experiments.
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One interesting area of research in perception relates to categorisation and categorical 
perception, can blue and green really be ‘atomised’ into two distinct colours and what 
happens at the boundary between the colours? The colours are categorically divided 
but the underlying wavelength continuum is just that, a continuum. This has resulted 
in a considerable amount of research into the issue of categorical perception. Are two 
items within a category more difficult to distinguish than two items equally different 
across a category boundary? That is to say are two blues harder to distinguish than a 
blue and a green? If this work was expanded into the world of taste we could ask is 
there a categorical perception effect for taste. We could either investigate the basic 
tastes or focus on real stimuli. As we have seen there is still disagreement as to the 
basic tastes and also investigating real stimuli is more ecologically valid and 
potentially more interesting. The issue of categorical perception will be discussed in 
more detail in Section Three.
So far the role of anatomy and biology in eating has been discussed. The 
neuroanatomy has started revealing many important insights, about which brain 
structures are involved and the order of processing. It is clear that the insula and 
orbitofi*ontal structures are involved, the processing involves information that is 
sensory multimodal and that the emotional centres are also involved. It has been 
clearly shown that basic sensory processing of a stimulus ‘surface’ characteristics are 
processed before a hedonic ‘pleasantness’ value is added. Hedonics is influenced by 
satiety and this is specific, that is to say even after a very filling savoury meal we can 
still enjoy a sweet dessert. Genetics have been shown to express themselves as the 
phenotype of papillae number and taste sensitivity. Those with fewer cannot always 
taste foods as effectively, especially for bitter qualities. This also relates to eating
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habits and a person’s food preferences. Super tasters can be finicky about food, while 
non-tasters are not.
Sensation and perception is not the same for everyone. This has largely been 
explained by papillae numbers. And a person’s hedonic appreciation can be very 
individual too. Early research established the concept of elemental basic tastes that 
can be easily categorised. The best established has been sweet, salt, sour and bitter. 
The validity of these basic taste categories is still a matter of debate. While interest in 
the basic tastes is important it is also important to understand how real foods are 
perceived, as people do not normally consume pure salt drinks or pure glucose drinks. 
People instead consume complex multifaceted foods. Researchers in the dominant 
senses have been researching how sensory stimuli are categorised and whether there 
are categorical perception effects. So far this has not been conducted on the chemical 
senses.
Going beyond biology and sensation and perception we enter largely non explored 
territory. The role of memory in the psychology of eating is almost a complete 
mystery. Compared to the dominant senses (sometimes called the far senses due to 
their ability to detect at distance) the chemical senses (the near senses, as we can only 
taste what is in our mouths and smell what is relatively nearby) our understanding of 
their related memory is very weak.
In terms of the psychology of eating there are at least two forms of memory which 
need to be understood. The first is memory for a food at a sensory input, the other is
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for a food as a brand which would include higher order representations and is 
presumably more complex involving more top down processing, including branding, 
and context. The memory associated with an apple is presumably less elaborate than 
the memory of a branded food such as a Mcdonald’s Big Mac burger or a context 
related food such as Christmas dinner or a birthday cake. The level or type of 
processing is therefore likely to be different.
The purpose of this thesis is to gain further insights into the role of cognition in 
eating. The basic cognition least researched is arguably memory. The small amount 
of literature in this area will now be discussed.
The role of memory in the psychology of eating
Both smells and tastes seem to have a special ability to elicit past memories, and we 
unquestionably must have a memory for food and its reward/hedonic value. If we did 
not every time we saw an apple we would not know it was an apple nor that it is 
edible and whether or not we enjoy it. Similarly we must have a memory that tells us 
that a stone is not food and would not be pleasant to eat. Somehow or another 
memory must also be learnt. The few people interested in this area of research are 
also aware of the importance of an ‘adaptive unconscious’ which is believed to be 
responsible for the majority of behaviour. After all we rarely consciously process 
what we are consuming, we just do it. Additionally when required to consciously 
process what we taste many people find it very difficult. Research into food memory 
needs to therefore make use of implicit not explicit memory tests, to access this 
unconscious processing (Mojet and Koster, 2005).
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Dijkster, Mojet, Koster, Moller, Hausner, Issanchou, Sulmont-Rose and Zandstra 
(2006) questioned how food memory functions in real life. Do the same mechanisms 
responsible in encoding odours, tastes and textures occur as when encoding pictures 
or words? Dijkster et al. (2006) highlight five main assumptions that have been 
generated from the research so far. Firstly in everyday experience where people are 
not required to consciously process what they taste and have no intention to learn, 
implicit memory processing must be engaged. Secondly in normal day to day life 
explicit recall and recognition of foods is not needed. This is likely to be the reason 
why training of food expertise takes so long. Thirdly we must have a substantial 
reservoir of knowledge about food but it remains implicit and unconscious, only 
surfacing when something is wrong with our food, resulting in the common feeling of 
a food tasting clearly ‘a bit funny’ yet not easy to explain why. Fourthly at least for 
the near senses memory is focused at detecting change rather than on precise 
recognition and identification as found with the far senses such as with visually 
presented pictures. Finally food is ‘omni-present’ in our experiences and in the 
situational meaning .. .we give our surroundings’ (Dijkster et al, 2006).
Some of the earliest research focused on whether memory for foods (tastes, flavour 
and texture) were encoded and stored in the same manner as words and objects. In 
these studies the same methods were implemented. The participants were invited 
along to the laboratory under the charade of taking part in another study, and are 
offered a meal supposedly as a gesture of good will. This meal comprises a number 
of target items that will later be tested for in a memory task, despite participants never 
being told to pay any attention to the meal. These targets in the recognition test then
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have to be distinguished from distracters. Two memory measures were employed; an 
absolute measure, whether they would identify whether the item was the same as the 
target in the meal and secondly whether the item differed from that previously tasted 
in terms of surface sensory qualities and liking/hedonics, this being a relative 
measure. Key studies to use this method include Koster, Prescott and Koster (2004), 
Mojet and Koster (2002, 2005), Sulmont-Rosse, Issanchou and Koster (2003).
From these studies some tentative conclusions were reached (Dijksterhuis 2006). 
People remember spontaneously and the memory and learning is incidental for 
flavour, texture and taste. This occurs even if a person is unaware that they have 
learnt something. The memory and learning is not equivalent for all sensory qualities 
and depends on the food item being tasted. As an example memory is comparatively 
poor for fat and sweet tastes, but is close to 100% for viscosity, crispness and bitter. 
Additionally memory for some surface attributes such as flavour, sourness and 
sweetness can vary between products. That is to say difference in the crispiness of 
crisps is important but the relative crispness of a biscuit is less important. Similarly 
the memory for acidity is better in yogurt than cream cheese. This suggests that 
tolerances for sensory deviation are determined by the consumer’s perceptual ability 
plus their memory/salience for product attributes. A cola fan would be more acutely 
attuned to their favourite cola than a person who only occasionally drinks cola.
Memory for food is not about precise recognition but is rather about change detection. 
In all the studies above correct rejection of distractors contribute the majority to the 
associated memory profile, whereas hits (correct identification of target) never
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surpassed chance. Furthermore when participants were requested to specify how sure 
they were of their negative or positive response at the recognition stage of the trial, 
they were always more certain that they had not tasted something than that they had. 
This suggests that recollection of flavour, taste and oral textures does not appear to be 
evolved for feature detection as found with the far senses.
Similar findings have been found with the other chemical sense, smell (Degel and 
Koster, 1999). Here participants were exposed to unnoticeable levels of odorants in a 
variety of rooms and then asked to associate smells with the rooms. This shows the 
memory and learning is unintentional and implicit. This effect was only shown when 
participants could not verbally label the odour, indicating that odour memory and 
verbal memory are likely to be distinct.
So far the research into the role of basic cognition has been very limited and when it 
comes to memory there is very little research. The research which has been 
performed has to date largely been exploratory. There has been little in the way of 
research that has been theory driven, or even closely related to any of the main 
conceptual models of memory. Applying a pre-existing model to a new area of 
research has the benefits of enabling the transfer of existing knowledge and methods 
which can only be beneficial. Do the findings for other modalities apply to taste? Can 
the methods used with the other senses and general memory research be applied to 
taste? With our interest in the role of memory in eating it would be foolish not to 
leam from both the history and current thinking of memory. This review will 
introduce one of the main memory theories levels of processing.
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Boring (1950) pointed out that the history of psychology is bulging with examples of 
the frictions stuck between structural and functional/action orientated accounts of 
mental phenomena. Initially there was the structural approach of phrenology, 
followed the cognitive revolution, many theorists continued in the structuralist 
tradition compartmentalizing mental processes in flow charts and box and arrow 
diagrams. However for nearly every structural approach there was a counter ‘action 
based’ processing account. For example the act psychologists in Germany, who 
followed the tradition of the Philosopher Brentano proposed that to understand the 
mind it was essential to understood it as an active entity. Similarly the famous 
William James advocated for a more action-orientated approach to the study of 
psychology. It is within this tradition that the levels of processing framework resides. 
Craik and Lockhart’s (1972) original paper contributed to emphasising the role of 
mental processing, or the activities of the mind. Craik and Lockhart viewed their 
theory as opposing the ‘boxes in the head’ information perspectives of the 1960s 
(Craik, 2002).
During the 1970s Morris, Bransford and Franks (1977) and Bransford Franks, Morris 
and Stein (1979) proposed the notion of transfer appropriate processing (TAP). This 
phenomenon and theory is the uneasy bedfellow of levels of processing, TAP 
emphasised processing in the way levels of processing does but instead of focusing on 
the issue of depth of processing, Morris and collaborators focused on the interactions 
between encoding and retrieval and whether the initial encoding was transfer 
appropriate to the method of retrieval. Transfer appropriate processing considers the 
types of processing during encoding as not inherently deep or shallow (or bad or
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good) for subsequent retention. To a certain extent it depends more on the demands 
on the retrieval environmental cues (Kolers & Roediger, 1984).
Theory in mind: the origins of memory theories
The last century was dominated by three main memory models, Atkinson and 
Shiffrin’s multi-store model, Baddeley (1981), Baddeley and Hitch (1974) working 
memory model and Craik and Lockhart’s (1972) levels of processing. The first theory 
being Atkinson and Shiffrin’s (1968, 71) multi-store model. Their model emphasises 
three separate architectural units, a sensory memory, short term memory and finally 
long term memory. The model also emphasised the role of rehearsal of material so 
that it could be stored long term. The model was overly simplistic; however it was an 
excellent starting point. By the end of the century Baddeley (1990) and Hitch and 
Baddeley (1986) had developed short term memory into the working memory model, 
comprising the well known central executive and two slave systems, an auditory and 
visual one. By the start of this thesis, the working memory model had become well 
established however the central executive is still poorly understood, in fact Baddeley 
and Hitch (2002) and Baddeley (2006) has openly admitted the central executive is 
the least well understood component of the Baddeley and Hitch model. Additionally 
the model does not include any slave systems for taste and smell either as separate 
entities or as a combined chemical sense slave unit. To use the working memory 
model would therefore prove troublesome as a starting point with the work at hand.
The other approach was conceived by Craik and Lockhart (1972). It has become one 
of the most influential theories/frameworks. Since then it has undergone considerable
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development and was updated recently (Lockhart and Craik, 1990). This update as 
mentioned took into account transfer appropriate processing as suggested by Morris et 
al. (1977). By 2002, another decade on, even more research had been conducted and 
the journal Memory published a special issue titled ‘Levels of processing 30 years on’. 
This special issue includes many reviews and the most up to date interpretations and 
criticism of the framework available at the start of this PhD. Many of the key points in 
that special issue amongst others will be covered shortly. This was the backdrop to 
this project which was started in 2003 and was influenced by the concurrent interests 
in LOP. The critically re-evaluated levels of processing was considered an ideal 
approach both theoretically and methodologically to the study of memory for taste. 
The levels of processing framework will now be presented in more detail taking into 
account its key assumptions, and the developments of the model including its 
weaknesses.
Levels of processing (LOP)
Craik (2002) in hindsight considers one of the major contributions of the levels of 
processing (LOP) paper was to underline the proposal of remembering as 
‘processing’, as a functional activity of the mind. This is in contrast to a structural 
thing or entity. Despite this they were strongly motivated by the studies on selective 
attention conducted by Broadbent (1958) and Treisman (1964, 1979). Treisman 
postulated that perceptual processing could be conceptualised as a hierarchy of ‘levels 
of analysis’ flowing from early sensory processing through to analysis that could be 
considered ‘deeper’ such as the identification and the meaning related to the stimulus 
being processed. From this work it seemed likely that the longevity and strength of
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the recollection of the stimulus, in addition to its qualitative nature would depend on 
its depth or level of analysing in the proposed hierarchy of analyses.
One interesting study, conducted by Hyde and Jenkins (1973), developed an 
incidental memory task (memory without intention to learn is most likely the way we 
leam food tastes) involving sorting words that were either related in meaning or not. 
Different groups then had to either rate the words for pleasantness/liking (a hedonic 
measure) or estimate the frequency the word appears in the English language or detect 
the occurrence of the letters ‘e’ and ‘g’ in the word lists or decide on the part of 
speech appropriate for the words or finally decide whether the list words fitted 
sentences. Hyde and Jenkins (1973) showed that rating of pleasantness and rating 
frequency of usage both led to the words being best remembered presumably due to 
involvement of semantic processing (processing for meaning) while the other three 
tasks when followed by a memory test showed poor memory. This clearly suggests 
that there must be something special about the way something is processed in terms of 
the likelihood it will be remembered.
Craik and Lockhart (1972) postulated a solution to such findings as would start being 
found by Hyde and Jenkins amongst others. They proposed that the depth of levels of 
processing was (Craik 1973, p. 48) determined by ‘the meaningfulness extracted 
from the stimulus rather than ... the number of analyses performed upon it.”
The main tennets of the model as presented in 1972 were:
The deeper the levels of analysis involved produce longer and more elaborate, and 
generally stronger memory traces than those produced by shallow processing.
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The depth of processing has a big effect on the memorabilty of an item. Shallow 
processing involves processing of surface characteristics such as shape or colour 
while depth involves semantic including hedonic assessments such as those in the 
Jenkins and Hyde study.
For the purpose of this thesis it is these two points that need to be remembered most; 
later developments to the model while making it stronger also made it more 
cumbersome.
Another study by Craik and Tulving (1975) similarly to Jenkins and Hyde (1973) 
involved words being presented, processed in the light of orientating questions (e.g., 
“does the word rhyme with train?”, “is the word a type of flower?”). These questions 
had the purpose of manipulating the level of depth of processing the subjects engaged 
in. afterwards unanticipated memory tasks were used demonstrating that the amount 
of subsequent recollection varied considerably (e.g., between 0.14 and 0.96: Craik & 
Tulving, 1975, Experiment 1.) This appeared to be simply a function of the type of 
question asked. This was a clear indication of a levels of processing effect. At this 
time Craik believed the concept of levels as literal, believing that the cognitive 
processing was terminated at different depths of perceptual-conceptual analysis 
(Craik, 2002).
Furthermore an unforeseen outcome was found, words that were not congruently 
matching (e.g. “rhymes with Spain?” TIGER: “a type of flower?” CHAIR) were not 
well remembered. However congruently matching words with their orientation 
question (e.g., “rhymes with Spain?” TRAIN; “a type of flower?” DAISY) were
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better encoded and recognised (Craik, 2002). This suggested that congruent question- 
word combinations bear more elaborate and rich encoding, and that richer encoding 
supported better recollection. This begged the question why should superior trace 
elaboration maintain retention? Two possibilities have been put forward. First 
elaborate record are more incorporated with organised knowledge structures. This in 
turn acts as an efficient scaffold for reconstructive retrieval (Moscovitch, 1995). A 
second (complementary) proposition relates that richly elaborated trace will be further 
differentiated from other similar episodic records- this greater level of distinctiveness 
then will sustain more effective recollection, in an comparable way that distinctive 
visual stimuli are discriminated better. A considerable amount of debate has 
emphasised the trace distinctiveness in memory and the significance of 
differentiation (Naime, 2002, Stein, 1978). However Craik (2002) believes that depth 
reflects the qualitative kind of analysis conducted on the stimulus, while elaboration 
on the other hand refers to the quantity to which each type of processing has been 
improved during the encoding process (Craik, 2002).
Craik (1977) argues that these two aspects of storage alongside congruity of the 
stimulus to its encoding context merge to bear an encoded representation that can be 
considered more distinct than other encoded data. That is to say, depth, congruity and 
elaboration are useful ways of describing parts of the encoding process, while 
distinctiveness refers to the ultimate product of these factors of the processed data 
(Craik, 1977, 2002).
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Limits and latitudes of levels o f processing
Watkins (2002) acknowledged the LOP position as the most influential cognitive 
paper since Miller’s (1956) "Magical Number Seven’ paper but he also went on to 
describe it as also standing a good chance as being the most criticised. Watkins’s 
(2002) critique of the framework is both in terms of conceptual issues and empirical 
issues.
Watkins clearly proclaims that limitations with the LOP framework are not hard to 
find and are numerous. For instance Watkins (2002) states , it does not account for the 
indubitable fact that memory for any given object or situation tends to fade with 
time; or that the speed at which it does so is reliant on such things as the person’s 
prior and subsequent experiences. Additionally it does not account for why a word 
(which had previously been presented as part of a word list) is better recalled in 
response to a representation prompt than by other methods (Watkins, 2002).
Furthermore, Roediger and Gallo (2001) judge that the LOP theory fails to account 
for a multiplicity of results that come from the orientating procedures much utilized 
by the LOP framework in which the theory is based. Roediger and Gallo (2001) 
summarized these as follows:
Recall is better for words given a positive response to the orientating question than for 
words given a negative response.
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LOP effects are present even if participants are conscious that their memory will later 
be tested and so might rationally be expected to employ supplementary deep covert 
processing while doing a shallow task.
LOP effect occurs even if the orientating questions are withheld for several seconds 
after presentation of their particular target stimuli.
Orientating tasks that could plausibly be accepted to require the equivalent level of 
processing can produce substantially dissimilar amounts of recollection.
Items that have only been processed in a shallow fashion can be remarkably well 
recollected
The type of memory task modulates the effect of orientating task.
Beyond these empirical weak points more conceptual criticism also exists. Perhaps 
the most frequent accusation against levels of processing is the charge of circularity 
and tautology. That is material that is well remembered must have been deeply 
processed, and that depth of processing is measured by the level of memory success. 
This is a valid caveat as there is no objective measure of depth. Yet it has value just 
like Darwin’s theory of natural selection has considerable usefulness despite taunts of 
circularity (propagation depends on successful adaptation, and adaptation is measured 
from propagation success), (Dawkins, 1986).
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A fiirther criticism is laid at LOP by the critical Watkins is that although the 
comparative processing levels for the three standard orientating tasks are fairly 
obvious (at least for visual material), it is tricky to discover tasks that require other 
levels. Consequently Watkins assumes it is dubitable whether levels of processing can 
be correctly considered as a continuum. This cynicism can be taken further and 
disputes the notion that the processing engaged by structural, phonemic and semantic 
orientation tasks are related in a linear manner (Watkins, 2002).
Watkins (2002) reports that Craik and Lockhart (1972) accepted from the outset, that 
the concept of LOP as a comprehensive description of memory was ridiculous. This 
option makes sense following accusations that have been levelled against LOP. Why 
then has the framework become so influential and arguably successful? Watkins 
stipulates the reason why ‘is that the concept of levels of processing is extremely 
powerful within a limited sphere of influence. The LOP concepts level of complexity 
is intuitive and non-technical and can be easily comprehended. Thus its power-to- 
complexity ratio is high.’ It is possible to elaborate the model to increase its power by 
inclusion of issues of elaboration, distinctiveness and transfer appropriate processing 
but by doing so it increases the complexity within a ‘power-to-complexity ratio’.
While Craik and Lockhart did not wish the LOP framework to be used as a theory in 
the hypothetico-deductive sense advocated by Popper (1968), it has been the epicenter 
of memory research theory since the 1970s. According to the Web of Science
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citations count by May 2002, 30 years after the original article in 1972 the paper has 
been cited in the region of 1300 times (Roediger, Galio and Geraci, 2002).
Although the framework and method gained instant acknowledgment it also attracted 
copious choruses of critics. Many of these criticisms focused on whether information 
processing could be halted at any particular processing level, and secondly whether 
there are strict levels (or depths) of the cognitive systems through which information 
streams.
Roediger and Gallo (2002) concluded that in spite of 30 years of research based on 
the levels of processing framework, there is no adequate account of the so called level 
of processing phenomena - the potent effect of orientating tasks on subsequent 
memory performance.
Here on, the review will consider some of implications of LOP; including the issues 
raised above in more detail. The relationship between transfer appropriate processing 
and levels of processing with also be discussed.
The STM/LTM distinction and the demise of the modai modei
The Craik and Lockhart paper (1972) is often considered the paper where the 
distinction between long term memory (LTM) and short term memory (STM) was 
savagely brought into doubt. Nevertheless Craik (2002) argues that such a stance is 
hyperbole. What they were really criticising was the concept of ‘structural’ memory 
stores, including the notion of a detached limited capacity STM. In this inward
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flowing information was stored ahead of being transported to the LTM store proposed 
by earlier researchers, such as Atkinson and Shiffrin (1971).
Craik and Lockhart retained the LTM/STM distinction, while resculpting the 
conception of STM as a transitory activation of processes that are representing 
conceptual and perceptual components of inward or recently accessed data. Cowan 
(1999), and Engle, Kane and Tuholski, (1999), deem, in a sense, that STM is the 
transitory activation of parts of LTM, but short-term activity in all probability also 
involves the perceptual aspects of the input (Craik 2002). Craik and Lockhart 
preferred to name this account of STM phenomena after William James’s term of 
‘primary memory’ (PM) (Craik, 2002).
Primary memory in this conceptualisation is not a store in a structuralist sense nor is it 
located exclusively in any one set brain region or cognitive system. Instead PM 
invokes activations of representations that associate with ongoing current experience, 
i.e. the current content of our conscious mind, and therefore PM may perhaps be 
situated in numerous different cortical regions depending on the information that we 
are consciously aware of. For that reason if we are consciously processing someone 
speaking, then the brain’s language centers should be stimulated, while if we are 
concentrating our consciousness onto an activity such as juggling then the motor 
system, somatosensory system and visual systems are the areas to be most active. This 
perspective is distinguished fi'om other STM models and solves the puzzle of how a 
single memory store can store a wide assortment of different kinds of information-
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semantic, articulatory, auditory, visual. Other models that attempt this problem 
include Baddeley & Hitch’s (1974) working memory.
Consolidation is crucial
In the original Craik and Lockhart paper (1972) it was proposed that the encoded 
‘record’ of an event or situation , the memory trace, was the mental record of those 
processing functions that had been conducted at the time of perceiving and 
comprehending the event. Accordingly there was no special memory encoding 
operations (above and beyond this) as such. The memory trace was there as the 
automatic residue by-product of initial processing. This observation was supported by 
results from incidental learning. The incidental nature is that the subjects had not been 
told they needed to memorise the stimuli but when the task was finished an 
unexpected memory task was then presented. The results clearly indicated that 
incidental encoding could produce results that are comparable with those from 
intentional learning (Challis, Velichkovsky & Craik, 1996).
One condition that this does not satisfactorily explain is organic amnesia (Cermak, 
1979 , Eysenck and Keane, 2005). Amnesic patients perceive and comprehend the 
world normally but do not remember what has been processed. Craik, as a result 
glimpsed the need to admit that some supplementary ‘something’ was required -  
beyond perception and comprehension for situations/events to be encoded so that it 
could be recollected, minutes, days, weeks or even years later. In 1999, Craik 
accepted that “ ...deep processing is necessary but not sufficient for later episodic 
memory” (Craik, 1999, p. 102).
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The obscure and mysterious index of depth
Watkins (2002) states that one of the most relentless and imperative criticisms of 
levels of processing is the nonexistence of an objective measure of levels of 
processing. Baddeley (1978) stalwartly argued that missing such a measure, it is far 
too trouble-free to assert that any well-remembered event or situation have to as a 
result have been deeply processed. Craik (2002) retorted with the objective to clarify 
the situation. He argues the notion of depth of processing is ‘not hard to grasp’; he 
defines ‘deeper’ as the analysis of implication, inference and meaning. This contrasts 
with ‘shallow’ analyses of properties such as loudness, colour, form, and brightness. 
Craik also argues that participants in LOP largely agree about the comparative levels 
of encoding operations. Additionally Seamon & Virostek, (1978) provided evidence 
that these ratings later predict memory performance. Being cynical is this just 
evading the point with a tautology?
One attempt at an objective measure was to use time as an index. One of the first 
attempts was by Craik and Tulving (1975), as noted previously involved deciding 
whether a word was or was not matching with the orientating question (e.g. ‘rhymes 
with Spain? Train “yes”: TIGER “no”. No and yes decisions were revealed to take 
about the same time as each other at each depth of examination (case of words, rhyme 
of words and processing of sentences). However, interestingly words that were linked 
with a positive rhyme and sentence decision were recognised to a higher degree than 
words that were negative to the decision task. This implies that time could not in and 
of itself be used as a good measure of depth. When the outcomes from the above 
study were plotted against subsequent recognition a pattern emerged. Yes and no 
decision times were demonstrated to follow different trend lines, and may possibly
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mean that both depth (the qualitative kind of information processing) and the amount 
of elaboration (the extent to which this form of encoding is developed) must be taken 
into account before the memory performance can be deduced. In other words Craik 
(2002) explains that for congruent (“yes”) decisions, the extra-time necessary for 
extra processing leads to enhanced memory ability. However, this would suggest that 
two different indices would be required, depth and elaboration.
Further troubles exist with time as the index of depth. For instance access time has 
also been shown to be a function of practice and expertise. Highly familiar, well- 
practiced stimuli can be identified and interpreted extremely fast, however they are 
also exceptionally well recognised when tested (Paivio, 1971, Mandler, 1981). It 
would not be impossible to envisage that the same applies to specific domains of an 
individual’s expertise. The expert can quickly establish a very elaborate and 
meaningful encoding of a stimulus which is within their field of experience and 
expertise (Bransford, Franks, Morris & Stein, 1979). to illustrate this point;given a 
herd of dinosaurs a palaeontologist is far more likely be able to memorise more of the 
dinosaurs than the lay person who might only be acquainted with a small number of 
dinosaurs. Whereas time may be used as a measure of depth for an individual and a 
certain kind of stimuli, deeper levels of processing can take more time to achieve but 
overall time can not be relied upon as a satisfactory measure of depth across different 
material or between people.
Craik (2002), notes that whichever suitable measure of depth ought to be able to 
gauge the elaboration and meaningfulness of the ultimately encoded representation.
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and not merely the relative difficulty of retrieval. As yet however no such relevant 
psychological theory exists.
Visualising depth: neuro-imaging and physioiogicai measures 
of depth
Experimental psychology’s endeavours at utilising time as a measure were ultimately 
unsuccessful. Conversely elsewhere research into physiological correlates of depth 
began to illuminate the path. The value this has brought has not been without 
criticism. For instance Watkins cynical eye now questions the worth of neurological 
research into memory as he claims ‘No matter how successful this field [proves], it is 
unlikely to shed much light on either the experience of memory or its behaviour 
consequence’ (Watkins, 2002 p 342).
Despite Watkin’s ‘unwarranted’ pessimism neuroscience may be able to answer this 
quandary with recent advances in imaging and related methodologies. Recently 
analysis of event related potentials (ERP) can afford information regarding both the 
time course of the spread of activation between neural areas and the brain areas 
involved in various encoding situation (Mangels, Picton, & Craik 2001). Moreover 
novel findings show that human heart-rate fluctuation is stabilised when doing a task 
with deeply encoded stimuli rather than new unfamiliar stimuli (Vincent, Craik & 
Furedy, 1996). However Treisman’s (1974) earlier opinion that we have to be vigilant 
when considering imaging data, paying attention to the ability to differentiate 
differences in access time plus effort, firom differences in the elaboration along with 
meaningfulness of the encoded representations, still remains a valid warning.
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Recently imaging research has investigated the relationship linking brain activation 
throughout initial encoding/acquisition and then during memory retrieval (see Nyberg 
2002, Cabeza & Nyberg 2003). Nyberg advocates that the research provided 
converging evidence that several of the brain regions that become activated at some 
point in encoding are reactivated during retrieval. However Nyberg points out that 
just a subset of the encoding associated activation pattern is reactivated through 
retrieval. Additionally the cortical regions where overlap is evident are more often to 
be in secondary rather than in primary area (Nyberg, 2002, Wheeler, Petersen & 
Buckner, 2000). This is strong evidence for LOP as the same areas being activated 
suggests there are not separate memory stores with material going from one to the 
other as implied by the modal model.
There is also evidence that when a participant focuses their attention to a specific 
modality it can result in the activation of brain areas that are active when really 
perceiving stimuli (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000). With this in mind it is imperative that 
imaging research, controls for this possible confounding effect of selective attention, 
although this may be of interest in its own right.
Nyberg, Habib, McIntosh and Tulving (2000) performed an imaging study on 
incidental reactivation. During the investigation participants encoded single visual 
words along with visual words paired with sounds. Next participants were set a yes/no 
recognition task of the visually presented words. Analysis of their data revealed that 
recognition of words that had been encoded with auditory pairings was linked with 
amplified activity in the auditory cortex (Nyberg, 2002). This was despite the fact that
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there was no demand to try and remember the auditory stimuli, i.e. incidental 
learning. This and related findings by Nyberg (1995) offer good support for the idea 
that perceptual information processing is a piece of the memory trace. Also that brain 
areas activated in encoding are spontaneously reactivated in retrieval.
In the original levels paper it was argued that preliminary analysis was not stored. 
Preliminary analysis refers to the analysis of sensory features such as loudness or 
brightness. However later studies have revealed that records of the basic sensory 
information can continue to influence subsequent memory abilities over a longer 
retention hiatus in time (Conway & Gathercole, 1987). More recent reworking of the 
levels of processing theory acknowledges that ‘sensory or surface aspects of stimuli 
are not always lost rapidly as was claimed in 1972’ (Lockhart and Craik, 1990, p.98).
Further work using (positron emission tomography) PET and (functional magnetic 
resonance imaging) fMRI has shown that both incidental and intentional encoding 
processing activate fi*ontal brain regions (Nyberg, 2002). In one of the early studies
Kapur, Craik, Tulving , Wilson, Houle & Brown (1994) demonstrated that neural 
engagement connected with the semantic processing of living/non living taxonomic 
categorization was contrasted with shallow processing of whether stimuli included the 
letter ‘a’ or not. The results illustrate that deeper processing was associated with 
increased activity in left prefrontal regions. Similar findings have moreover been 
reported in numerous other studies (Buckner, Logan, Donaldsldson & Wheeler 2000 
provide an excellent coverage). Additionally it was shown that encoding processing 
is substantially less connected with the right than the left frontal lobes. However this
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may be an experimental artefact as the right frontal lobe has been shown to be 
activated in more non-verbal tasks (Kelley et al, 1998).
Additionally the Kapur et al. (1994) study on the neuroanatomical correlates of LOP 
effects postulated that activity rises in left inferior frontal regions results in the 
increased retrievablity of memory.
The reality and nature of levels
The original notion of “levels” as said earlier follow from Triesman’s (1964, 1979) 
studies on selective attention. Basically some kinds of representations, those involved 
in implications and interpreting meaning, required extra attention than those involved 
in surface/sensory analysis of events and/or objects. Additionally it was assumed that 
surface analysis preceded subsequent conceptual analysis. Within this logic the levels 
were seen as discrete stages where the output of one stage was the input for the next 
deeper level (Craik, 2002). Later it was recognised that this opinion was probably too 
rigid and the more conceivable scenario was one in which both top-down conceptual 
and bottom-up perceptual processing occurred in an interactive parallel fashion (Craik 
and Tulving, 1975) although memory performance was still seen as a frinction of 
depth and elaboration.
Lockhart, Craik, and Jacoby (1976), point out that deeper processing is not just simply 
a lengthening or extension of shallow processing. For this reason the levels could be 
relabelled as ‘domains of processing’. This would for instance with written script, 
goes from visual graphemic processing before going to articulatory/phonological 
analysis and finally conceptual analysis. Craik (2002) suggested that it would seem
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doubtful whether these qualitative analyses occur in the same sequence. To support 
this he draws on the research by Coltheart (1985) that demonstrates that beginner 
readers sound out letters to construct the word and then analyze it for meaning, 
whereas the adult reader appears to sidestep the phonological stage and transferred 
directly to semantics. Velichkovsky (2002) describes the processing levels as 
heterarchical rather than true hierarchy (Turvey, Shaw & Mace, 1978). Coltheart et al.
(2001) discuss the dual route cascade in more detail but this is not needed here.
Craik (2002) proposes that the processing does not inevitably always follow a set 
sequence instead the progression can vary depending on the task, the person’s purpose 
and their levels of expertise. Processing is both bottom up and top down. Context and 
expectations affect the top down processes. It has also been suggested that there 
might be levels within levels, however Craik argues (2002) that this is unlikely. He 
also emphasises that additional processing at superficial depths of processing does not 
always produce an advantage in enhancing memory, nor does distinctiveness (Craik & 
Watkins, 1973). Goldstein and Chance (1971) demonstrated this when they showed 
participants uniquely different snowflake pictures yet recognition remained poor. This 
they argued was due to the fact the participants did not have the semantic 
understanding to differentiate and categorise the snowflake stimuli in a manner to 
create meaning (Craik, 2002). They additionally state that a specialist in 
crystallography of snowflakes could have differentiated between the snowflakes and 
meaningfully label/classify them and thus perform better on subsequent memory 
tasks. Close interaction between attention, perception and memory has been stressed 
by the LOP framework and seem to be embedded in working memory/ short term 
memory (Cowan, 1988,1999)
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General to specific levels of representation
Craik (2002) argues that levels of representation go from general to specific. This is 
based on the idea that older adults characteristically show two main types of memory 
dysfunction, firstly difficulties of episodic memory forgetting details of past events, 
and secondly forgetting the names of things, especially people. This has been argued 
to be a failure of the semantic memory system (Tulving and Schachter, 1990). While 
these at first may give the impression of being very disparate they both are arguably 
similar as the information that is being retrieved is rather specific, e.g. a person’s 
name or the exact details of one event amongst many events (Craik, 2002).
Knowledge may be arranged in a form of hierarchy, in which higher levels represent 
things at a more general and abstract level and at the lower levels represents specific 
material such as people’s names or the specific details of an event (Cohen 2000, 
Velichkovsky 2002). At the highest levels there is context free knowledge, which 
becomes more context related and specific at lower levels. This proposed continuum 
from high to low is akin to semantic memory at the higher levels to episodic at the 
lower levels. Within this perspective the difference in ‘knowing’ and ‘remembering’ 
is a frinction of what part of the hierarchy is being activated. If it is at the semantic 
level it is material that is known while if it is in episodic memory it is something that 
has been remembered (Cohen, 2000).
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Craik (2002) admits that there is still a vagueness within the LOP framework and that 
‘the challenge now (as in 1972) is to refine and specify [clearly] such concepts as 
depth, elaboration and distinctiveness’.
Transfer appropriate processing (TAP), Encodlng-retrievai 
interactions
Arguably the most important shift in the LOP framework is the inclusion of retrieval. 
The original article by Craik and Lockhart (1972) was concerned with the issue of 
encoding and ignored retrieval. However it has to be conceded that the issue was 
alluded to in follow up papers (Lockhart and Craik, 1990, Moscovitch & Craik, 
1976). The major concern is encoding especially (Tulving & Thomas, 1973) or 
transfer-appropriate processing (TAP) (Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977: Roediger, 
Weeldon and Challis, 1989). The relationship between LOP and TAP has sometimes 
been considered antagonistic, nevertheless Craik’s (2002) take on the relationship is 
more complementary than antagonistic. Craik states that initial mental analysis 
effects, the qualitative quality of the trace that is being encoded, deeper encoding is 
linked with a wider likelihood for retrieval. It is the retrieval context (which could 
comprise specific retrieval cues) that can harness greater retrieval if they are 
‘congruent, compatible or appropriate.’
Morris et al. (1977) made a more dramatic statement. As noted earlier researchers 
established that rhyme-related encoding was better than semantic encoding 
(traditionally considered deeper) when the experimental task was rhyme recognition. 
From this they decided that that “deep” semantic analysis consequently was not
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inevitably the most useful factor in subsequent recollection ability (Craik, 2002). 
They postulated it all depends on the retrieval task. Typically semantic encoding is 
superior, simply because the usual retrieval method also involves semantic 
processing. Craik (2002) acknowledges TAP as ‘a compelling argument and a 
compelling case’. However he then goes on to remind us that the Morris et al. (1977) 
study demonstrated that the amalgamation of semantic recognition plus semantic 
encoding produced a dramatically better recognition level than the rhyme-rhyme 
grouping (0.68 v 0.40 averaged over the first two studies).
Reviewing the TAP and LOP literature Craik (2002) argues that deeper processing at 
encoding results in an encoding trace that is potentially very memorable, hence an 
appropriately akin cue is available at time of retrieval.
The relationship between LOP & TAP and the troubling 
tautology.
LOP is often severely criticised for its tautology, in which the presumed cause (deep 
processing) could be nothing more than a restatement of the effect of improved 
memory. By their inherent characteristics tautologies are unfalsifiable; thus making 
the idea of depth of processing potentially lacking empirical value.
In considering the tautological Achilles' heel, it is interesting to compare it with 
another tautological concept, that of Darwinian natural selection (Darwin, 1859). 
When it comes to Darwinian natural selection, the spotlight of the condemnation is 
usually on the idea of adaptation, and in particular “the survival o f the fittesf^ in the
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context of Herbert Spencer’s idiom . The tautology dispute has been presented by 
Dawkins (1996) that no independent definition of fitness exists. The fitness is defined 
in this context in terms of those creatures or plants who stay alive. Fitness is 
consequently a cause that can be argued to be nothing more than a restatement of its 
effect (Lockhart, 2002). Evolution as a process of natural selection is therefore 
wounded by its tautology. Lockhart (2002) believes it is helpful to follow this parallel 
between natural selection and levels of processing neither fitness nor depth is able of 
completely predicting its applicable conclusion, i.e. survival of the organism or the 
survival or retrievability of the memory respectively. At best the concepts portend of 
probabilistic outcomes: specific qualities of an organism might make it more likely to 
survive and certain features of a memory trace may make it more likely to be 
retrieved. It is this that Lockhart affirms is the post hoc quality (the inability to predict 
deterministically) of both concepts and makes it vulnerable to taunts of circularity.
Adaptability and retrievability are ideas that are both however relativistic. Lockhart,
(2002) states that survival is not foreseeable simply on the basis of some a priori 
description of fitness or any part of the organism because survival is a relationship 
between such properties and environmental conditions (this should remind us of 
TAP). Analogously Lockhart (2002) suggests retrievability is not fully predictable by 
some a priori definition of depth of processing or any other property of the memory 
trace (such as strength or distinctness) per se because retrievability is relational 
between such properties and the conditions under which retrieval is required. In other 
words the successfulness of the memory trace being remembered is both dependant on 
its initial encoding and by the environment in which it is being retrieved. Additionally 
while an attribute such as a large brain is potentially adaptive to an organism there
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may be ecological situations where this would not be the case and thus the attribute 
would not be adaptive. This illustrates the relational and contextual feature of 
adaptation. The same is true of the memory trace, which has a relational attribute in 
the form of transfer appropriate processing.
While in terms of the essential logic of the tautology there is no happy solution it must 
be remembered that the concept of depth can be defined and studied outside of pure 
logic. Empirical experimental cognitive psychology and neuroscience have both 
endeavoured to do this.
The relational/relativistic aspects between the memory trace and the conditions of 
retrieval is according to Lockhart (2002) the essential claim that underlies the concept 
of transfer appropriate processing (Morris et al, 1977) and the encoding specificity 
principle of Tulving & Thomson (1973). The evidence validating these conceptual 
twins Lockhart claims is overwhelming. It should be noted however that transfer 
appropriate analysis is equally susceptible to similar accusations of tautology as LOP. 
For that exact same reason it also holds its post-hoc nature and probabilistic 
determinacy. Following conditions in which retrieval circumstances cannot be 
identified beforehand. Processing can be acknowledged as transfer appropriate only 
after retrieval has taken place (Lockhart 2002). Lockhart continues that the definition 
of LOP and TAP remain unclear but numerous significant theoretical concepts start as 
unclear conceptual ideals and that clarification is the objective of investigation and 
not the starting point. To throw the idea out would be to throw out the proverbial baby 
out with the bath water. Indeed, in genetics this was the case at the time of Gregory
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Mendel and Charles Darwin the property that was inherited from one generation to 
the next remained unclear, while retaining explanatory value and probabilistic 
determinacy. It was not until the Watson and Crick model of DNA and genetics that 
the concept became clear.
Lockhart (2002) proposes the following argument using natural selection as its 
analogy. Certain species are ‘fitter’ than other species in the restricted sense that the 
species are adapted to stay alive in a wider range of ecological situations, or survive 
within surroundings that are the more likely to have in their future. In this respect 
rabbits might be considered fitter than the koala. The rabbit has properties of diverse 
dietary habits and fecundity that would encourage survival chances across a wider 
range of ecological situations. While conversely the koala is jammed within a very 
narrow ecological niche and has a slow birth rate, and a relatively long period before 
sexual maturity and a very restricted diet: only of eucalyptus. It is however possible to 
identify situations in where a koala could survive while the rabbit could not. Although 
the earlier are highly exact, incapable of even the slightest ecological deviations and 
improbable to arise in reality. Therefore Lockhart (2002) suggests that when gambling 
on the odds of survival in an unsure future environment, ‘smart money will take the 
rabbit’. Lockhart goes on to claim, that the classic levels of processing effect is akin 
to the greater “survival” value of deeper processing for those retrieval circumstances 
generally to be expected more often. Once more however it is possible to construct 
very specific circumstances where shallower conditions outperform deeper 
processing, as demonstrated by Morris et al. (1977) when they illustrated that rhyme- 
recognition outperformed semantic recognition. Since then the transfer appropriate 
processing effect has been largely verified, although Lockhart (2002) says only within
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highly specific retrieval conditions. This therefore means that TAP is very important 
but that LOP is possibly superior in most situations.
While granting that typical retrieval environments and cues favour deep processing, 
this avoids the fundamental issues of the relationship between LOP and TAP. The 
main research indicating the superiority of the LOP effect over TAP is that even when 
conditions are maximised to produce perfect TAP performance is still less powerful 
than depth (Fisher & Craik, 1977); this effect is described as the matched transfer 
effect. Marmurek (1995) demonstrated that this effect can not be accounted for by the 
difficulty of the retrieval task. Theoretically it is feasible to identify at least two 
possible sources of the matched transfer effect (Lockhart, 2002). The first consists of 
the nature of the memory trace itself that are independent of the particular retrieval 
environment e.g. resistance to interference, distinctiveness, or even strength. This 
explanation is referred to as the trace explanation of the matched-transfer effect. 
Moscovitch and Craik (1976) argued along this line of explanation. The second 
possibility is the matched transfer effect is the influence of transfer appropriate 
processing itself (Lockhart, 2002). This may seem unlikely:
‘Given the claim that transfer-appropriate processing has been matched. However, 
despite the nominal equating of the level of transfer- appropriate processing with the 
two encoding conditions, it is conceivable that semantic processing in conjunction 
with semantic cueing nevertheless represent a greater degree of transfer 
appropriateness than the corresponding match for shallower proeessing such as 
rhyme.
(Lockhart 2002, p. 400)
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The retrieval environment is very unlikely to elicit exactly the same processing as the 
initial coding so is never 100% transfer appropriate and superficial analysis may be 
more susceptible to the mismatch produced by little variation in the recovery cues. 
This viewpoint does not deny the advantages of LOP but argues that levels of 
processing are a phenomenon that can be covered under the umbrella of transfer 
appropriate processing (Lockhart, 2002). Transfer appropriate processing is the 
machinery by which it appears to operate. Manipulating the depth of analysing is thus 
a non direct method of influencing the extent to which the cognitive processing is 
transfer appropriate (Lockhart, 2002). Both accounts are of course not mutually 
exclusive both the trace account and the transfer account may be valid. The trace 
account is generally regarded as being better supported by empirical research. 
However the transfer account has received more attention in recent years: for a review 
of this literature and the concept of robust encoding see Lockhart (2002).
Levels of Processing: Synopsis
Thirty years of research on LOP has resulted in considerable change, criticisms and 
development. The original parsimonious model has now become less elegant but 
decidedly more capable. During the 1990s Craik and Lockhart updated the 
framework in three main ways, firstly Craik and Lockhart (1990) accepted the notion 
of TAP proposed by Morris et al. (1977), but postulated that we can reconcile the two. 
Transfer appropriate processing predicts that memory performance depends on the 
interaction between the type of processing at encoding and at retrieval.
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Fundamentally LOP predicts a main effect of processing depth when transfer 
appropriateness is held constant.
Secondly Lockhart and Craik (1990, p. 97-98) conceded that their previous 
assumptions that shallow processing always leads to rapid forgetting was not correct 
as they say “ since 1972... a number of results have been reported in which sensory 
information persists for hours, minutes or even months”.
Thirdly, Lockhart and Craik (1990) noted that they had previously assumed the levels 
go from shallow to deep along a continuum and that shallow processing always goes 
first. This was accepted as not satisfactory;, ‘an adequate model will comprise 
complex interactions between top-down and bottom-up processes, and that processing 
at different levels will be temporarily parallel or particularly overlapping’ (Lockhart 
& Craik, 1990, p.95).
Where does this leave us? The answer remains that levels of processing is a very well 
respected and well replicated phenomenon and theory. Its biggest weakness is finding 
an objective measure of depth, but neuroscience may soon be able to address that 
caveat. Transfer appropriate processing is an interesting phenomenon but over all 
Levels of processing is a superior effect. And this effect essentially boils down to 
processing shallow characteristics of a stimulus results in a less elaborate and distinct 
memory trace than does meaningful processing, i.e. making use of our semantic 
systems. Additionally this effect is incidental and shows a person can learn without 
intention.
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Chapter Three will briefly remind us of the literature covered and will direct us to the 
thesis aims and objectives.
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Chapter Three: Aim and purpose
Chapter One, directed us to the importance of understanding scientifically the 
psychology of food choice and eating. In understanding food choice better, we may be 
able to influence at some point peoples cognitions and behaviours, which at present 
are entering the dangerous arena of chronic illnesses including heart disorders and 
diabetes. Understanding food psychology will also be beneficial the food industry to 
make tastier, healthier and more remembered products. There is also a considerable 
theoretical benefit to studying this area, as it is a relatively virgin territory, ready for 
exploration.
Explanations of eating behaviour has primarily been focused at the 
psychophysiological (e.g. hormones, and neural circuits), at one end and 
sociodevelopmental (e.g. learning and experience) at the other. The intermediate 
realm of cognition has largely been ignored, except for research into complex 
cognitions such as attitudes and beliefs about food and diet. The gap in our 
understanding is resident at the level of the basic cognitions: sensation, perception and 
memory. Of these, sensation has received most attention. Our understanding of 
perception of food and the functioning of the chemical senses is no where near 
comparable with our understanding of perception for sight and sound. When it comes 
to food memory, we are in almost complete darkness.
In understanding physical digestion properly, it was important for anatomists to 
carefully study the structure and function of the digestive system at all its stages from 
initial mastication to final defecation. Similarly to fully understand the ‘cognitive
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digestion’ involved in the psychology of eating and the chemical senses it is essential 
that we too study the structures and functions of our mind/brain at all stages of the 
process from start to finish and at all levels including the role of the basic cognitions. 
Especially effects need to be directed at going beyond sensation and investigate 
perception and memory.
Chapter Two introduced a synopsis of the literature relevant to this thesis. The 
relevant essentials of the biology were introduced first including the structure and 
physiology of the chemical sense and the related neural circuits. Of interest was the 
fact that the neural circuits involve frontal and limbic apparatus. The processing has 
an order, with basic sensory ‘surface’ properties processed before and separate from 
any hedonic ‘pleasantness ‘value is added’ additionally the food representation is 
multimodal, involving taste, smell, and texture and visual data. Does this suggest 
different levels or styles of processing?
Chapter Two also identified the role of papillae and taste buds and it was noted that 
there is considerable variation in a number of papillae on the human tongue and this 
alongside the chemical ‘chemical marker’ such as PROP seems to relate to a persons 
taste/flavour perception. The more taste buds you have make you a super taster while 
few make you a non-taster. Would this variation in perceptual sensitive extend to the 
level of memory, would people with more papillae recognise tastants better?
Next, the concept of categorical perception was addressed. We shall address this in 
detail in Section Three where the questions of whether there is a categorical
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perception effect for taste/flavour and whether any effect is more perceptual or 
memory based?
Finally, the topic of food memory was discussed. The main conclusions reached in the 
literature are that food memory is incidentally learnt, i.e. no intention is used to 
memorise the foods. Not all food qualities are remembered equally. Importantly food 
memory unlike visual memory does not seem to be evolved to precise recognition but 
is more similar to a change detector. That is too say we aren’t very good over all at 
identifying exactly what we have tasted but are better at detecting what we have not 
tasted. This results in low correct identification rates and near chance performance.
Levels of processing theory were presented as a modem and dynamic framework both 
theoretically and practically. Levels of processing has evolved considerably over its 
thirty or more years of existence and to some extent has been morphed by transfer 
appropriate processing. However the core principle remains. Stimuli can be 
memorised unintentionally and that the depth or type of processing involved has an 
effect on subsequent memory performance. Processing for basic sensory qualities is 
assumed to relate to a poorly elaborated neural trace and poor memory whilst deep 
processing involves deep meaningful analysis such as hedonic appreciation or 
semantic analysis.
Section Two is dedicated to the investigation of whether there is a levels of 
proceeding effect for flavour. This will in effect test the levels of processing
79
phenomena and methods within a new sensory domain. Additionally the role of 
papillae numbers on memory will also be investigated.
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Section 2: Levels of processing 
Chapter Four
Section overview
The focus of this section is on the two studies conducted to investigate levels of 
processing. Study one aimed to investigate whether a levels of processing (LOP) 
effect exists for taste using two orientating tasks to orientate toward deep and shallow 
processing. The second study aimed to overcome methodological problems identified 
with the first study and to investigate whether LOP could be found when going to 
even shallower and deeper levels.
This first chapter of this section will briefly recap the key points of section one 
including a discussion of the purpose of the research and drawing on some recent 
research on LOP with the chemical senses, specifically odour (as there is none on 
taste). The most relevant issues on papillae density and their role in the research will 
be discussed the second half of chapter four will present Study one: Depth of
Processing & Papillae Density - effect on memory. This will include method, results 
and a brief discussion.
Chapter five will present Study two: Going deeper and shallower in search o f LOP. 
This experiment was conducted in two phases. Firstly, the shallow and deep data were 
collected, and then the addition of a deeper level was added to help prevent making a 
Type two error, by searching for the elusive LOP on even deeper terrain. This resulted 
in three levels of orientating task. This chapter will include method, results and brief 
discussion.
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Chapter Six is a succinct discussion of the main findings of Section Two. This will 
focus on LOP but also include a discussion of the results relating to papillae density. 
Limitations and future directions will be briefly considered. A more comprehensive 
review and discussion is to be found in Section four.
Levels of processing and papillae
The psychology of eating behaviour and food choice has largely been neglected by 
cognitive psychology. While cognitive psychology is beginning to infiltrate the 
psychology of eating, the main emphasis has been on ‘complex cognitions’ and social 
cognitions and has focused mainly on attitudes, social norms and perceived control 
(Ogden 2003, Sobal et al. 2006, Conner et al. 2006). This is in contrast to mainstream 
academic cognitive psychology with its emphasis on attention, perception and 
memory.
Memory research, like most other successful areas of psychology has developed due 
to the successful combination of theory and empirical data. So far the research on 
taste memory has been very limited and exploratory lacking much theory. 
Furthermore, most of the research in cognitive psychology has been dominated 
directly or indirectly by the primary senses of vision or hearing, whether this is at the 
perceptual level or at the level of memory (e.g. working memory has a visuo-spatial 
module and a phonological unit but no units relating to touch or the chemical senses). 
This bias is largely due to the relative importance of the senses and the difficulty 
related to stimuli that are more difficult to control successfully, such as those involved 
in smell and taste.
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Algom, D.,Wolf, & Bergman. (1985), Algom & Marks (1989) were among the 
earliest researchers in memory psychophysics, or mnemophysics, which they describe 
as the branch of psychophysics that deals with the quantitative relations between 
physical stimuli and their related memory. Until 1989 research had dealt almost 
exclusively with qualitative aspects of memory for odours, and virtually no studies 
had been performed on memory for taste (but see Moyer, Sklarew, & Whiting, 1982, 
for some preliminary results on sweetness). Research on the chemical senses has 
continued to be dominated by an interest in olfaction (smell).
A recent study by Royet, Koenig, Paugam-Moisy, Puzenat, and Chasse (2004) 
investigated whether a levels of processing effect existed for a task of olfactory 
naming. Levels of processing was the dominant theoretical framework of memory 
proposed during the 1970s by Craik and Lockhart, (see Section One for more details). 
In the study Royet et al. (2004) investigated the effects of odour processing at various 
levels, from simple analysis to deep or semantic analysis. The method included two 
consecutive sessions; an initial session involved participants characterising a battery 
of 30 odours with criteria that employed a range of levels of processing followed by 
another session to identify the odours as rapidly as achievable. The processing 
circumstances were based on superficial (shallow) olfactory judgments, high-level 
olfactory-gustatory-somesthetic judgements (deep) and higher-level non olfactotory 
judgements (deep-control processing), where participants rating odours with visual 
and auditory descriptors. A naming index was calculated dependant on response 
accuracy and response time. The study revealed that levels of processing modified 
odour naming in 18 out of 30 odorants with the scores for odour naming higher with
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the deep processing task. Overall the data suggested that deep olfactory encoding was 
afterwards linked with increasingly better abilities on the naming task.
The above experimental study suggests that levels of processing effects exist for 
olfaction as it does for vision and hearing. Nyberg (2002) provided further invaluable 
evidence for levels of processing occurring within different sensory domains via the 
use of functional brain imaging. Evidence reported by Nyberg covered the visio- 
spatial domain, and auditory processing, in addition to motor information processing, 
(which uses somatic/’touch’) processing as feedback (Nyberg, Peterson, Nilsson, 
Sandblom & Aberg, 2001). This suggested that LOP is a relatively global 
phenomenon of the mind effecting most sensory modalities and therefore could apply 
to taste.
A level of processing framework provides an ideal starting point to continue the 
understanding of mnemophysics of taste. As stated in section one. Levels of 
processing theory is often regarded as the first theoretical framework to attack the 
difference between short-term memory (STM) and long-term memory (LTM). This 
distinction, Craik (2002) argued has been overstated. Craik (2002) was not convinced 
by the view of separate memory stores, including the concept of a single limited 
STM processor in which received information was stored prior to being ‘sent’ to 
LTM (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1971) but retained the STM/LTM distinction, 
reconstructing the architecture of STM as a momentary activation of cognitive 
processes reflecting the sensory and conceptual aspects of incoming stimuli. Central 
to the levels of processing theory success and criticism is the notion of depth. One
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main criticism of the LOP framework is the lack of an objective index of processing. 
Lacking such an index, and the poorly defined notion of depth had led many to 
criticise the model (Baddeley, 1978, Watkins 2002). Craik (2002) argued that the 
concept of depth:
Tt is not hard to grasp - “deeper refers to the analysis of meaning, inference, 
implication, in contrast to “shallow” analyses such as surface form, colour, loudness, 
brightness’
Craik, 2002, p 308.
The levels of processing are also not conceptualised as distinct levels, but rather levels 
of processing is a continuum from shallow to deep. In visual processing, for example, 
graphemic properties are low level, such as the shape of the word ‘dog’ and whether it 
is in upper or lower case. Beyond this depth ‘dog’ can be increased to a phonetic level 
(does ‘dog’ rhyme with ‘log’ or ‘tree’), through to semantic or deep analysis (the 
concept of a dog e.g. as an mammal, a pet, a relative of the wolf).
The evidence from levels of processing research suggests that a depth effect can be 
demonstrated for four out of the five human senses; vision, hearing, touch and smell. 
It would therefore seem sensible to assume that a depth of processing effect would 
exist for gustatory (taste) memory. Following on from the conceptualisation of depth 
as presented by Craik, shallow processing should relate to the surface characteristics
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of taste e.g. the pulpiness of orange juice, while deep or at least deeper processing 
could be a measure of how much they like the orange juice.
Levels of processing theory clearly links initial perception to memory. The notion that 
perception and memory are related is appealing; the more sensory information 
available for processing the better memory could be. For taste there is a dramatic 
difference in the perceptual abilities of individuals ranging from non-tasters to super 
tasters, (Bartoshuk, 1991).
As previously discussed, taste is possible due to taste receptor cells. The taste cells 
are located on taste buds that are located on the tongue’s papillae. The papillae are the 
small anatomical structures that appear on the surface of the tongue. Some people 
have been found to have very few while others have many, with a tongue resembling 
a cobbled street. The research which first indicated that there may be large scale 
differences in the taste perception abilities of individuals, started in 1931 when Fox 
first described taste blindness. When he was doing some paperwork the chemical 
PTC was knocked into the air and nearby people noted how bitter it tasted, yet Fox 
himself tasted nothing (Fox, 1931). Fox reported that out of 2500 participants 28% 
reported it was tasteless while 65.5% reported that it was bitter tasting. Family studies 
(Blakeslee & Salmon, 1931) clearly concluded that PTC non -tasting is a Mendelian 
recessive genetic trait, i.e. people with two recessive alleles (tt) are more likely non - 
tasters and people with one dominant allele and one recessive (Tt) or similarly (tT) 
and those with (TT) are referred to as tasters. Since then research has focused on 
taster’s profiles based on the ability to taste PROP (6-n-propylthiouracil), which has
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also been shown to be genetically influenced. The PROP gene was located on 
chromosome 5, and may also influence the phenotype (Reed et al., 1999).
Since then, Bartoshuk has reclassified the taster profile into non tasters, average 
tasters and supertasters (Miller & Bartoshuk, 1991). The genotype for supertasters is 
expected to be two dominant alleles (TT) with the average tasters possessing one 
dominant allele (Tt) or (tT), this as yet has to be verified. The expression of the 
genotype is the phenotype of papillae density and thus taster ability (and potential 
taste memory too).
Miller and Reedy (1990) revealed this physical difference between non-tasters and 
tasters by means of simple blue food colouring that differentially stained structures on 
the surface of the tongue. The food colouring fails to stain the fungiform papillae (the 
mushroom like structures that include the taste buds on the anterior tip of the tongue) 
so that they can be counted. Since then the result that super tasters have the most taste 
buds and the non tasters have least has been replicated in numerous studies (Hosako- 
Naito, Lucchina, Synders, Boggiano, Duffy and Bartoshuk, 1996, Tepper and Nurse, 
1997, 1998). The research has thus showed that taste perception varies considerably 
between people. Generally, within an area the size of a hole re-enforcer, people can 
have from as little as 5 to over 35 papillae (each papillae has one to several hundred 
taste buds, visible only with a microscope). Each taste bud has 50-150 taste receptor 
cells arranged like the sections of an orange inside it (Bear et al. 2001). Given this 
huge diversity and evidence fi*om genetics and research involving getting people to 
taste PROP to see whether they could taste it provides clear evidence that some
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people live in a ‘pastel’ (non tasters) tasting world while others live in a ‘neon’ 
(supertasters) tasting world (Bartoshuk 2000).
The studies in the following section employ orange juices as stimuli. These studies 
will use the LOP framework and transfer the methods used within LOP research to 
test whether there is an effect of LOP on memory for taste. Liking will be used as the 
deep orientating task, (this involves analysis of meaning, inference, implication) while 
pulpiness assessment will be used as a shallow orientating task as it involves the 
analysis of surface characteristic of the tastants. Additionally the study will combine 
levels of processing theory and the work of Bartoshuk to investigate whether memory 
varies for tastants as a function of taste ability as measured by papillae density. The 
food due method will be employed. Study two is an extension of study one focusing 
only on levels of processing and not papillae.
The design and procedure of the current study and all subsequent studies involved no 
important ethical issues. Normal ethical considerations were applied at all stages of 
research. All participants were treated with due respect. The studies involved all 
participants tasting a selection of items and were informed they would be asked to 
answer a few questions about each item. Consent was gained in all studies. The 
studies did involve an unexpected memory test but did not put participants at any risk. 
All participants were asked if they were allergic to any of the items that would be 
used in each study. All participants received full debriefing at the end of each study. 
Some participants were paid for their involvement but were informed that they could 
withdraw at anytime without forfeiting their financial payment of £5.
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study one; Depth of Processing and Papillae Density - effect on 
memory
Method 
Subjects
An opportunity sample of 50 people, mainly students, were enrolled for the study. The 
average age was 25 years (SD 7.01). The sample comprised 40% males and 60% 
females. The sample included 49 Caucasians and 1 Indian female. 36 participants 
were non-smokers, 11 smokers (i.e. more than 1 a day most days), and 3 ex smokers. 
Half the sample (n = 25) rated the juices for liking (deep processing) while the other 
half pulpiness (shallow).
Apparatus 
Foodstuffs
The study involved the use of 10 orange juices including some of the market leaders 
such as Del Monte and Tropicana alongside a selection of own brand juices. The 
juices selected were representative of those on the market including juices from 
concentrate and squeezed varieties, alongside smooth or bitty juices. The sample also 
included two organic juices and some ‘health’ juices i.e. extra calcium. All the own 
brand orange juices were Tesco products: this selection was based on two reasons, 
firstly Tesco is the leading supermarket within the UK and additionally for pragmatic 
reasons in that it would be easier to replace juices this way than visiting a variety of
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supermarkets. The juices were then randomly allocated into two groups an A group 
and a B group. The juices were allocated a name and symbol that would represent it in 
the study. The juices and their labels are as follows:
GROUPA
Alpha Tropicana squeezed with added calcium 
Beta Tesco Finest with bits squeezed 
Delta Del Monte smooth from concentrate 
Epsilon Tesco value from concentrate 
Gamma Tropicana squeezed with bits
GROUPB
Kappa Tesco smooth concentrate 
Omikron Tesco organic from concentrate
Rho Tesco healthy living modified orange juice with added calcium 
Sigma Del Monte with bits from concentrate 
Zeta Tesco organic smooth.
All juices were refrigerated at a constant low temperature, 4 -  5°C. Additionally a 
bottle of Tesco Perthshire spring water was used to rinse out the mouth between 
juices. The water was stored at the same temperature as the juice.
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Orientating task scales
Two scales were used in the study; one to assess liking (deep) and the other to assess 
pulpiness (shallow. The liking scale was a 9-point scale ranging from 1 ‘dislike 
extremely’ to 9 ‘like extremely’. This has the advantage of being able to test people 
who do and do not like orange juice. The pulpiness scale (pulpiness/juicy bits) also 
involved a 9 point scale ranging from (1) no pulp content to (9) high pulp content.
Taste bud equipment
The assessment of fungiform papillae required blue food-colouring (Super cook 
brand), cotton buds and a magnifying mirror.
Additional equipment
A  video camera was used along with a stop watch to provide a measure of time for 
initial tasting and tasting in the recognition test.
Procedure/ Design
The participants were blind to the true nature of the study, i.e. that it was a memory 
task. They were simply told that the research involved tasting orange juices and 
assessing them for a certain quality. Both tasks of asking about likeability and 
pulpiness made sense within this context.
The juices were randomly allocated to 2 groups, GROUP A and GROUP B. Half of 
the subjects had GROUP A as targets and the GROUP B juices as non-targets 
(distracters). The other half of participants received the opposite. This was counter
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balanced. This method ensured that all juices would be used as targets and as 
distracters. The order of presentation of juices within a trial was random.
Pre-test
In the pre test assessment stage of the study the participant was introduced to the 
study and asked to fill in the scales for each of the 5 juices (targets) they would 
sample. Every juice was assessed on a separate form and as soon as it was completed 
(by putting a tick on the scale), it was removed and replaced by another blank form.
Each juice was presented in an identical disposable cup. The juices had been prepared 
in advance and stored in the refrigerator until they were needed. In this stage of the 
study all 5 target juices were lined up on the table together. Each glass was 
inconspicuously labelled with Greek letters as described previously. The letters used 
do not correspond to any connected sequence of Greek letters and were arbitrarily 
assigned so that they could not be used by participants. The amount of juice was kept 
constant - 50ml. Participants were then asked to rate each juice (either on the shallow 
or deep scale) after tasting the juices for as long as they needed to. The juices were 
swallowed so that the ftill flavour of the juice could be appreciated. The participant 
was allowed to taste the juices in whichever order they wished but could only taste 
one juice before moving onto the next. Between juices the mouth was swilled out with 
a ‘gargle’ of water. Between juices a period of 30 seconds was used as an interval.
Test (recognition stage)
The subjects were presented with all 10 juices, 5 of which they had already tasted 
(targets) and processed either in a deep or shallow fashion, and a further 5 which had
92
not yet been tasted (distracters). This time the juices were again labelled with small 
symbols (actually Egyptian hieroglyphs - not corresponding to their Greek 
alphabetical labelling within the first stage of the study). The order of presentation 
was randomised. The juices were presented in groups of 4, then 3 and then 3. The 
participant was not told how many juices they would taste during this part of the 
study. Participants were asked to decide whether they recognised each juice or not 
before moving onto the next. They only needed to taste as much of the 50ml of juice 
as they required to reach a decision. Their responses were verbally reported to the 
researcher and were recorded.
Following the testing procedure the counting of tongue fungiform papillae was 
conducted. This involved the participant painting their tongue with food colouring 
with the aid of the cotton-bud and the magnifying face mirror. Particular attention was 
paid to covering the anterior body and tip of the tongue and along the mid sagital 
plane of the median sulcus, the area most populated by fungiform papillae. Following 
this the participant was asked to swill their mouth out vigorously with water while 
rubbing the hard palate until all debris of orange juice had been removed along with 
some of the dye. At this point the fungiform papillae (pink in colour) become visible 
to the eye aided by the contrast of the blue that does not adhere to the fungiform 
papillae. Subsequently a standard hole-reinforcer (designed for reinforcing punched 
paper) was placed in the fungiform area and the numbers of papillae were counted. 
Figure 4. 1.
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Figure 4.1: Placement of hole-reinforcer
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Results
Firstly in analysing the data it was essential to clarify that the recognition task was 
sensitive and that participants were not merely performing at random. A one-sample t 
test was performed with 5 acting as the criterion of chance, i.e. a person being correct 
on 5 out of the 10 trials. The mean total correct was 6.02 (SD 1.38) with the 
respective test statistics (t= 5.24, df 49, p< .0005 two tailed). This shows over all 
participants were performing better than chance alone. However we shall see shortly 
some were performing below chance.
Performance on the recognition task was classified in accordance with Signal 
Detection Theory as presented by MacMillan & Creelman (1991). A Response 
Matrix is displayed below. Table 4. 1.
Recognised Not Recognised
Tasted (target) True Positive 
HIT
False Negative 
MISSES
Not Tasted (distracter) False Positive 
FALSE ALARM
True Negative 
CORRECT REJECTION
Table 4.1: Memory profile response matrix
The total number of targets that could be correctly identified is 5, this does not 
produce a good range of scores to form a Gaussian distribution especially when at 
chance people should score at least half correct. Inspection of the data suggests that 
the traditional statistics of d’ and p would be inappropriate due to the small number of 
trials.
Aaronson & Watts (1987) (1984) advocates a sensitivity measure called A’, and a 
measure of criterion (responder bias) called B”. Unlike d’. A’ is defined even if  hit 
and false alarm are equal to or close to 0 or 1. That is to say it can be calculated even
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when performance is nearly perfect or very weak. The equation used was derived 
from Grier (1971) although the measures were first suggested by Pollack and Norman 
(1966) and Hodos (1970). A’ and B” are not exactly the same as d’ and p, but follow 
the same theoretical rationale and are used in the same way as measurers of sensitivity 
and criterion respectively (Aaronson & Watts, 1987). A fuller discussion of A’ and B” 
will be discussed later as the measures recently have come under question, however 
they remain the predominant ‘non parametric’ measures in signal detection theory. 
The calculations used are presented in the appendix.
Having calculated measures of sensitivity and criterion (means and standard 
deviations are shown in Table 4.2, the first hypothesis was investigated; that there 
would be a significant difference in memory between the deep and shallow 
processing. There was no significant difference in sensitivity between the groups (t= 
.165, df = 48, p= .869, two tailed) nor was there a difference in criterion (t= 1.715, df 
= 48, p= .093, two tailed). Figure 4.2a and 4.2b illustrates the variation in A’ and B” 
for the two groups. A completely insensitive taster produces an A’ accuracy measure 
of 0.5, while perfect performance is indicated by an index of 1. Criterion B” varies 
between -1 and +1, with negative scores indicating a lax criterion (a bias to saying 
they had tasted a juice) and positive scores indicate a stringent responder bias. It can 
be seen that most people have scores 0.5 (chance) or higher for A’, and this in accord 
with the single sample t test. However it is also clear some people are performing 
lower than chance. One person in both the shallow and deep task perform below 0, 
both persons were smokers. Could this mean these tasters were confused by the task 
or maybe had confused taste perception? Stanislaw and Todorov (1999) point out 
below 0.5 can either be responder confusion or sampling error. It should be noted 
again that 20% of the sample were smokers additionally past research (Chapter 2)
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shows people on task recognition tasks do not perform very well with most coming in 
around chance. As for the bias B” scores on both tasks the scores are near zero 
suggestive of an ‘uncertain taster who feels like he is guessing, even though s/he 
unconsciously is capable to do the task. Most people’s bias in the deep task was 
around chance (0) while a small number had strong stringent bias (near +1) believing 
they had not tasted any of the drinks before while for the shallow group bias a small 
number were convinced they had tasted all the drinks before (+1) or not tasted any 
before (-1). This is not surprising as participants were not told how many of the 
drinks in the memory task were in the first task, they all could be or all could not be or 
somewhere in the middle. It is possible that their processing made them think they 
had tasted all tastants before as there was nothing in the task to say that was not the 
case.
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Number of people
1 2 '
1 0 '
Std. Dev = .26 
Mean = .61
N = 25.00
-.25 0.00 .25 .50 .75 1.00
A' shallow
Number of people
1 0 '
std. Dev = .28 
Mean = .60
N = 25.00
-.25 0.00 .25 .50 .75 1.00
A' deep
Figure 4.2a: A' sensitivity; the ability to discriminate
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Number of people
2 0 '
1 0 '
std. Dev = .42 
Mean = -.07
N = 25.00
- 1.00 -.50 0.00 .50 1.00
BIAS shallow
Number of people 1 0 '
std. Dev = .30 
Mean = .10
N = 25.00
-.82 -.47 -.11 .24 .59 .95
BIAS deep
Figure 4.2b; B" criterion bias for shallow and deep processing
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In order to investigate whether there was difference between the time that participants 
spent at initial tasting the tastants in the deep and shallow tasks analyses of time at 
tasting was also analysed between the two levels of processing groups; these analyses 
revealed no significant differences. Tasting shallow mean = 8.75 seconds (SD 3.88), 
Tasting deep mean = 10.94 seconds (SD 6.87), (t = 1.386, df =48, p=. 172, two 
tailed). This suggests that there was no difference in tasting times between the 
processing groups.
Next to assess whether there was a difference in memory (A’ and B”) between those 
who tasted for more or less than average time at initial tasting and during the memory 
test. Participants were divided into two groups based on tasting time dividing the 
groups at the mean 9.85 seconds (SD 5.63). Following this, t tests were conducted on 
A’ and B”. Neither proved significantly different, (see Table 4.2).
Longer tasting times 
(above average)
Shorter tasting times 
(below average)
t df P
(2
tailed)
Sensitivity A’ = .65 A’= .57 .942 48 .351
(SD .23) (SD .29)
Bias B”= -.07 B”= .07 1.353 48 .182
(SD .35) (SD .36)
Table 4.2: Sensitivity and bias for tasting time
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Analysis of recognition time was also conducted to discover if there was a difference 
in recognition time between LOP groups. Recognition time was measured as the time 
the drink was first tasted (brought to the lips) to when a clear yes or no verbal 
response was given. These times were pooled together and no effect was found, 
recognition shallow mean = 11.88 (SD 3.94), recognition deep mean = 13.15 (SD 
4.74), (t =1.031, df=48, p = .308).
Subsequently differences in recognition memory (A’ and B”) between above and 
below average recognition time were assessed. Participants were divided into two 
groups based on recognition time dividing the groups at the mean 12.51 (SD 4.36) 
seconds. Following this, t tests were conducted on A’ and B”. Neither proved 
significantly different, see Table 4.3.
Above average tasting 
time
Below average tasting 
time
T df P
(2
tailed)
Sensitivity A’= .66 A’= .56 1.371 48 A l l
(SD .20) (SD .30)
Bias B”= -.02 B”= .04 j5 8 48 .580
(SD .27) (SD .43)
Table4. 3: memory scores in relation to time
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Correlations were conducted to investigate whether A’ or B” were correlated with 
either tasting time or recognition time. No significant correlations were found. 
However a Pearson’s correlation revealed a correlation between tasting time and 
recognition time (r = .419, n =50, p =.002, two tailed). Table 4.4 illustrates these 
relationships and Figure 3, presents the correlation between tasting and recognition.
Correlation Results
A’ & Tasting Time (r = .033, n = 50, p =.818, two tailed)
A’ & Recognition Time (r = .202, n = 50, p = .158, two tailed)
B” & Tasting Time (r = -.202, n = 50, p = .159, two tailed
B” & Recognition Time (r = -.045, n = 50, p = 2756, two tailed
Table 4.4: Correlation coefficients of A’ and B” with time measures
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Figure 4.3: Correlation between tasting and recognition time.
A considerable amount of research has shown that papillae numbers are much reduced 
in smokers. A recent study by Pavlidis, Nikolaidis, Anogeianaki, Dimitrios, Kekes 
and Anogianakis (2009) have further established this effect and also shown that the
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morphology of the papillae statistically differs. If papillae numbers are important then 
it is important to take into account smoking behaviour too. The sample included a 
fairly large number of smokers, for this reason smoking behaviour was included in 
some of the analyses. Smoking behaviour classification was arrived at by verbal 
reports. People were classified as smokers, i.e. smoking more than one a day most 
days, ex smokers or non-smokers. Overall the sample included 36 non smokers 
(72%), 3 ex smokers (6%) and 11 smokers (22%).
To make sure that there was no difference in smokers between the LOP conditions, a 
Mann-Whitney test was performed and revealed no effect z= .494, p > .05. The 
selection of the Mann-Whitney was based on the fact that the smoking behaviour 
classification could not be considered anything other than nominal or ordinal.
With the levels of processing results out of the way our attention now turns to 
papillae. To address whether there is any effect on memory due to papillae numbers. 
Firstly to discover whether there would be a correlation between number of papillae 
and memory two Pearson’s product moment correlations were conducted between 
papillae density and sensitivity/accuracy (r = .174, n = 50, p= .228, two tailed) and for 
the criterion (r = .033, n = 50, p= .818, two tailed) both proved not significant. Scatter 
plots (Figure 4.4) are subsequently presented illustrating the lack of correlation.
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Figure 4. 4: Scatterplots of A’ sensitivity and B” criterion against number of papillae density.
Additionally t tests revealed no difference in memory (A’ or B”) between those above 
or below the mean papillae count of 16.24.
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Above
average
papillae
count
Below
average
papillae
count
t Df p  (2 tailed)
grouping grouping
Sensitivity A’= .67 
(SD .20)
A’= .54 
(SD .31)
1.733 48 .089
Bias B”= .05 
(SD .43)
B”= -.02 
(SD .31)
.620 48 .538
Table4. 5: Papillae count and memory scores.
Past research indicates a relationship between papillae count and smoking behaviour. 
To investigate this possibility of a correlation, a Spearman’s Rank correlation was 
conducted supporting previous findings (Rho = -.416, N = 50, p =.003, two tailed). 
See Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Papillae count in relation to smoking behaviour
A further point of interest was to see whether the papillae would correlate with tasting 
time. No correlation was evident (r = -. 118, N = 50, p = .416, two tailed). No 
correlation was found for recognition time and papillae count (r = -.129, N = 50, p = 
.371, two tailed).
Next, when the mean ratings from the shallow (pulpiness) scales were compiled, it 
was possible to rank order the juices from perceived non-pulpy (1) to (10) most pulpy. 
Ranking of mean liking was also produced, rank 10 was best liked. Sets of ranks are 
illustrated in Table 4.6a and 4.6b.
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Rank Perceived Pulpiness o f  the juices Juice
1 Tesco Healthy with added calcium
2 Tesco Value from Concentrate
3 Del Monte Smooth
4.5 Tesco smooth
4.5 Tesco organic from concentrate
6 Tropicana with added calcium
7 Tesco Organic Smooth not from concentrate
8 Del Monte with Bits
9 Tropicana with bits
10 Tesco finest
6a
Rank Liking judgements for each juice Juice
1 Del Monte Smooth
2 Tesco Value from Concentrate
3 Del Monte with Bits
4 Tropicana with added calcium
5 Tesco smooth
6 Tesco Organic Smooth not from concentrate
7.5 Tesco Healthy with added calcium
7.5 Tesco organic from concentrate
9 Tropicana with bits
10 Tesco finest
6b
Table 4.6: Rankings for pulpiness and liking judgements
One important issue in the design was finding a measure of deep processing and 
shallow processing. Liking and pulpiness judgments were selected for these roles. 
However correlational analysis reveals that these two tasks were correlated (r = .787, 
n = 10, p = .007, two tailed). The correlation is illustrated below in Figure 4.6. Juice 
identification numbers are listed now.
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GROUPA 
Tropicana squeezed with added calcium, 
Tesco Finest with bits squeezed,
Del Monte smooth from concentrate, 
Tesco value from concentrate, 
Tropicana squeezed with bits.
Juice number 
1 
2
3
4
5
GROUP B
Tesco smooth concentrate, 6
Tesco organic from concentrate, 7
Tesco healthy living modified orange juices with added calcium, 8
Del Monte with bits from concentrate 9
__________________Tesco organic smooth.________________________ 10
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
4.5 5.0 6.0 6.5 7.05.5 7.5
Rsq = 0.6192
liking rating
Figure 4.6: The deep task (liking rating) and shallow task (pulpiness) rating are correlated.
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Finally using signal detection it was not possible to calculate A’ or B” for individual 
juices across all individuals. Therefore it is not possible to profile the memory for 
each juice.
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Discussion
Study One had two main hypotheses to address; firstly, whether a levels of processing 
(LOP) effect could be found and secondly, whether there was an effect on memory 
from papillae density. No significant effect of LOP was identified in measures of 
sensitivity/accuracy A’ or in responder bias B”. An inspection of the data revealed 
that 8 (4 shallow, 4 deep) out of the 50 participants scored less than 0.5 (insensitivity, 
responding at chance level). This finding can be tentatively explained, perhaps these 
participants found the task too difficult or confusing this may be a result of the large 
number of smokers in the study or simply taste recognition is considered to be 
difficult (Mojet & Koster, 2002).
Next, the prospect of an effect on memoiy due to perceptual sensitivity (measured by 
the number of papillae) was also refuted, failing to support the second hypothesis. 
While within the current sample the samples range of papillae was similar to those 
presented in the literature, it was observed that the present study included a substantial 
number of non-tasters (those with less than 15 papillae) and smokers. However it 
was found that these variables were related. This correlation is consistent with the 
literature Pelchat and Danowski (1992).
The methodology used to assess LOP in taste had been influenced by LOP research in 
other sensory modalities, namely vision and auditory. However it had not been used 
in the gustatory modality before. As such it was possible that the experiment may 
have been insensitive and overly difficult as suggested above, with people only 
guessing whether they had tasted a juice or not, which would not be very informative
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in discovering real memory effects. However, statistical analyses reveal that the task, 
while challenging, was pitched at a sensible level. Most of the participants scores 
were sufficiently distributed and above the level of chance.
Analysis of time at initial tasting and time at recognition were not statistically 
different between the shallow and deep conditions, and so this rules out a potentially 
confounding variable. Time is not the pertinent factor in memory.
As with all research the question of which statically methods to use is a bit of an art 
and also can result in criticism of being too lenient or to strict. Signal detection 
theory is a well accepted statistical method within psychology, however Stanislaw and 
Todorov (1999) remind us that it is often underutilised and they argue this is because 
relevant text books do not go into the details of the maths underlying the method. 
When the maths that underlie the method are explained such as in Stanislaw and 
Todorov (1999), and (Macmillan and Creelman, 1991, 2005) the explanations are 
convoluted and as decipherable as hieroglyphics. To make matters worse the literature 
is in disagreement over which measure to use. For example with the most basic and 
familiar measure of d’, the bias p is mostly used however some now suggest c instead 
(Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). When it comes to what measure to use with data around 
chance levels and data that are parametric the researcher is left in quandary.
A potential problem with the study relates to the measures of A’ and B”, although 
they are the most popular alternative to d’ and p and advocated by many such as Ward 
(1984), Grier (1971), and MacMillan & Creelman (1991). However some have
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questioned the validity of A’ and B”, and suggested a slight modification to the 
calculations. In the present study it was decided to accept A’ and B” until further 
support is given for the new alteration proposed by Zhang and Muller (2005). 
Pastone, Crawley and Skelly (2003) go into detail about misconceptions surrounding 
nonparametric signal detection measures and argue that the term nonparametric may 
not be a perfect description of the measures as depending on the interpretation of the 
maths not all the assumptions of the parametric tests are abandoned. However the 
initial problems that suggested the avoidance of the traditional measures remain, that 
of low sample size, low number of trials and low score range (maximum of five when 
chance alone would produce a score of between 2 and 3). The Gaussians produced 
from the data are at best staccato and in no manner smoothly bells shaped. While the 
parametric assumptions were grounds to avoid the traditional measures of signal 
detection which seems to heavily mathematical and confusing even to experts in the 
field use of standard parametric tests such as the t test were not avoided as they are 
robust measures and they are very familiar to all readers.
The study clearly revealed results suggesting no LOP effect at the level of taste. A 
number of precautionary analyses focusing on a number of potential design problems 
and confounds were eliminated, suggesting that the lack of effect may be real.
However, potential concerns still exist that could be considered in future research. 
The most important relates to the general problem of LOP theory, namely a lack of an 
objective measure of depth. It is possible that the lack of an effect of LOP was 
because the assessing for pulp and assessing for liking may not be that dissimilar in
112
depth. While liking is often used as a deep process (Hyde, & Jenkins, (1969), Naime 
& Pandeirada (2008), Challis, Bradford, Brodbeck, David (1992); In the auditory and 
visual domains, it may not be with taste, or at least it may be less deep. Taste liking 
may be an instinctive and automatic process that we do every time we taste 
something. This is not the case generally with visual and auditory data, while we can 
assess it for liking, it may be more at a higher cognitive/intellectual level than with 
taste which may be more basic and fundamental. Similarly the shallow task of 
assessing pulp content may not have been shallow, or more correctly that shallow, as 
depth is not a dichotomous variable but rather a continuum. A potential shallow 
property could be temperature. However, this has its own problems as a real change in 
temperature can change the taste of food substances. The tasks in the study may have 
been too similar in depth, and future research would require suitable tasks at deeper or 
shallower levels. This is an objectifiably difficult task, it may even be that LOP in the 
gustatory domain does not exist. If this is the case, it contrasts sharply with LOP in 
the other modalities, but it is possible that using ‘liking’, while generally a deep 
process, may not be so within the gustatory domain. If this is the case a LOP effect 
may still exist, but its hierarchy of task depth may be different between domains.
Consistent with past research a high degree of variation in number of papillae was 
found with some non tasters ‘living in a pastel tasting world’ and average tasters and 
some super tasters living in a ‘neon tasting world’ (Prutkin, et al 2000, Bartoshuk 
2005).
However, while the method used for counting papillae is generally considered reliable 
and valid, it may be prudent to be cautious. While the counting of papillae is fairly 
easy, a degree of subjectivity enters into the counting of the papillae. In some cases it
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was difficult to know what to include and what not to include, especially with small 
papillae, and this could have resulted in a conservative counting of papillae. In future 
research, this problem could easily be overcome by taking a digital photo of the 
tongue at high magnification and having the number of papillae counted by two 
researchers. A superior method would be to use PROP alongside counting the taste 
buds. While the use of PROP has the limitation of only being able to categorise 
people as non-tasters, normal tasters or super tasters, it does this very well and could 
be used as another measure of taster sensitivity.
In conclusion there was no evidence for a levels of processing effect for taste. 
Additionally potential confounds such as time were shown to not have had an effect. 
Additionally it was revealed that there was no effect of papillae counts on subsequent 
memory performance. The main problem identified with the study was that the two 
orientating tasks were correlated, and may have been tapping into the same/similar 
level of processing. The next study will aim to overcome this issue with a new 
orientating task which will hopefully not correlate. The next study will focus on LOP 
alone as no effect was shown for the papillae.
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Chapter Five 
Study two: Going deeper and shailower in search of 
Leveis of Processing
Introduction
This study is a follow up to the previous study. The previous study had both a deep 
(liking) and shallow (pulpiness assessment) orientating task which on analysis were 
shown to be correlated. This study will aim to search out whether a LOP effect does 
exist by going deeper and shallower. Instead of just thinking how much oneself likes 
each tastants now participants had to process it ‘deeper’ for how much a significant 
other (e.g. partner, parent or friend) would like the taste. The new shallower task was 
to assess how big a sip they had taken. It is difficult to see how the surface 
characteristic of volume could in anyway be anything other than shallow. It is 
conceivable to understand that the pulpiness of orange juice is not just a surface 
characteristic but is a quality that people focus in on when assessing how much 
someone likes a juice. After all many people do have a preference one way or another.
Method 
Subjects
Opportunity samples of 62 people, mainly students were enrolled for the study. Mean 
age of the sample was 24.7 (SD 5.82). The sample comprised 54 Caucasians, 5 Asian 
and 3 black. The gender ratio of the sample was exactly equal. The sample was then 
divided into those in the sip-size shallow group (n=22), liking deep condition (n =18), 
and liking by significant other deepest level (n=22). The shallow and deepest groups 
had equal sex ratios while the deep (liking) condition had 12 females and 6 males.
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Smoking behaviour was not recorded nor was papillae counts. One person was 
excluded as they had a cold and had very poor sense of taste and did not feel they 
could drink the number of juices used in the study.
Apparatus 
Foodstuffs
The juices in study two were the same as those in the previous study. Specifically the 
study involved the use of 10 orange juices including some of the market leaders such 
as Del Monte and Tropicana alongside a selection of own brand juices. The juices 
selected were representative of those on the market including juices from concentrate 
and squeezed varieties, alongside smooth or bitty juices. The sample also included 
two organic juices and some ‘health’ juices i.e. extra calcium. All the own brand 
orange juices were Tesco products, (see previous chapter for more detail).
Scales
Three scales were used in this study (see appendices for copies). The scales were the 
liking scale (deep) as used in study one, ‘sip-size’ estimation scale (shallow) and 
‘liking-by significant-other’ scale, which was the deepest scale. The liking scale was 
a 9 point scale ranging from 1 dislike extremely to 9 like extremely, identical to 
previous study.. This has the advantage of being able to test people who do and do 
not like orange juice. This liking scale has the advantage of being an ecologically 
valid form of assessment of a drink product, i.e. we often assess what we ingest for 
how likable/pleasant it is. The liking by significant other scale was similar to the 
liking scale but the participant had to make their assessment based on what they felt
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their significant-other would assess the juice on the 9 point scale. The choice of 
significant other was up to them but had to remain constant throughout, suggested 
significant others included parents or partners but they were fi*ee to choose anyone 
they share a close relationship with. This should be involve deeper analysis than how 
much oneself likes a juice and should produce a more elaborate longer lasting and 
stronger memory trace The sip size estimation scale also involved a 9 point scale 
ranging from (1) extremely under sipped to (9) extremely over sipped. This scale 
replaced pulpiness assessment as a shallow task. The sip size estimation was in 
relation to whether they felt they over or undersipped each tastants compared to how 
much of a sip they took from an initial glass of water at the start which was 50ml in 
total.
Procedure/ Design
The participants were blind to the true nature of the study, i.e. that it was a memory 
task. They were simply told that the research involved tasting orange juices and 
formed part of continuing research into orange juices.
The design and procedure was very similar to study one, with the exception that the 
papillae were not counted. Additionally and more importantly there were three levels 
of orientating task, liking-by-significant-other (deepest), liking (deep) and sip-size 
assessment (shallow). The procedure is now discussed in more detail.
The juices were randomly allocated to 2 groups, GROUP A and GROUP B. Half of 
subjects had GROUP A as targets and the GROUP B juices as distracters. The other
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half of participants received the opposite. This was counter balanced. By doing this all 
juices would be used as targets and as distracters. The order of presentation of juices 
within a trial was random. This is identical to study one.
Pro test
The pre-test was identical to study one except that different scales were used for the 
different orientating tasks. All participants had a 50ml drink of water with which they 
could swill their mouths with to start. Those in the shallow condition were told they 
could use as much or as little of the water to use to swill their mouth but they should 
take a conscious note of how much they used. The exact volume was not reported to 
them and their estimation of sip volume was therefore a ‘relative’ one.
Test (recognition stage)
The subjects were presented with all 10 juices, 5 of which they had already tasted 
(targets) and processed either in a deep or shallow fashion, and a further 5 which had 
not yet been tasted (distracters). The order of presentation was randomised. The juices 
were presented in groups of 4, then 3 and then 3. The participant was not told how 
many juices they would taste during this part of the study. Participants were asked to 
decide whether they recognised each juice or not before moving onto the next. They 
only needed to taste as much of the 50ml of juice as they required to reach a decision. 
Their responses were verbally reported to the researcher and were recorded. This is 
identical to the previous study.
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Following the findings from the previous study papillae counts were not conducted 
this time.
Results
Firstly after compiling the data, correlations were conducted on the orientating tasks 
to ascertain that they were unrelated. Correlation analysis revealed that sip-size 
estimation and liking judgments were not correlated (r = - .351, n =10, p = .319, two 
tailed). This result overcomes the problems of correlation discovered in study one 
between the deep and shallow orientating tasks. Liking and liking-by-significant-other 
were shown to be correlated ( r = .725, n = 10, p =.018, two tailed). This suggests that 
these tasks could have been utilising similar levels of processing. No significant 
correlation was found between liking-by-significant-other and sip-size judgments on 
each of the ten juices, ( r = -.525, n = 10, p > .05, two tailed). These relationships are 
illustrated in figure 5.1, 5.2 &5. 3. In all the following three graphs the tastant mean 
rating is displayed.
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Figure 5.1: Scatterplot for correlations between deep (liking) and shallow (sip size) task
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Figure 5.2: Scatterplot showing liking-by-significant-other (deeper) and liking (deep) judgements 
are correlated
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Figure 5. 3: Scatterplot liking-by-significant-other (deepest) and sip-size (shallow) are not 
correlated
To ascertain whether overall participants were performing better than chance a one 
sample t test was conducted which showed that participants were performing better 
than chance with a mean total correct 5.67 (SD 1.42), ( t = 3.69, n = 60 p< .001, two 
tailed). In the previous study the mean total correct was 6.02 (SD 1.38).
Performance on the recognition task was classified in accordance with Signal 
Detection Theory. As with study one. A’ and B” were used, these can be defined 
even if Hit and False alarm are equal to or close to 0 or 1. (See the preceding study for 
more details about A’ and B”.)
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One-way ANOVA examined sensitivity (A’) for the three levels of processing 
conditions. ANOVA revealed a non-significant result for sensitivity, ( F ( 2, 49) 
=.824, p = .625). These sensitivity results are illustrated in Figure 5. 4.
1.0
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Figure 5.4: sensitivity scores (means plus Cl) for deep (liking) shallow (sip-size) and (deepest) 
liking-by-significant other
Next ANOVA was used to investigate whether there was a LOP effect for memory 
bias, no statistically significant effect was found (F ( 2,49) = .824, p = 625), see 
Figure 5. 5.
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Figure 5. 3: bias scores (means plus Cl) for deep (liking) shallow (sip-size) and (deepest) liking- 
by-significant other
Next, a Pearson’s correlation revealed a correlation between the amount of juices 
(volume) an individual tasted initially and subsequently during the recognition task 
(r= .803, n = 62, p< 0.001, two tailed). See Figure 5.6 for this relationship. This 
correlation suggests that people who require more tastants during the initial tasting 
also did so for recognition. Those who needed little tastants at initial tasting also 
needed little at recognition.
123
4 0
30"
20 .
1 0 .
0 10 20 30
mean sip at recognition (ml)
Figure 5.6: correlation of mean amount of tastants tasted by each participant at initial tasting 
and recognition
As shown in the literature the issue of times is an important issue to take into account 
(see chapter 2) As with study one, time at tasting and time at recognition time was 
shown to be correlated suggesting that a person who spend longer on the one is likely 
to also take longer on the other, ( r = .601, n = 62, p < .001, two tailed). Figure 5.7 
illustrates this correlation. This could be related to the amount of time needed to 
adequately process the stimuli (and the task).
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Figure 5.7: correlation between initial tasting time during orientation task and at subsequent 
recognition
Following the above correlations, Spearman’s correlations were conducted to 
investigate whether the two time measures related to the sip sizes at both stages of the 
study. No correlations were found, firstly for initial tasting time and sip-size amount ( 
r = .052, n =62, p < .05, two-tailed), nor for time at recognition and amount tasted at 
that time, (r = -.224, n=4 = 62, p = .080, two tailed); this however is approaching 
significance.
ANOVA was used to investigate whether there were any differences between the 
levels of processing groups in terms of time at initial tasting, at recognition and for 
amount of tastants consumed at both stages of the study. No significant different 
results were found except for amount consumed (volume) at initial tasting. The
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shallow group tasted more than their deep counterparts. Tukey HSD showed this 
difference was significant at p< .05. However, as Figure 8 shows, there is overlap in 
the confidence intervals. The descriptives, F values and p values are illustrated in 
Table 5.1.
Initial time Mean SD d f F P value
Deeper 7.45 2.72 (2,59) nil >.05
Deep 4.87
Shallow 7.8 2.7
Recognition Mean SD df F P value
time
Deeper 12.5 4.71 (2, 59) .165 >.05
Deep 11.94 628
Shallow 11.64 4.18
Initial sip Mean SD df F P value
amount
Deeper 13.9 5.4 (2,59) 3.57 = .035 .108
Deep 12.31 6.8
Shallow 17.46 6.74
Recognition Mean SD df F P value
sip amount
Deeper 12.17 4.9 (2,59) .698 >.05
Deep 12.4 7.7
Shallow 14.1 4.9
Table 5.1: ANOVA results and descriptives between tbe levels of processing groups deeper 
(liking-by-significant-other), deep (liking), and (sip-size) shallow in terms of time measures and 
volume of tastants consumed (ml).
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Figures. 8: sip volume consumed during the orientation tasks for the three levels of processing 
groups; deeper (liking-by-significant-other), deep (liking), and shallow (sip-size)
Further t tests also revealed no differenee in memory performanee (A’ and B”) 
between the two juice groups. This is consistent with the previous study and is to be 
expeeted, as it suggests that neither group of juices were any more memorable than 
the other set. See Table 5.2.
Group A tastants Group B Tastants t test
Mean Sensitivity .56 (SD.14) .46 (SD .25) /=1.89, n= 60, p>
A’ .05, two-tailed
Mean Bias B” .11 (SD .20) .03 (SD .21) /=1.64, n= 60, p>
.05, two-tailed
Table 5.2: Mean sensitivity and bias scores for both tastant groups
Correlations were conducted to investigate whether A’ or B” were eorrelated with 
either tasting time or reeognition time. No significant correlations were found. Table 
5.3 displays this absence of correlation.
127
tasting time recognition time
A’ .026 .078
(p = .840) ( P  = .545)
B” -.051 .037
(p = .695) (p = .776)
Table 5.3: Correlations between sensitivity (A’) and bias (B”) and bow long participants take to 
taste initially or perform in tbe recognition task
Discussion
The study was successful in identifying two orientating tasks that are not correlated; 
suggesting that the tasks do not ‘tap into’ the same level of processing. The lack of 
correlation between the tasks should have made any LOP easier to identify. When the 
sensitivity A’ and bias B” measures of memory performance were analysed between 
the levels of processing groups, no effect of depth of processing was found. This is 
consistent with the preceding study and implies that a LOP effect for taste (including 
tastant texture) does not exist. This is contrary to the predictions made by LOP theory. 
The experimental design was strong and should have revealed an effect if one existed. 
Analysis of the data revealed no effects of time. For example, no LOP group tasted 
for any significant different amount of time. The study did reveal that there was a 
significant correlation between an individual’s sip size at initial tasting and at 
recognition, revealing that the more someone sips initially the more time they take at 
recognition.
The lack of a LOP effect is interesting as it challenges LOP, which has been the most 
influential conceptualisation and methodological framework in the last 30 years of
128
memory research. Whilst having great influence, it is not without its critics. It has 
been criticised as tautological, as it has no objective measure of depth and that it is an 
oversimplification. This suggests a number of possibilities. It is possible that for taste 
or more correctly flavour perception (this incorporates olfactory and gustatory 
sensation), the stimuli are always processed deeply. Alternatively it is possible, liking 
is not a deep process when it comes to taste, which would be distinctly different fi*om 
memory generally. From everyday experience it seems that liking is assessed 
automatically and instantly. It is possible that the orientating tasks while uncorrelated, 
did not sufficiently well represent the polarity of ‘depth’ and ‘shallowness’, yet it is 
difficult to think of qualities which are obviously very deep and very shallow. In the 
preceding study, the quality of pulpiness which is a surface characteristic of an orange 
juice, was considered a priori to be shallow but on analysis was found to be 
significantly correlated with liking, a supposed deep quality to be processed. It is also 
possible that food memory has not evolved for identifying to any great extent what 
has been tasted, but may be better at recognising novel/new tastes as this may have an 
evolutionary advantage. It does not really matter if a food generally tastes normal, but 
‘off tasting’ or unusual tastes are well perceived and may be more important to 
memory. This may suggest asking people if they can identify what they have not 
tasted, may be a better task to find a memory effect. Having no effect may just be an 
artefact of the question of how the recognition task was phrased. This hypothesis that 
memory for food has developed to identify difference and novelty has recently been 
suggested by Mojet & Koster (in Press). These possibilities leave the issue open to 
question or may generally be just ‘clutching at straws’.
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One issue so far neglected was the sample sizes in these studies. It is possible the lack 
of the LOP effect is due to a lack of statistical power in the studies. The use of one­
tailed testing which could be theoretically justified would have provided results in the 
predicted directions and results approaching statistical significance. Two-tailed tests 
are inherently conservative (less prone to Type one error but more to Type two 
errors). Based on recommendations suggested by Fife-Schaw (2002) and Howitt & 
Cramer (2008) one-tailed a priori tests were rarely made in this thesis. This position 
could be considered overly conservative.
Further research would replicate this study or attempt to find tasks that could be 
considered even shallower or even deeper and see whether a LOP effect could be 
demonstrated. An alternative line of enquiry could pursue the possibility that food 
memory has evolved to taste novelty. One way of examining this would be to 
investigate how memory is processed, and if prototypical stimuli are better recognized 
or more deviant forms better remembered. It would also need to include how these 
categories are arranged and do they overlap, is there a hierarchy and how does this all 
relate to memory performance? Future research would also benefit from increased 
sample sizes and expected effect size and power calculations established.
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Chapter Six 
Levels of processing and papillae density; Synopsis 
and discussion
One of the areas that have received little interest in research on the psychology of 
food has been the role of memory. Section Two presented two studies investigating 
levels of processing for taste. The first study also investigated whether papillae 
density (the number of papillae within a specific area) had any effect on memory. 
This was based on the idea that the more taste buds a person has the superior the taste 
perception and therefore potentially better taste memory too. The key findings of 
section two are as follows;
No levels of processing effect was identified between those who tasted deeply (with a 
liking orientating task) and shallow (pulpiness rating).
The orientating tasks were designed to be unrelated and therefore tap into different 
levels of processing. However this was unsuccessful as the orientating tasks were 
shown to be correlated. In hind sight this is not surprising as many people like or 
dislike a juice based on whether it is pulpy or not.
Study Two utilised orientating tasks which were designed to orientate at even deeper 
and shallower levels. The liking task fi*om the previous study was retained and 
accompanied by a deeper orientating task (how much would a significant other like 
the juice?) and a shallower task of sip size estimation. These tasks were shown to be 
not correlated and therefore should involve cleanly different levels of processing. 
Still no levels of processing effect were shown.
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While no LOP effect for taste was found this does not necessarily mean no LOP effect 
exists for food memory for such things at branded food as brands may comprise 
complex characteristics beyond simple tastes, such as advert songs, images or 
associated ideas i.e. sensuality and Flake, .improved ‘work rest and play’ with Mars 
and quality and extravagance with M&S foods. The lack of a LOP effect goes against 
LOP theory
The ability to correctly identify what has been tasted before seems to be a difficult 
task consistent with previous research. While over all performance was slight better 
than chance, performance would not be considered to be effective.
No effects of papillae density were found on memory performance.
The main methodological issues relating to the studies were:
While signal detection theory is a well respected method within psychology the 
‘preferred’ method of choice is a matter of controversy. This is more so for so called 
‘nonparametric measures such as A’ and B”. Despite this controversy the two 
measures were employed as they still arguably remain the most commonly used 
‘nonparametric’ measures.
While counting papillae using the food colouring dye method is well established and 
is a valid method, it was felt that the method is vulnerable to issues of reliability as the 
counting of papillae is not as easy as it sounds.
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The study utilised relatively small sample sizes and these are associated with low 
statistical power.
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Section 3: Categorical Perception 
Chapter Seven: Section overview and Categorical 
perception literature review.
The focus of this section is on the three studies conducted to investigate categorical 
perception for tastants. The tastants will be mixes of two ‘tastes’ such as orange and 
lemon mixed together. These mixtures are called binary mixtures. The primary aim of 
this section was to identify categorisation and categorical perception effects for taste. 
Additionally the areas furthest from category boundaries were investigated as these 
were considered to be the area where prototypes exist. And finally the effect of time 
delays on CP for taste was studied.
This first chapter of Section Three introduces the reader to concept/category research 
and in particular the categorical perception literature which was very briefly discussed 
in Section One. This is a more comprehensive discussion; firstly positioned in an 
evolutionary perspective (a common background context in chemical senses and taste 
research) and secondly taking into account different theoretical perspectives that have 
developed since categorical perception was first demonstrated for sound. The bulk of 
the literature on categorical perception (CP) effect was developed in the far-senses of 
vision and audition. From that starting point, a rationale is presented suggesting the 
need to test the CP effect for food (specifically flavour) and considering whether the
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effect is just perceptual. The concept of taste-space is also introduced. Those familiar 
with research on categories and CP and its background context can leap forward to the 
subsection; Warped space, magnets and shifts towards prototypes.
Chapter Eight presents Study One: Categorical perception in the taste domain. This 
includes a brief introduction, method, results and a brief discussion. The chapter also 
presents the pilot studies involved in producing a binary tastant mixture needed in the 
study.
Chapter Nine presents Study Two: Widening the search for CP over three binary- 
mixture taste-space terrains. This study aimed to replicate the CP effect found in the 
previous study using the lemon/orange binary mixture. Furthermore, two more binary 
mixtures were formulated and tested for CP effects. Effects around prototypes were 
also investigated to test prototype theories. This chapter includes a brief introduction, 
method, results and discussion. The taste-space pilot study on the two new binary 
mixtures is presented in Chapter Nine.
Chapter Ten presents the final study on CP. Study Three: Is CP just perceptual? The 
effects of a time delay. This study is essentially a replication of the first CP study with 
the main addition of a time delay. An introduction, method, results and discussion are 
included.
Chapter Eleven is a discussion of the main findings of Section Three. This focuses on 
CP within the taste domain. Limitations and future directions are briefly introduced. A
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review and discussion of this section along with the previous section is found in 
Section Four.
Categorical Perception: a review 
Categories and concepts
Dodwell (1995) has pertinently observed that perception on the surface appears 
largely effortless. However he goes on to state that to truly comprehend ‘perception 
is nevertheless a great challenge’. While the research on perception is well 
established, the bulk of the research evidence and theory has developed on the distal 
senses of vision and hearing. With vision for example, we are confronted with a 
‘buzzing confusion’ all around us, yet all seems to make perceptual sense (it is 
unlikely computer science will match this skill artificially for some time yet). Our 
eyes and mind have developed the capacity to perceive with an extraordinary degree 
of accuracy; mostly only failing when confronted with some form of manmade 
illusion or natural camouflage. Humans have been gifted with depth perception, and 
perceptual constancy for size, shape, location, brightness and colour. Alongside these 
we have an ability to perceive motion and patterns. Pattern and object 
perception/recognition may benefit from some form of feature detection or prototype 
detection. Our perceptual abilities may be largely bottom-up (data driven) as 
suggested by perceptual processing theorists such as Gibson (1966, 1979) or involve 
top-down (or conceptually driven) perceptual processing relying on our mental 
semantic systems and shaped by learning. This chapter will discuss these issues in 
some depth.
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With visually presented objects whether they are faces, cups, sabre-toothed tigers the 
object/entity must arguably go through a number of stages of analysis before the 
object can be recognised. Two well known theories in this research include Marr’s 
(1982) computational theory and Biederman’s recognition-by-components theory. 
Regardless of the theory employed in understanding object recognition it is clear a 
number of problems have to be overcome. Firstly; how different are objects needed 
to be, to be categorised together or separately? The second problem is how do the 
object features get processed, separately or as a gestalt whole?
One feature of any object is its colour; the concept of colour can be divided into many 
categories such as red, blue and yellow. Between some of these categories other 
categories can be found such as orange and green. This begs the question how do 
people categorise colour? What has been found and has already been introduced is 
that colour-space is warped and that there is a clear categorical warping for example 
of perception between a blue and a green item. This warping of colour perception is 
interesting as it does not relate to the physical light waveform received by the eye, 
which is a steady continuum and not categorical and staggered. This is clearly evident 
when considering a rainbow; the many colours we perceive are generated by our 
minds and not what is ‘truly’ out there (Figure 7.1.).
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Figure 7.1.: the colour spectrum appears to be comprised of clearly distinct colours
What is in front of us when we view a rainbow is light spread aeross its wavelength, 
in a continuum and not the clear poekets-of-eolour categories that they appear to be. 
A vivid metaphor of this would be seeing a staircase which you believe you can walk 
down (looking like a series of elearly defined step) it is in fact more like a slide- a 
clear smooth gradient. If we were to try climb up it we eould end up sliding down it 
like a child on a playground slide.
At this point it is useful to acknowledge that the literature is inconsistent on the 
definitions of concepts and categories (Murphy 2002). For our purpose this 
diserepancy is not of too much importance; however, from here on, eoncepts will be 
defined as the mental representation of classes of objects or other entities, whilst 
categories are classes of objects embodied within concepts. It is important to 
remember that as people categorise the world in different ways and at different levels 
of elaboration the exact nature of categorisation is likely to have a high degree of 
individual differences. It is possible an artist will be able to categorise colour far more 
comprehensively than a lay person and a botanist is likely to be able to categorise 
plants more elaborately than a lay person (it is not clear to what extent this 
categorisation is due to language and/or experience and not perception per se). What
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however has becomes clear is categorisation processing is hierarchical in architecture. 
This is somewhat like a taxonomy tree with concepts or categories as the tree or main 
limbs, while individual objects are the twigs. It is clear that everyone has different 
abilities to set up their own mental trees, influenced most likely by langage, culture 
and education. Rosch, Mervis Gray, Johnson and Boyes-Braem (1976) identified 
three levels within such hierarchies, with superordinate categories at the top and basic 
ones at the bottom. For example ‘furniture’ can be considered a superordinate 
category whilst ‘sofa’ is a subordinate category and a ‘sofabed’ is a basic level 
category. The basic level of categorisation is considered (in most cases) to be most 
useful as it has the most efficient balance of distinctiveness against informativeness. 
Rosch et ah (1976) pointed out the ‘informative value’ is missing at the highest level 
of the hierarchy, and distinctiveness at the lowest level.
The way the object is categorised seems to be due to some form of attribute/feature 
processing or based on comparison with a prototype of some form. The earliest 
theorising on recognition and object identification was by Plato, in his early work on 
his doctrine of innatism- the belief that we are bom programmed with certain kinds of 
knowledge (an early version of nativism). This he demonstrated by questioning 
whether a young ‘uneducated’ slave could recognise a selection of shapes and indeed 
the slave could identify a triangle as a triangle. His explanation for this ability was 
that we all possess immortal souls which have had a previous existence, so that all 
learning is really just ‘recollection’ or anamnesis of an ideal form. These ‘ideal 
forms’ are templates/prototypes of things experienced in the real world. A chair for 
example is compared to the ideal form chair held in our soul and therefore we can 
identify it. Plato’s experiment may have been rather simplistic and ineffective but his 
ideas that we can identify and categorise items in the real world by comparing them to
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an ideal form ‘prototype/template’ in the soul (mind) was a clever idea that was taken 
up again in the twentieth century in a modified form. Rosch and Mervis (1975) work 
on categorisation employed a prototype approach, where items were divided into six 
categories including fiimiture, fruit, vehicles, weapons, clothing and vegetables. 
What they demonstrated was that the most prototypical item of a category was 
considered the most typical of its kind sharing most similarity with its kind. Thus 
chair, sofa and table are more prototypical of furniture than closet, vase and 
telephone, similarly orange and apple are most typical of fruits whilst tomato and 
olive are not very typical, furthermore peas and carrots are typical vegetables but 
pumpkin and rice score low in terms of being a typical vegetable. This line of thought 
requires us to consider what ‘food’ is.
As omnivores we are confronted with a considerable plethora of foods. This range of 
potential food sources in the 21®^ century is now considerably driven by the worldwide 
food market. Food can be considered to be a concept (or a superordinate category), a 
banana is food but soil and faeces are not, except when a person is exhibiting the 
‘clinical’ conditions of geophagia or coprophagia respectively (Persaud, 2003 
provides an excellent coverage of pica and other unusual food habits in the clinical 
literature, Persaud’s coverage including reference to the Greek physician Galen and 
cross-cultural examples reminding us that what is considered as edible or not is 
historically and culturally dependent). As a cultural example, in the west few would 
eat insect but for the vast majority of the human population in Asia and Afirica would 
consider insects a staple food source or even a delicacy. Within this concept of ‘food’ 
there is finit and vegetables (cereals), dairy and meat and fish. Each of these 
categories of food can be subdivided into basic categories such as oranges and lemons 
for fruit. This thesis will consider these basic categories of taste (e.g. orange and
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lemon) as they are basic and are likely to be the most usefiil in distinguishing between 
foods. Researching high level categories that relate to such things as what is a food 
and what is not a food would also be difficult to investigate. This is commonsense and 
is in accord with Rosch’s (1976) assertion that basic categories are most often used by 
people as they possess the best combination of distinctiveness and informativeness. 
The stimuli (i.e, orange, lemon and blackcurrant) in the following studies are likely to 
be considered real drinks in at least the majority of human cultures.
Defining Categoricai perception
Liberman, Harris, Hoffman & Griffith (1957) were the first to demonstrate what 
would become identified as categorical perception (CP). Liberman et al. (1957) 
demonstrated that when participants listened to sounds along a ‘voicing continuum’, 
such as the ‘ba-pa’ continuum they hear only the has and pas. The intermediate b/pa 
(integrated b and p) were never reported. This effect in which a perceptual jump of 
category occurs along a continuum, as opposed to a gradual change was to become 
the hallmark of CP; Figure 7.2 illustrates such an effect for discrimination of a b/d 
spectrum. Between stimuli 4 and 5 there is a category boundary; on one side items are 
‘b’ and on the other side, they are ‘d’; discriminability is heightened around the 
boundary.
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Figure 7.2: Categorical perception for ‘b/d’ spectrum
The similarity with colour discussed previously should be clear. In other words CP is 
the perception of different sensory items/entities as being qualitatively categorically 
different. This is in contrast to continuous perception, where sensory phenomena are 
perceived as if they are located on a smooth continuum.
Much later than Liberman’s work studies have used a recognition memory task with 
an X A-B (2 AFC) design for colour (e.g. Uchikawa & Shonida, 1996, Roberson & 
Davidoff, 2000, Roberson, Davies & Davidoff, 2000, Wiggett, Ozgen & Davies, 
2002). The X A-B design is the same as discussed in the levels of processing chapters. 
With this design a target stimulus is presented, and after an interval, participants are 
asked to identify the target from a pair of stimuli (one the target and one the foil). 
When using this method to test CP, the targets and foils are either from the same 
category or from different categories. Overall studies using this method have shown 
performance was better with items straddling the boundary than within it. Going back 
in time to the 50’s Liberman et al. (1957) suggested that what they had demonstrated
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was particular to speech perception and explained it with a motor theory of speech 
perception; this theory was based on the assumption that CP related to the ability of 
the human acoustic system to produce speech sounds. As we have seen briefly with 
the colour example this motor theory was to lose favour by the end of the century as 
its explanatory power was limited as CP extends beyond speech sounds.
Evolution of Categorical Perception
As research has continued, the question of whether categorical perception is innate or 
inborn has been a key issue of dispute (Davidoff, Davies & Roberson, 1999). If CP is 
inborn then it would suggest it has come about by evolutionary processes and 
consequently all people everywhere on the planet should categorise in the same ways. 
If CP is learnt (and shaped by language), then perception would not be universal (this 
shall be considered shortly). As we have seen formerly CP was thought to be peculiar 
to speech, since then CP has been shown to be far more global a phenomenon 
(Gumperz & Levinson, 1997), and might actually be linked to the brain’s neural 
networks that detect the features in the world into meaningful categories (Miller, 
Freedman & Wallis, 2002), freeing us from a ‘confusing and overwhelming 
environment of constant change’. Items within our environment which enter our 
sensory systems become warped with the extension of difference and suppression of 
similarity thus reducing the cognitive load and being more advantageous and arguably 
‘adaptive’ (Miller, Freedman & Wallis, 2002).
The neuropsychology underling CP is just starting to be investigated but is already 
showing many interesting but tentative results (Miller et al, 2002, Miller, Nieder.,
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Freedman & Wallis,2003.). These studies will not be discussed extensively here 
however examples from the neuropsychology and computational accounts will be 
presented shortly. Interested readers will find neural correlates of different categories 
can be identified and there appears to be a role of the frontal lobes in the process of 
categorising. One interesting study for the time being by Holmes, Franklin, Clifford 
& Davies (2009) studied the time course and the contributions of perceptual and post- 
perceptual processing in colour CP to investigate whether CP is purely perceptual. 
They used a visual oddball paradigm (identifying novel stimuli from more frequent 
stimuli) with standard and novel stimuli from within and across category items. 
Holmes et al (2009) found CP on a behavioural (standard) version of the task with 
better accuracy speedier reaction times for across than within. On a neuro 
physiological version of the task, event related potential (ERP) recordings were made 
showing early (perceptual) and late proeessing components (language related) in CP.
Computational models have also provided insight as to how the brain may work in 
creating CP effects (Sharma and Dorman, 1999). The Sharma and Dorman paper for 
example uses a computational approach with auditory stimuli with various onset 
times.
But what is a category? Categories can include numerous items. Category 
membership can either be all-or-none or a matter of extent. A cabbage for instance is 
all vegetable and not meat. Pork is 100% meat and 100% not vegetable. Whether 
something is vegetable or meat is clearly categorical. Height however is clearly 
continuous; some things are ‘small’ but other things are ‘not as small’ or ‘even 
smaller’. Here the category is continuous (a matter of extent to which an item 
corresponds to some point on a continuum). This can also be considered to be context
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dependent; for example a human baby is relatively small for a human but is relatively 
large compared to a frog or cricket.
Most objects/entities we perceive with our sensory systems can be considered to be a 
mixture of the two forms of categories at the level of everyday human experience. 
Items can appear categorical, but are in fact items on a continuum. Colour for 
example as we have seen appears to be categorical with central blues being clearly 
blue and not yellow. Yet in the green zone items can have ‘yellowness’ (yellowy- 
green) or ‘blueness’ (blueish-green). Additionally there is nothing intrinsic within a 
certain section of visible light that makes it a certain colour. Rather it appears to be a 
product of the mind (Tijsseling & Hamad, 1997).
Animals have an extraordinary capacity to achieve adaptive responses in diverse 
situations. A mind which can categorise incoming data will be more adaptive to new 
situations (Miller, Freedman & Willis, 2002). To engage with every novel 
object/entity afresh would be very demanding and potentially life threatening. A 
caveman who has only encountered sabre-toothed tigers in the past but never sabre­
tooth lions would be in terrible trouble if their perceptual systems were not adaptive 
enough to cope with a world of ‘blooming, buzzing confusion’ including dangerous 
predators! William James (1890) understood that humans do not perceive a 
continuum of ‘blooming buzzing confusion’ but an ordered world of coherence and 
meaningfulness. Some of these categories seem to have been integrated into species 
by the processes of evolution (Fabre-Thorpe, Richard & Thorpe, 1998). A classic
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example in humans is a neonate’s ability to perceive human faces and therefore 
favour them over other stimuli (Fantz, 1961).
Animal studies in contrast to Liberman et al.’s (1957) beliefs that CP is a human 
phenomenon peculiar to sound have shown that even simple creatures such as crickets 
can categorise pure tones into two categories consistent with CP, these are between 
perceiving the tone as a ‘mate’ or a ‘bat’/‘predator’ (Wyttenbach et al, 1996). Even 
though the tone varies along a continuum of sound space it appears as if the cricket 
warps the sound at 16 kHz. Below this the cricket heads toward the stimulus as if it 
were a mate and above it escape behaviour is shown. This approach is evolutionarily 
adaptive as it maximises reproductive success and reduces risk or predation 
(Wyttenbach et al., 1996).
Miller et al. (2002) states that more ‘elaborate’ animals including birds and mammals 
show more sophisticated behavioural repertoires. These must rely on more advanced 
categorisation than those of simpler creatures such as the frogs and crickets. A 
primate’s mental lexicon is arguably relatively large and includes ‘abstract’ 
categorisations that are categorised along multiple dimensions including categories of 
tools and non tools (Miller et al, 2002). It would not be surprising if our caveman 
ancestors including homo-habilis, the ‘handyman’ had similar categorisation of tools 
to our primate relatives; being able to see and categorise pieces of flint into non useful 
rock and usefiil tools. Modem man has the capacity to distinguish between many 
kinds of tools including the same kind of tool which only differs by branding. Our 
categorisation skills are obviously far wider than just relating to tools. What is clear
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about us and the advanced animals is that they have an enormous capacity to adapt 
and learn which is not as developed/evolved in the simpler species. Miller et al. 
(2002) believed that most human categories are acquired through learning; we learn 
what it is that makes a chair a chair, or a table a table, and importantly what makes a 
table not a chair despite the fact that you can sit on it. This is in clear contrast to the 
earlier views of Plato and his eternal ideal forms. High level categorisation is not just 
a human feature, our monkey relatives are also accomplished at categorisation, being 
able to tell animals from non animals (Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988), fish from non 
fish (Vogels, 1999) and food from non food (Fabre-Thorpe et al. 1998).
Frogs have been demonstrated to have an innate ability to detect flies with only 
normal exposure without any extensive special learning in order to catch them. 
Humans are also believed to have similar inbuilt category detectors (Sekuler & Blake 
1994). The human face (Fantz, 1961) is arguably the best known example: newborn 
babies can identify a human face from a very young age and an area in the brain 
known as the fusiform gyrus seems to be specially attuned to human faces (Farah 
1990, 1994). Basic tastes including sweet, sour, salty and bitter have also been shown 
to elicit distinctive behavioural reactions in neonates without any prior exposure 
(Steiner, 1977, 1979). This included a licking of lips to sweet and screwing up of the 
face to sour. Many have also believed colour categories are inbuilt, although 
according to the Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity (Whorf, 1956) this may not 
be the case. Whorf believed language plays an important role in categorical 
perception. If this is the case it suggests an increased role for top-down processing 
and a role of memory which includes our knowledge of colours and colour names.
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Elliott and Anderson (1995) conducted one relevant and recent study investigating 
memory and categorisation. Elliott and Anderson researched the effect of memory 
decay on predicting changing categories. They state that countless categories in the 
real-world experience systematic and regular change in their definition over time. An 
example of this could be colour categories in an aspiring artist, or wines by their 
grapes in aspiring wine tasters. Elliott and Anderson conducted four experiments to 
investigate such category changes. They demonstrated particapants successfully 
attuned as category change happened. They also demonstrated a cumulative and 
persistent effect of past observations. The results suggest a decay function and that it 
is close to a power law (Elliott & Anderson, 1995).
The human lexica comprise many category names, most of which appear to have been 
learnt via experience, rather than by any evolutionary inbuilt detection system. While 
examples like the human face may well be in-built as may be the basic tastes, it is 
extraordinarily unlikely that the specific names of human individuals could have been 
inbuilt. Similarly it is excessively unlikely that we have any evolutionarily 
predetermined ability to categorise cola drinks such as between Coca-Cola, Pepsi and 
generic cola. There is no genetic method by which this could have occurred so 
quickly and as such, it must be a learnt ability. Similarly, a person’s ability to 
categorise and recognise his own language fi*om other languages must be learnt.
Returning to Liberman et al’s (1957) initial research and the embryonic 
conceptualisation of CP, the research interest was based on the peculiarity of speech 
perception. The theoretical explanation was the motor theory. It explained that the
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reason Liberman et al’s participants perceived an abrupt change in category between 
‘ba’ and ‘pa’ is that the way they heard the sound was influeneed by the way their 
speech anatomy works. What varies with the ‘ba’ and ‘pa’ stimuli is voice-onset­
time; essentially the ‘b’ in ‘ba’ is sounded but the ‘p ’ in ‘pa’ is not sounded. Hence 
when a participant listens to a sound item from the ba-pa continuum their brain 
perceives it by somehow matching it to whatever would be needed to produce it via 
the vocal apparatus. Since people (at least in English are only accustomed to 
producing ‘ba’ and ‘pa’) they were only able to perceive stimuli along the continuum 
as either ‘ba’ or ‘pa’, whichever is the closer. Similarly a CP effect would be elicited 
on a ‘ba’-‘da’ or other such binary syllable continuum. Vocally ‘da’ is produced with 
the tip of the tongue and the hard palate. The ‘ba’ sound is the product of an 
articulation formed by the aspiration with a pairing of the lips. Our anatomy, 
Liberman and other supporters of the motor theory claim, does not allow us to 
produce intermediate sounds and therefore there is no reason to perceive intermediate 
stimuli. Therefore CP occurs.
Motor theory, having been developed from research on human speech and its 
explanation of the CP phenomena being linked to the motor control of speech 
inevitably failed as CP was found for other stimuli and in other sensory modalities 
(Hamad, 1987, described many such studies).
The belief that motor production mediates sensory perception relies on the assumption 
that CP is a result of learning to produce speech. Infants however were found to 
demonstrate a CP effect for speech perception before they had learned to speak
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(Eimas, 1975). This suggests a possible innate effeet. Humans may have evolved to be 
prepared to leam to speak (Chomsky 1968). This view is contested however as the 
silent chinchillas which obviously do not have the power of speech can demonstrate 
‘speech CP’ (Kuhl, 1987). Lane (1965) was one of the earliest to also show that CP 
can be generated purely as a result of learning and this was for purely visual material 
in which there is no motor production behaviour to mediate perceptual categorisation. 
From this, it was becoming clear that CP for human speech was not special after all 
and as such the motor theory at best is inadequate and at worst completely wrong 
(Livingston, Andrews & Hamad 1998). In this way it was established that speech CP 
was not special, but could be considered as just a case of Lawrence’s (1950) classic 
work that demonstrated that stimuli to which a person has learnt to make a difference 
response become more distinctive and stimuli to which a person learns to make the 
same response become perceived as similar. Anecdotally most of us have no need to 
be able to distinguish between different coffee beans and therefore cannot while the 
coffee-merchant needs to acquire this skill and can leam to distinguish the subtleties 
of different beans.
The view held by Liberman et al. (1957) that CP was an all-or-none effect also 
became vulnerable as more research was conducted. It is not the case that all ‘pas’ 
are indistinguishable and all ‘bas’ are forever indistinguishable. Humans can hear the 
differences as we can see all the shades of green. It is just that the within category 
difference between bal/ba2 or greenl/green2 are perceived as smaller than for 
between category items such as bal/pal or green 1/blue 1, even when the proportional 
distances of the underlying characteristic are actually the same whether it is voicing 
continua, visible light wavelengths or other material.
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As more research came in it was clear the motor theory and the idea that the 
peculiarity of CP for speech would need to be abandoned. The research and theories 
developed into contemporary versions. CP happens when perceived within-category 
differences are condensed and/or between category differences are expanded, relative 
to a baseline of contrast judgement such as the physical properties of the stimuli. If 
the effect is with an artificially learnt category, as in an experiment, then the 
perceived similarity between within-category items would increase and/or the 
perceived similarity of between-category items would decrease as the category was 
learned (Lotto 1998).
Exemplars or prototypes
The two main approaches to how categorical effects are generated relate to whether 
the process is dependent on comparison to exemplars or prototypes for each 
object/entity. Eysenck and Keane, (2005) describe that within prototype theory, 
concepts have a prototype structure; the prototype is either a collection of 
characteristics or the best example (or examples) of the concept. There is no 
delimiting set of necessary and sufficient features for determining category 
membership. There might be necessary attributes, but they can not be considered 
jointly sufficient, indeed concept/high order category membership often depends on 
the object/entity possessing some set of characteristics, non necessary attributes that 
are considered more typical of the category than others. Categories have fuzzy 
boundaries. What is and is not a member of the category is ill-defined. As such 
category membership may cross boundaries; e.g., is a tomato a fruit or a vegetable; or 
is a transsexual male or female? Instances of a category can be arranged in terms of
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their typicality to form, that can be conceived of as a typicality gradient which 
charaeteristises the differential typicality of the concept. In essence, the category 
membership is determined by the similarity of an object/entity to the category’s 
prototype (Eysenck and Keane, 2005).
Exemplar approaches are characterised by a number of factors that distinguish them 
from prototype theories. Categories are made up of a collection of instances or 
exemplars rather than any abstract ‘description’ of these instances such as a prototype 
summary description. Instances are grouped relative to one another by some 
similarity ‘metric’. Categorisation is a mechanism that retrieves instances from 
memory given a particular cue. When exact matches are not found in a person’s 
memory the nearest neighbour to the cue is normally retrieved.
One of the central areas of research into CP and categorisation has been to establish 
which of these two systems is really used. One of the best known exemplar based 
approaches is Nosofsky’s (1988, 1991) generalised context model (GCM). In GCM 
exemplars are symbolized as nodes within a multidimensional space, where the 
dimensions are features. These features can include colour, loudness, luminosity etc. 
In the case of food these features could include, texture, heat or basic tastes such as 
salt or sweet. Exemplars localised nearer to one another in the representational space 
are more alike than those that are distant in the space. Recognition and classification 
are based on the similarity between exemplars. These models tend to have single 
cognitive systems for attention and memory for the periods of recognition and 
classification. This approach has been appealing; however, it assumes that we hold 
innumerable examples or templates in our mind. This seems a very weak evolutionary 
strategy as it would require a ridiculously large brain to cope and it would still
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undoubtedly be very slow unless it was highly parallel. Not the best state of affairs 
when faced with a sabre-tooth!
Prototype models also make use of a multidimensional representative space similar to 
exemplar approaches. When people experience objects/entities during training, they 
extract the central tendencies or summary version of those items, called the prototype. 
In recognition a stimulus is compared with the prototype, if  it is considered similar 
then it is a member of the category if it is dissimilar then it is not. This approach also 
allows items to be partly something (Solomon & Barsalou 2001).. This strategy seems 
to have its benefits. It is easy to imagine a prototype cat in one’s head, with lions, 
tigers and tabbycats somewhere along its multidimensional branches It is less clear 
however to imagine a prototypical fruit after a person had experienced kiwifruit, 
grapes, bananas, pineapples, strawberries, uglyfruit and pomegranate (Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975).
Whichever approach is used a multidimensional space is assumed, along which a 
feature is expressed such as sweet, sour or salt. These spaces include the classic sound 
spaces such as the ba-da space through to similarly well studied colour spaces. Colour 
research such as that by Roberson et al. (2005) used the Munsell colour circle which 
represents numerous colours varying in hue and lightness. All colours can be plotted 
within the Munsell space. It would be interesting to know whether the same is true of 
the chemical senses; could stimuli be represented usefully in a similar manner?
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This debate between prototype theory and exemplar theories is a longstanding one, 
and there is good evidence on both sides. Recent progress in neuropsychology while 
strongly supporting the concept of categorisation and CP has yet to provide 
conclusive evidence of whether exemplar or prototype explanations are best (Gauthier 
& Palmeri, 2002). However, Miller, David, Freedman and Wallis (2002) suggest a 
brain limited to testing independent records of each experience would require an 
exceptional amount of storage and burden us with unnecessary details. Such a brain 
would also suffer in terms of speed of processing as well as being excessively large or 
extraordinarily crinkled to increase surface area for grey matter. Instead we appear to 
have evolved the ability to detect commonalities among experiences and items and 
store them as abstract concepts or categories. This is an efficient way of dealing with 
the complex world around us. By extracting the essential information we are able to 
generalise to future situations and items. This seems to favour prototype approaches.
Nativists V empiricists
Some theorists such as Guest & Van laar (2000, 2002) believe that colours are 
perceived as categorical only on arbitrary grounds; that is, because we have names for 
them and to categorise them by. This subdividing of the spectrum was believed by 
them to be arbitrary as it was a product of learning, and as such, these categorisations 
would not be universal. Berlin and Kay (1969) contested this; not only did they show 
that most languages and cultures divide the colour spectrum or colour space in a 
similar manner, they also showed that greens are always perceived as greens and 
blues as blues with a boundary in between regardless of whether there are names to
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divide this blue/green space. This resulted in a strong belief that the Whorfian 
viewpoint was overstated. This view continues to be contentious.
During the late 20* century with an increase in evolutionary psychology it was not 
surprising that proponents of the nativist perspective again became prominent. Foder 
(1983) in the nativist tradition implied all categories are innate. When considering the 
vowels examples, the size of the smaller CP effect can be considered as merely a 
‘scaling factor’; it is the warping of a space in an ‘accordion’ like fashion of 
expansion and compression that is the distinctive feature of CP. Therefore, it is not of 
central importance that the CP effect for vowels is less than for consonants. As with 
colour, researchers were suggesting again innateness and thus the product of 
evolution. Our perceptual systems are biased to distinguish categories and warp 
perceived material including sound space and eolour space (Hamad, 1987).
Goldstone (1994) has replicated the earlier research of Lane (1965) and Lawrence 
(1950). This work continued to look at the role of learning and that CP can be elicited 
by learning alone. Additionally our mental lexica with its numerous categories, 
alongside those catalogued in the dictionaries of the world could not have been all 
established by evolution and innate; there is no sensible way to claim that there is an 
innate detector for Coca-cola or Pepsi or Mozart or Bach.
Furthermore recent research suggests that while elementary colours and speech 
categories are likely innate, their boundaries can be successfully manipulated and 
modified and even lost as a result of learning and experience. Moreover, new
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boundaries (although weaker) can be created by learning and experience alone 
(Roberson et al. 2000).
One method of testing the nativist empiricist debate is with cross cultural research. 
The question of whether a person’s language can influence his/her perceptual 
experience continues to engender debate as it highlights the differences in opinion 
between nativists and empirists (Ozgen & Davies, 2003, Saunder & van Brakel, 
2002). Part of this debate has become characterised by the polar views that thought 
processes are shaped by language (Brown, 1976) or completely independent of it 
(Berlin and Kay, 1969). If perception is purely biologically based, then our 
perception, including CP, should be very similar across the world. If, however, 
pereeption is shaped by a person’s language environment, it suggests a key role of 
learning (memory) in the process and suggests that pereeption can be modified with 
experience. The field of colour categorisation has proved an excellent testing ground 
for the effect of language on perception. While the physiological basis of colour 
vision is believed to be the same for all people with typical vision (Jordan & Mollon, 
1997), there is a wide variety in the manner that different languages slice the 
continuum of colours. Rosch (1972) reports some categorise colour in as few as two 
colour terms while others have reported between three and eleven (Berlin & Kay, 
1969) and some including Russian have up to 12 (Davies & Corbett, 1977). Recent 
research by Roberson, Davies & Davidoff (2000) and Roberson, Davidoff, Davies and 
Shapiro (2005) established considerable results suggestive of cognitive colour 
differences among communities of different languages. Some doubts however 
remained as to how representative might be a small, tremendously isolated soeiety 
whom research was conducted with. Roberson et al. (2005) replicated and extended
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prior result by means of further paradigms amongst a bigger community in a different 
visual environment. In their study, semi-nomadic adult tribesmen in Southern Africa 
regions carried out similarity judgments, short term memory and long term memory 
learning tasks. The participants showed different cognitive organisation of colour to 
both English and another language with five colour terms. Furthermore CP effects 
were demonstrated to vary even more between languages with roughly comparable 
colour categories. The results provide additional support for the idea of the tight 
relationship between language and perception.
At the current time, it is clear that CP is a real effeet; it is an effect not peculiar to 
speech alone and cannot be dependent on motor production as proposed by the motor 
theory. CP is a mentally global effect and has been demonstrated on numerous stimuli 
and in different sensory modalities (MeMurray, Tanenhaus, Aslin & Spivey 2003, 
Goldstone, Lippa and Shiffrin 2001, Pilling, Wiggett Ozgen & Davies 2003). The 
debate over learning and innate warping systems built into the brain by evolution is 
still energetic. It is however probable that both views are partly correct. Some basic 
categorisations may be innate including those involving human face recognition and 
basic taste perception. However, the majority of categorisations that an adult human 
can distinguish between must involve learning. This strongly implies the role of 
labelling and the Whorfian hypothesis is still very valuable. This also suggests that 
perception has top down processing modifying it; this material must come from 
memory. Therefore, categorical perception may not be 100% pereeptual. Other 
interesting research shows CP is not just a human characteristic (Sharma and Dorman 
1999). New research into computational modelling and evidence from neuroscience 
has also helped establish CP as real phenomena.
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Recent investigations: computationai modeiiing and 
neuroscience
Computational modellers such as Damper & Hamad (2000) and Tijsseling & Hamad 
(1997) have shown that computational nets display CP-like effects. In back -  
propagation networks, hidden unit activation pattems that represent an input build up 
within category similarity/compression and between categories expansion as the 
network leams. CP can therefore be seen to be a means to an end, a useful and maybe 
neeessary characteristic of a system that deals with highly variable inputs. This has 
evolutionary advantages as expressed earlier. Inputs that differ in their own kind are 
compressed in their ‘space’ if they all produce the same output response (Tijsseling & 
Hamad 1997). Different outputs are produced by expanding the space between items. 
It can be said that the networks thus act as a bias filter. This eomes about without 
design or intervention. The networks accomplish this by selectively detecting 
invariant features that are shared by items of a kind and that reliably distinguish items 
of different kinds, or in other words between categories. This teaming by the network 
is thus an inherent property of a complex network; inputs are likely to be proeessed by 
similar networks in similar ways and produce similar outputs. This is similar to the 
innate basie CP effects. And the specificity and tremendous number of categories a 
network can leam resembles those found in humans over a wide range of stimuli. This 
leaming in the networks is via trial and error akin to that in the human studies 
discussed previously (Tijsseling & Hamad 1997). Recent research in 
neuropsychology has shown neural correlations for CP and leaming event related 
potentials have shown differences that eorrelate with differences in perceived
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category of stimuli that participants were shown. Seger, Poldrack, Prabhakaran, 
Zhao, Glover, Gabrieli & John (2000) have provided interesting results on the 
neuropsychology of CP with brain imagining studies. Latéralisation and localisation 
have been found with participants who have successfully learnt to categorise items. 
These effects were absent in those who had not learnt to categorise the stimuli.
Miller, Freedman and Wallis (2002) and Keri (2003) reviewed the multidisciplinary 
literature on category leaming, taking in evidence from modelling (above), 
experimental psychology, clinical psychology, single cell studies and imaging. Keri 
reported that while the results should not be considered irrefiitable, some general 
principles do surface. Cortical areas in the sensory neo-cortex seem to be responsible 
for the perceptual representations of category exemplars, while areas in the anterior 
and lateral prefontal cortex seem to be essential for the encoding of category 
boundaries and the constmcting of ‘abstract mles’. The prefrontal cortex might effect 
categorical representations in the sensory neocortex via some form of top-down 
processing. Kero (2003) also states that the neostriatum has a key role in stimulus- 
response mapping, and the orbitofrontal cortex/ventral striatum are required for 
stimulus-reward conditioning (leaming). Overall Keri (2003) concludes that category 
leaming (including boundaries and exemplars/prototypes) has many mechanisms 
including mle generation, top down processing affecting the attention used and 
decision making, mediated by many brain regions, principally lateral prefrontal- 
anterior cingulated, orbitofrontal, sensory neoeortex, basil ganglia and medial 
temporal lobes.
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Warped space, magnets and shifts towards prototypes
For those readers who have leaped forward to this subsection you may wish to first 
inspect Figure 7.2 which displays the graphed results of a hypothetical CP study. So 
far, the apparent categorical perception effect has largely been diseussed as one 
phenomenon. However, this may not be the case. Three main subtly different 
perspectives have evolved; traditional categorical perception (e.g., Roberson et al. 
2000; the perceptual magnet effect (e.g., Guenther et al., 1999); and prototype effect 
(Huttenlocher et al., 2000). The underlying mechanisms involved in ‘categorical 
perception’ could involve a real perceptual warping at the category boundary, direct 
labelling (i.e. using a labelling strategy), while others may even relate to memory bias 
or attention effects.
Traditionally and as described so far, CP has been coneeptualised as a perceptual 
effect brought about due to a warping at the category boundary. This warped space 
makes items around the boundary perceptually more different than items away from 
the boundary. This perspective is category-boundary focused. Its prediction is 
traditionally limited to this area and does not rely on a prototype or deseribe what 
would happen per se at the prototype
The main point about ‘shift towards prototype’ memory bias (STP) is that it makes 
different predictions for the cases around the prototype and just either side of the 
prototype, in essence focused on the prototype. Straddling the prototype, whichever 
the target stimulus is, during the test interval, the ‘memory’ for the target shifts 
towards the prototype, thus making it more similar to the prototype, and therefore 
harder to discriminate. Figure 7.3 illustrates this with lemon and orange stimuli.
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OrangeLemon
Figure 7.3. Schematic representation of the basis for within-category order effects expected as a 
result of the Shift towards prototype mechanism. (1) When within-category target is closer to the 
boundary (2) when within-category target is closer to the prototype. Here the boxes represent 
stimuli, the box displayed in bold represents the target stimulus, and the dashed line represents 
the category boundary. The circle represents the prototype (in this case lemon), and the arrow 
represents the shift towards prototype.
For the two within category ones, if the target is the one closest to the prototype, its 
memory shifts towards the prototype, increasing its separation from the test item, 
whilst, the shift decreases the separation. On average, even when test order for the 
within category pairs is not taken into account this should be found. According to 
STP within should be easier than across. This is in contrast to the general perceptual 
magnet/warping account.
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In essence categorical perception cross-category discrimination should be simpler 
than comparable within-category discrimination. In terms of the perceptual magnet, 
discrimination proximal to the prototype is more difficult than items far fi"om the 
prototype. In the shift toward prototype approach, memory errors are said to be 
biased towards the prototype and hence there should be more errors with increased 
time delays in tasks.
One example of this emerging debate was in Ts colour ‘categorical perception’ really 
perceptual’ by Pilling, Wiggett, Ozgen and Davies (2003). This investigated the 
relations among the three phenomena with colour. Their stimuli varied in Munsell hue 
(colour space) and discrimination was measured using a successive same-different 
task with a five second ISI (inter-stimuli-interval time gap); different-pairs were split 
by the same number of hue units, within the experiments. Pilling et al (2003) asked 
their participants to give judgements around the prototype of the green and blue 
categories and they established that prototype-bias and the perceptual magnet 
occurred for colour, and that their effect was additive. Pilling and his team went on to 
say that participants then learned new categories by splitting green or blue into two. 
Categorical perception was established proximal to the new boundary. However they 
reported that, categorical perception appeared to be independent of prototype-bias. 
Their next study utilised stimuli from the green-blue boundary and included either 
visual or verbal interference in the ISI. With no interference, both prototype-bias and 
categorical perception were established, but the categorical perception effect was 
eradicated with the effect of verbal interference.
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Davies, Ozgen, Pilling, Riddett (2004) further investigated the relationship between 
CP and the shift towards prototype memory bias. In the paper they state that based on 
the earlier 2003 paper the STP and CP phenomenon may be the same thing. They 
clarify this by stating that in STP, memory errors are biased in the direction of the 
category prototype. In CP, within-category discrimination is harder than across- 
category discrimination. They tested this by employing a same-different task. The 
shift of the target memory in the direction of the prototype expands target-test 
separation distance for cross category paired items but reduces them for within 
category paired items producing a CP style effect. The study was conducted on colour 
as before. They showed that a shift towards the prototype was evident with errors of 
different signs either side of the prototype following delay. Davies et al. (2004) go on 
to state that CP was evident by local discrimination maximum at the prototype and 
minimum at the category boundary. When the CP and STP data was correlated a 
degree of independence between CP and STP was shown.
As we have seen some of the CP effects could be due to a perceptual magnet effect 
(PM) (e.g. Lively & Pisoni, 1997), or a shift towards the prototype (STP) 
(Huttenlocher, Heges & Veveas, 2000). The use of a 2 AFC recognition task as 
discussed already could be used at the boundary and at the prototype to determine 
whether a boundary and a prototype effect is found This would provide information as 
to the taste space beyond the category boundary.
Based on the preceding papers it is not clear if CP and STP are the same, or different 
although it seems likely they are independent based on the Davies et al. (2004) study. 
The pattern of effects for CP, PM and STP is very similar and has often been treated
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as one phenomenon; Lotto, Kluender & Holt (1998) for example claim CP and PM 
are equivalent. Other researchers however do distinguish between the effects, 
Iverson and Kuhl (2000) distinguish PM and CP, emphasising the role of memory in 
PM. From this view, a time delay in a task should impact on the CP effect.
Tastants and Taste-space
When considering tastants mixtures ranging from 100% of orange and 100% lemon 
somewhere in between a category boundary is likely to occur with an ‘orange’ 
category on one side and ‘lemon’ on the other. When using an X A-B design at the 
boundary, a CP effect is predicted to be found; similarly a prototype effect of some 
form may be found at the prototype (100% concentration). To test for this, another 
binary mixture continuum would need to be added beyond the prototype. If the lemon 
prototype is of interest then it could be neighboured with the orange/lemon continuum 
on one side and for example a lemon/blackcurrant continuum on the other. The 
essence of the design would be simply to use the prototype as if it was the boundary 
in a traditional category boundary study. It should be noted this idea of taste-space as 
it will be used in the following sections, actually relates to flavour and not just taste, it 
also combines the viscosity and temperature of the stimuli.
Categorical perception and memory
Another key issue relates to memory. If CP is not purely perceptual, what role is 
there for memory? This is not straight forward at all and depends on the theory 
employed. Rosch (1978) and Liberman et al. (1957) in the tradition of nativists like 
Plato, would argue that the perceptual categorisation is innate and hardwired into our
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brains (or soul for Plato) and anatomy/physiology for survival advantage and 
cognitive economy. Empiricists however argue for the role of leaming, memory and 
language involvement. Labelling theories state CP is not perceptual- rather it is a 
result of labelling (e.g., Kay & Kempton, 1984: Roberson & Davidoff, 2000). This 
implies a role of memory and that without the use of a label the CP effect should 
diminish. Similarly perceptual change theorists (Goldstone, Lippa & Shiffrin, 2001; 
Ozgen & Davies, 2002) argue like nativists that CP is perceptual, however they 
believe it is acquired and shaped via experience and not innate.
In the levels of processing section it was noted that the LOP theory developed from 
the Atkinson & Shiffrin (1968) multi-store modal model. This model segregated 
memory into three stmctures; firstly, the sensory register then short term memory and 
finally long term memory. The sensory information stores have been difficult to 
study due to their short duration of retention (Groeger, 1997), luckily however 
computer based methods have allowed numerous studies to investigate the iconic 
(vision) and echoic (sound) store. Interestingly these studies have largely coincided in 
their results, iconic memory decays within 0.5 seconds (Sperling, 1960). Treisman 
(1964) showed the temporal duration of unattended auditory information in the echoic 
store is around 2 seconds. Presumably, there is a flavour sensory store or at least taste 
and olfactory stores that are highly integrated. Investigating the chemical senses is 
more troublesome than visual and auditory studies. For example, the effect of a taste 
store is likely to be far smaller than some aftertastes left by certain foods. With taste, a 
certain taste can be weakened via prior exposure-adaptation and taste modification 
caused by the presence of another stimulus. Remember it is difficult to wash out the 
mouth completely, think of the aftertaste of garlic or the persistence of the minty taste
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of toothpaste or the highly pungent chilli. Most of the food we eat can be ‘tasted’ after 
it has left the mouth as particles remain in the saliva and possible after-effects of the 
nose and tongue. Any study investigating a memory effect for taste would have to 
take into account that it is almost impossible to remove ftilly any after-effect and that 
the delay needed to test for sensory/perceptual decay would need to be longer than 
with visual or auditory stimuli. The use of a time delay should be able to reduce a CP 
effect if the effect is largely the product of perception or a basic sensory store. 
However if higher level labelling is used this may be able to maintain the effect 
despite delay.
Categorical perception: synopsis
What is clear from the above discussion on categorical perception is that the initial 
motor theory of CP is no longer considered valid as the phenomenon it is not unique 
to speech sounds nor to humans. CP is multimodal and can be found for a whole array 
of sounds including speech sounds and non speech sounds and a whole array of visual 
material. So far, however, CP effects in the chemical senses have not been 
investigated. There remains a debate as to whether CP is purely innate or learnt via 
exposure and experience (including language). If this is the case then top down 
memory factors are likely to be involved in CP too. The neurological literature 
suggests this is the case. There is also a debate over whether categorisation is due to 
exemplar or prototype processing however, as noted above, exemplar based 
processing would not be favoured by evolution, whilst prototype processing seems 
more adaptive and also supported by a large percentage of the literature. Three main 
mechanisms have been put forward recently to explain the CP effect including the
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warped CP boundary, memory bias shift towards prototype and perceptual magnet 
effect.
'Learning to teii appies from oranges'
Manfred Fahle in 2005 published an article titled ‘Learning to tell apples from 
oranges’. This paper highlighted an interesting point: how do we categorise foods 
and drinks? Does the CP effect exist for taste? So far, this question had largely been 
ignored. While Fahle’s article itself while very interesting it did not address the issue 
of the title. The research to date on taste categorisation is largely limited to the 
classification of the basic tastes of sweet, sour, bitter, salt and umamai. Section One 
discussed the important issues relevant to our understanding of taste perception.
In the studies that follow the stimuli used were real world substances, 
squash/concentrate drinks. These were used as they have greater real life value than 
basic taste solutions (e.g., sour, bitter) which are never really tasted in the real world. 
It was decided squashes would be used purely as it contrasts with the fruit-juices used 
in Section Two. As discussed, sound and colour can be split up and presented on 
continua such as the ‘ba’ ‘pa’ continua and the colour wheel or Munsell colourspace. 
It is easy to extend this idea to a multidimensional taste-space, with tastes located 
along it. For example with an orange taste there is likely to be a prototypical version 
of the taste with less typical tastes increasing as we move further from the prototype. 
(It is very possible that the prototypes for real fruit drinks and squash/concentrates are 
different as orange squash is easy to distinguish from real orange juice. Similarly, the 
tastes of artificial strawberry banana and strawberry flavours in drinks are clearly
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distinct from their real fruit drink counterparts). If we imagine a selection of taste 
mixtures of varying amounts of orange and lemon drinks; then the 100% orange and 
100% lemon are likely to be prototypical of that particular taste. Somewhere in 
between the two concentration mixtures, the drinks will no longer be classified as 
orange but as lemon and vice versa. This would be the category boundary. With such 
a binary tastants mixture a within and cross category categorical perception task can 
be performed, the methodology of which will be presented in the next chapter. It will 
be possible to assess whether people do taste such mixtures categorically and then 
whether there is also a CP effect along the continuum with cross category decisions 
being easier than within category decisions. Two issues need some expanding firstly 
the multidimetional space of taste would in theory be presented in a similar way to a 
colour space although it would most likely require more dimensions added. Colour 
only has three key ‘ingredients’ namely hue (which distinguishes red from green). 
Secondly there is saturation, which relates to whether it is pale or vivid and finally 
brightness which is simply the perceived intensity of light. Flavour perception 
(ignoring food temperature and texture which are both very important; liquidised 
turkey no longer really tastes like turkey, and boiling hot ice cream no longer is 
clearly ice-cream) is dependent on an unimaginable and as yet undefined number of 
aromas relevant chemical volatiles. While immense it is conceivable that in the future 
the relationship between these could be slowly plotted and understood. The second 
issue relates to what were called the continuums. These were experimentally regular 
changes in concentration of the two tastants. The underlying structures and volatile 
complexity of something as simple as an orange or lemon drink is still largely beyond 
the manipulation or understanding of science. The exact chemistry of the binary 
tastant mixtures is very complicated.
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The third section of this thesis addresses issues relating to the CP effect. Specifically 
is there a categorical perception effect for taste? Can it be replicated and found for 
other binary tastants mixtures? Is there a prototype effect? Additionally is there a role 
of memory in taste categorical perception?
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Chapter Eight: Study One: Categorical perception in 
the taste domain.
As we have seen, Categorical Perception (CP) refers to the superior ability to 
distinguish between members or items of different categories compared to equally 
different members of the same category (Liberman, Harris, Hoffman, & Griffith, 
1957). This effect has been recorded for a whole variety of stimuli (see preceding 
chapter) and could therefore exist for taste.
When we categorise things we treat discriminably different items/entities as 
equivalent. So although we may be able to detect the difference between, say, 
different varieties of orange juices, or different lemon juices, often just knowing 
which category (orange or lemon) is sufficient for our needs. The same applies to 
many other categories, such as; animals or plant; man or woman (Campanella, 
Chrysochoos & Bruyer, 2002); smile or frown (Cambell, Woll, Benson & Wallace, 
1999). Additionally, anecdotally it would seem the same occurs for other categories 
such as red or white wine, types of cheeses or brands of soft drinks. These categorical 
differences are so useftil that humans embed them in language; often we have 
common words that label the categories, so most of us use the words ^orange’ and 
 ^lemon \  but we do not have (many) words for particular kinds of orange and lemon 
(the exception to this rule for example would include a lemon farmer who would need 
to tell different lemons apart. Interestingly this ability to tell the lemons apart visually 
may not extend equally to taste discrimination). Hence, our perceptual world seems to 
be split up into categories despite the real world data that we receive from our senses 
being a multilevel continuum of sensory variation.
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These categorical differences often seem to affect ease of discrimination: it is easier to 
decide that two things are different if they are from different categories than if they 
are from the same category; e.g. two golden delicious apples are harder to distinguish 
than a apple and a banana. This difference in discriminability is the signature of 
categorical perception: cross-category discrimination is easier than within-category 
discrimination, even though the physical separations among the stimuli are equal. 
Categorical perception (CP) is found for many kinds of stimuli; speech sounds, colour 
and facial expressions. However, it is not known whether CP occurs for taste. This 
chapter presents the first study conducted to ascertain whether a CP effect can be 
found for taste. Please note this and the following studies investigate a categorical 
perception effect for the taste of beverages. These studies have purposefully avoided 
products that also have clear brand categories such as Pepsi and Coca-Cola as these 
higher order brand-names might also have category distinguishing characteristics 
related to them. For example some people have ethical concerns with certain cola 
companies which might impact on their liking and therefore categorisation of a 
tastant.
Just as with sound or colour, a taste continuum of orange to lemon can be created by 
mixing pure orange and pure lemon in various proportions. For example at the two 
extremes are pure orange (01) and pure lemon (LI); with the following intermediate 
concentrations: 02, (orange 80%, lemon 20%), 03, (orange 60%, lemon 40%), L3, 
(orange 40%, lemon 60%), L2 (orange 20%, lemon 80%). This binary mixture series 
is illustrated in Figure 8.1.
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Figure 8.1: A hypothetical taste-space for a binary mixture of orange and lemon
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In such an experiment, we can treat the mixtures with more orange than lemon as 
''orange ” (O) and the mixtures with more lemon than orange as “lemon ” (L). If CP 
occurs, then, distinguishing 03 from L3 (cross-category) should be easier than either 
03-02 or L3-L2. The aim of the current investigation was to test whether a CP effect 
does exist for taste using an orange/lemon binary mix. Before this could be achieved, 
initial pilot work would be needed to verify the nature of the ‘taste-space’ and that its 
physical continuum had been categorised.
Taste-space pilot study 
Taste-space Pilot
The study initially involved a pilot study conducted in two parts which was developed 
to understand the topology of taste-space for an orange and lemon mixture. This was 
conducted in two stages initially to allow for testing of mixtures including the poles of 
the mixture continuum (100% orange to 100% lemon). Secondly, attention was 
diverted to the boundary zone to provide a more precise assessment of the transition 
between orange and lemon. Following from the data provided by the pilot, it was 
possible to conduct the main study. The pilot study would also reveal whether there 
was a clear boundary line or a vague zone between the categories.
Pilot subjects
The first half of the pilot involved 22 subjects; 20 students and 2 non students. The 
samples comprised 14 females and 8 males (average age 19 years). The second stage
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involved 22 subjects; 18 students and 4 non students. The samples comprised 12 
females and 10 males (average age 24 years).
Pilot stimuli
Throughout the experiments, the concentration of squash was diluted with equal parts 
water. Pilot 1 involved 5 variations in concentration of orange/lemon mixtures (see 
Table 8.1). The stimuli were all prepared using two Sainsbury’s squash drinks; The 
No added sugar lemon squash (containing 10% fruit), and No added sugar orange 
squash (containing 10% fruit). This accounted for half of the volume of each tastant, 
mixed in the ratios above. Each was then diluted with equal measures still spring 
water producing an intense tasting stimulus that is more potent than normally 
consumed (one part squash with 4 parts water). Highly concentrated mixtures were 
used to make the task easier as squash drinks are inherently less distinguishable than 
the juice drinks of Section Two; due to differences in viscosity, sweetness, bitterness 
and other natural variations of natural products.
The stimuli were presented to the subjects in disposable opaque glasses. Each glass 
contained 10 ml of stimulus. The testing room was illuminated dimly to prevent any 
colour cues from the tastants being used by participants. Blindfolds were not used as 
it was difficult to aim the drinks to mouths, the experience would likely get messy and 
being blindfolded and being administered drinks could make some people potentially 
feel uneasy.
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Tastants Orange percentage concentration Lemon
percentage
Concentration
1 100% 0%
2 75% 25%
3 50% 50%
4 25% 75%
5 0% 100%
Table 8.1: Tastants employed in taste-space pilot part one.
The 100% concentrations were used in the first stage of the pilot as it was assumed 
that these may represent prototype versions of the stimuli. Additionally using a full 
range from 100% orange to 100% lemon was considered advantageous as it would 
provide a greater opportunity of finding a category boundary, anywhere along the 
continuum, this was especially important as the literature has nothing to offer on this 
point.
The second half of the tastes-pace pilot focused on the boundary area identified in 
pilot 1. This was found between the 50:50 and 75:25 ratio and consequently used 
stimuli in this range. The aim was to see if the data would reliably overlap with the 
data from the first stage of the taste-space pilot. The study was also able to identify 
more precisely the cross over point. The extreme limit concentrations in this study
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were 20:80 ratios. The concentrations of tastants in the second half of the taste-space 
pilot are in Table 8.2. All the stimuli are illustrated on a taste-space spectrum in 
Figure 8.2.
Tastants Orange percentage concentration Lemon percentage 
Concentration
1 80% 20%
2 70% 30%
3 60% 40%
4 40% 60%
5 30% 70%
6 20% 80%
Table 8.2: Tastants employed in taste-space study part two.
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Grange Lemon
Figure 8.2: Tastants used in the pilot study, the upper selection were used in part one and the 
lower half in part two (not drawn to scale).
Pilot procedure
Each subject tasted each of the stimuli one at a time and in random order. They were 
then asked to identify the tastants as either “mainly orange” or “mainly lemon”. 
Between each taste, the subject was given still spring water to rinse out the mouth.
Pilot results
Data from the pilot work were combined (Figure 8.3), revealing 65% orange 
juice/35% lemon juice to be the cross over point. This is between 50:50 and 75:25 
ratios of the first half of the pilot. The x axis is scaled in orange thus 80 represents 
80% orange 20% lemon. The graph shows that there is a substantial amount of
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overlap in concentration between both stages of the pilot. This suggests that there is a 
great deal of variation as to where individuals place their category boundary. Overall 
the change in perceptual categorisation is consistent with concentration change.
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Figure 8.3: Pooled data from pilot stagel and 2 illustrating the number of participants who 
identify a tastant as either orange or lemon.
Pilot discussion
Based on these results there is some evidence that the binary tastant has been divided 
into two categories. That is to say most people name items on one side orange and the 
other lemon. However the curves are not strictly classical CP in shape. This 
categorisation effect occurs near the cross-over between the changing concentrations
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(note that the boundary is not at 50:50 ratio concentration) and most accurate 
categorisation occurs at 100% concentration. This suggests these concentrations may 
be representative of a prototypical orange and lemon taste. With the data obtained 
from the pilots it was possible to conduct a two alternative forced choice (2 AFC) 
recognition memory task (also referred to as an X A-B design) which is one of the 
main methods used in categorical perception research; another common method is 
absolute identification tasks. This method was presented in the section introduction 
but will be reiterated for clarity shortly.
One issue of potential concern arose during the pilot study. While it was very unlikely 
tastants colour visual cues could have been used due to the dim lighting and 
participants were told not to look directly into the cup, (the disposable cups were 
opaque white and used in all studies in this section) they could potentially have used 
colour cues. Therefore in the main study the sample will be divided into those who 
consume tastants via cups as in the pilot and the remainder via straws preventing all 
visual cues.
Categorical perception main study
Having discovered the general shape of taste-space with the orange lemon mixture it 
was then possible to conduct the main study to identify a CP effect for taste using four 
tastants as stimuli, two from the orange side of the category boundary and two on the 
lemon.
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Subjects
The study was performed in two parts, the first with the drinks administered via cups 
and the second via straws whilst blind folded thus avoiding any visual cues which 
could theoretically have been involved when tasting via the cups. The cup group 
involved 10 subjects, the samples mean age 23.10 (SD 3.03), the sex ratio was equal. 
Six subjects, four female and two male were involved in the version of the study 
where drinks were administered via straws. The subjects were all post graduates with 
a mean age of 27 years. A further four participants were excluded due to colds, 
influenza or they had just consumed a pungent food.
Stimuli
Four stimuli were prepared based on the findings of the pilot work. In those studies 
the category boundary was found to be located at 65% orange 35% lemon. Two 
stimuli were selected from both sides of the boundary. The stimuli were as shown in 
Table 8.3,
Tastants Orange percentage 
concentration
Lemon percentage 
concentration
01 80% 20%
02 Targetl 70% 30%
Category
boundary
65% 35%
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LI Targetl 6W% 40%
L2 50% 50%
Table 8.3: Tastants used in both stages of the CP study, i.e. straw and cup.
The stimuli were all prepared as in the taste-space pilot. As stated, the study was 
conducted under two conditions, one where subjects drank straight from the cup and 
the second half via drinking straw while blindfolded so as to prevent any visual cues. 
The testing room was illuminated dimly to prevent any colour cues from the tastants 
being used by participants in the cup administration method. Again, participants were 
asked not to look directly into the cups. The dimming of lights and straws were 
considered appropriate, as the use of a colorant to change the tastants’ appearance 
could have interfered with perception, such that red would make people think it is 
grapefruit juice or contains strawberry potentially. Additionally colorants would 
interact with the main tastants colour and would not have the same effect on all 
tastants such that a green colour mixed with lemon would produce greenish-yellow 
however, green colorant mixed with an orange squash would produce an unpleasant 
brown shade.
Procedure
To measure discrimination in processing, an X-AB design was employed. A target 
stimulus (X) was presented followed by two other stimuli A and B. Either A or B is 
identical to X, and the other one (the foil) is a similar but different stimulus. The task 
is to decide whether A or B is the same as X.
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In this example, the target (X) for a given subject is the same, but half the subjects 
have one target (Tl) on the orange side of the boundary and the other half of the 
subjects have a different target (T2) on the lemon side of the boundary. The taste that 
is different to X (A or B) is either 02  (cross-category) or L2 (within-category) for the 
lemon target (T2), and either LI (cross-category) or 01 (within-category) for the 
orange target (Tl). See Figure 8.4. This X-AB design was used throughout.
Category
Boundary
65% 0/35%
70% O
02
30% L20% L
80%O
01
60%O
40% L
50%0
50% L
Figure 8.4: Stimuli used in the categorical perception main study
Each subject was tested one at a time and in a quiet room with no distractions or 
ambient noise; i.e. ideal psychophysical environment. The subject did not need to 
follow any written instructions or fill in any forms; they only needed to respond to 
questions from the experimenter. Participants in the first group tasted via cups and 
the second group tasted whilst blind folded via straws. On each trial, the subject tasted 
a “target” flavour and then had to choose from a pair of stimuli (target + foil) which 
one was the target. The experimenter recorded the order of drinks given and the 
subject’s answers therefore putting less demand on the subject reducing interfering 
with their focused attention on the task. This was repeated in total 6 times with 3 
“within category” trials and 3 “across category” trials. Between each tasting, subjects 
swilled their mouths with water. The maximum score would be three for within 
category judgements and a further three for across category judgements.
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Main study results
Mixed (2x2) ANOVA was employed to ascertain whether there was a categorical 
perception effect (within and across) and secondly whether there was an effect of the 
method of administering the drinks (between subjects), i.e. straw or cup. An effect of 
a categorical perception like nature; that is correct identification was superior when 
undergoing an X A-B task across a category boundary compared to within a category 
boundary was found (F (1,14) = 19.70, p  = .001). There was no effect of 
administration method {F (1,14) = .234, p = .636). Nor was there any interaction 
effect {F (1,14) = .335, p =.572). This relationship is demonstrated in Figure 8.5. The 
within group error bars are based on Masson and Loftus (2003) calculation.
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Figure 8.5: Categorical perception effects showing superior performance on an X AB when foils 
are across category compared to within category items. The results for both administration 
methods are shown, i.e. via a straw or disposable cup. Error bars illustrate plus and minus 2 
standard errors.
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Finally the frequency of scores were given attention, For within category scores, two 
people scored 0, five scored 1, eight scored 2 and one scored the top mark of 3 
correct. This compares with across category where five people scored 2 and eleven 
scored top marks of 3. This is suggestive of a clear CP effect despite a potential 
ceiling effect on the across scores. Luckily, this did not prevent the effect showing 
itself avoiding a type II error. It should be acknowledged that the scaling is rather 
crude.
Discussion
The pilot study revealed a loose ‘category boundary’ for a binary tastants mixture and 
apparent prototypes at the 100% concentrations having close to perfect concordance 
of taste judgment with the tastants real ‘flavour’. That is 100% lemon was categorised 
as lemon and 100% orange as orange by almost all subjects.
The taste-space data is very interesting but also slightly concerning. It would not be 
practical to have produced a taste-space for every subject in the main study therefore 
the general findings of the taste-space study have to be applied. The problem is one of 
considerable individual variation in classification. While overall, largely orange 
tastant will be categorised as orange and a largely lemon one as lemon beyond the 
65% orange 35% lemon boundary a substantial number of participants were still 
classifying items in the lemon category as ‘orange’ and ones in the orange category 
as ‘lemon’. This means that basing the main study on the findings of the pilot has to 
be taken with care. The CP effect could have been lost as while a CP test was being 
conducted it is possible for some individuals that all stimuli were ‘in category’ and as 
such no CP effect would be found. To have produced accurate and precise mixes of
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unique tastants for each participant would not have been practical. It would have been 
far too time consuming and would have opened up a higher risk of stimuli production
errors.
As stated in chapter seven not all categories have clear sharp boundaries some have 
fuzzy boundaries. Traditionally in CP studies a clear sharp category boundary is 
normally found. The lack of such a sharp boundary does not mean the items on either 
side are not in different categories. Ideally, a clear step boundary would have been 
useful, however the taste-space produced showed an almost linear relationship rather 
than a sharp boundary. This is not a classic CP boundary (Figure 8.6).
Ideal classic CP clear boundary Boundary with considerable 
Variability in response
Figure 8.6: Hypothetical clear boundary and linear cross over boundary.
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The main study showed a categorical perception effect where participants could 
identify a tastant correctly from a foil more successfully when the foil was across 
category compared to within category. This effect is clear despite any potential 
problems of the category boundary addressed above, i.e. the overall boundary is just 
an average for the sample and does not reflect every single subject’s classification 
which could place the boundary in differing positions. While the CP like effect is 
shown it does not fit a classic CP graph with a sharp boundary. The precaution of 
using two administration methods revealed no effect. This suggests that the dimmed 
lighting was sufficient to prevent any cues from colour differences in the drinks. No 
interaction effect was found.
The method was successful at identifying a CP effect. The tastants were just a mixture 
of two readily available squash drinks and could have easily have been mixed and 
drank at home in real life. Additionally it is very possible a drinks company could 
make a squash drink which is a mixture of orange and lemon, giving the study some 
ecological validity.
The study clearly demonstrated a categorical effect for an orange lemon tastant binary 
mixture. The next study will aim to replicate this effect and examine whether the 
effect is present for other mixtures involving two tastants. In addition to testing for 
effects around category boundaries trials will also be administered that cross 
‘prototypes’ (100% concentrations). Would there be any difference in the ability to 
correctly identify tastants from distractors when they come from a separate binary 
mixture? Before this, the two new tastants mixtures needed to be tested by a taste-
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space pilot so that the stimuli could be divided into categories. One of the interesting 
features that would be looked at would be the shape of the taste-space boundaries as 
to whether they are sharp or frizzy and whether CP style effects are closer to a 
traditional CP sharp boundary.
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Chapter Nine: Widening the search for categoricai 
perception over three binary-mixture taste-space 
terrains & a search for a prototype effect
Introduction
The preceding chapter firstly established the topology (shape) of taste-space for an 
orange/lemon mixture. A blurry categorisation of the taste-space was found. Tastants 
made from largely lemon were identified as lemon and largely orange ones as orange. 
The CP curves were not as sharp as would have been expected and do not reflect a 
sharp CP boundary. Almost everyone judged the polar extremes correctly with 
correct identification dropping away from the poles. Following the pilot, the main 
study showed that participants performed better at identifying tastants from cross 
category foils than from within category foils, typical of a categorical perception 
effect. This chapter aims to retest the orange/lemon mixture to ascertain whether or 
not the category boundary was similar to the preceding study. In addition to this the 
topology of two more continua were tested to identify their respective category 
boundaries and therefore allow for selection of tastants to be used for a main CP 
experiment. The stimuli were squash drinks as in the preceding chapter; the mixtures 
were orange/lemon, lemon/blackcurrant and orange/blackcurrant. Blackcurrant was 
selected, as it is one of the most popular squash drinks alongside orange and lemon. 
Also unlike lime, which could have been used, blackcurrant is not a citrus drink and 
could provide interesting results.
If the three continua ranges are laid out, a triangle shaped space can be created with 
100% lemon at one comer, 100% orange at another and 100% blackcurrant at the
188
third. As noted before it is reasonable to assume that 100% concentration is likely to 
be prototypical of a tastant, after all you can not get more orange than 100% orange. 
This shall be discussed in more detail shortly. Additionally the previous chapter 
demonstrated that most people do correctly categorise the 100% concentrations 
further supporting the idea that the 100% concentrations can be considered 
prototypical. It should be noted this triangular taste-space does not relate to any 
assumption that there truly is a Temon-orange-blackcurrant’ taste-space; however this 
layout of the juices can be practically useful in understanding the prototype regions. 
This is similar to a map of the world’s surface being very useful even though it is not 
a true representation of the topology of the Earth which is more accurately presented 
on a globe.
When it comes to theoretical predictions, standard CP theory would suggest correct 
identification should be better across a category boundary than within the category. 
Perceptual magnet theory suggests performance within category near the prototype 
should be the poorest of all.
EASIER
PROTOTYPE
☆
HARDER
P e rc e p tu a l  M ag n et p red ic tion : av erag e  o f  A + A  » h a rd e r
Average o f B + B * e a s ie r
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Figure 9.1: Perceptual magnet effect predictions.
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However, in the triangular arrangement of tastant mixtures, there is also a kind of 
‘boundary’ around each prototype (see Figure 9.2). Although the predominant taste is 
that of the prototype, the secondary tastes differ each side of the prototype. Provided 
the two secondary tastes can be distinguished, it is possible that discrimination of 
stimuli straddling the prototype could be easier than discriminating two stimuli close 
to the prototype, but both on the same side. For example it is possible to imagine a 
very lemon drink (95%) with a hint of blackcurrant and another drink with 95% 
lemon and a hint of orange would be easier to distinguish than the same 95% lemon 
drink with a touch of orange from a drink with 85% lemon and a 15% orange part. We 
could say two are lemon-orange drinks and one is a lemon-blackcurrant drink If such 
a ‘prototype-category’ effect were found, this would contradict the PM hypothesis as 
on average the cross-category stimuli would be closer to the prototype than the 
within-category pair.
YXPrototypes
'Prototype Category Boundary"
YX
ZY
Figure 9.2: Prototypes (100% concentration tastants) can be represented as the apexes of the 
triangle or as similar to a category boundary.
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This chapter firstly aims to retest the orange/lemon taste space and establish the taste- 
space of orange/blackcurrant and blackcurrant/lemon. This will ascertain category 
boundaries around which to test for CP effects. Additionally stimuli proximal to the 
100% concentrations will be used to test the Perceptual Magnet hypothesis and to see 
if there might be a ‘prototype-category effect as well.
Taste-space pilot 
Pilot subjects
There were 40 participants, mean age 25.52 (SD 7.44) years; there were 12 males and 
28 females.
Pilot stimuli
The pilot used binary tastant mixtures of orange and lemon, orange and blackcurrant, 
and blackcurrant and lemon. The interval of change was a difference of 10% 
concentration. Along with the mixed tastants, pure stimuli were also used at the poles, 
so for example on the orange lemon continuum at one end was pure lemon and the 
other was pure orange with nine stimuli in between.
Pilot procedure
All participants tasted all tastants and had to identify the tastants as one of the two 
tastes that it was made from.
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Pilot results
Figures 9.3, 9.4 and 9.5 show the number of people judging each mixture to be 
predominantly one or other of the two constituents, for each binary mixture. For two 
of the mixtures, the estimated boundary (the average ‘50% judgment’) was at or about 
the 50% mixture (Figures 9.4, 9.5), but for the orange-blackcurrant mixture, the 
boundary was at about 60% orange (Figure 9.3).
 freq judged orange
—  freq judged blackrurramt 
O  freq judged orange 
O  freq judged blackrurramt
40.00”
30.00-
G)
"S 20.00-
10 .00”
0 .00”
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1000
Orange/blackcurrant tastant scaled In orange
Figure 9.3: Taste-space for blackcurrant/orange mixture, scaled in orange. The number of 
participants judging each tastant as orange and blackcurrant.
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O  freqency judged lemon 
O  freqency judged orange
Lemon/orange tastants scaled In lemon
Figure 9.4: Taste-space for lemon/orange mixture, scaled in lemon. The number of participants 
judging each tastant as orange and lemon.
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Figure 9.5: Taste-space for blackcurrant/lemon mixture, scaled in blackcurrant. Tbe number of 
participants judging each tastant as lemon and blackcurrant.
Pilot discussion
The profile of the taste-space is similar to that of the preceding chapter. The polar 
examples were always judged to be the correct taste (X), and the proportion of X 
judgments fell monotonically as X was diluted. Somewhere near the middle but not 
necessarily at the 50/50% concentration ratio the dominant judgement switched to the 
other component that is to say with lemon/orange on one side of the boundary most 
will name it orange and on the other lemon. Operationally, the average 50%
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judgement point was treated as the category boundary. The category boundary for 
orange and lemon was slightly different in this pilot (orange 55%, lemon 45%) to the 
preceding one where the boundary was closer to 65% orange, 35% lemon. The latter 
may reflect the larger sample size in the pilot study, and the finer gradations of the 
mixtures relative to the previous study. The curve of the taste space in the pilot studies 
are more sigmoid in shape than in the first CP Pilot, this shape is more typical of the 
classic CP.
Main study 
Subjects
The sample comprises of 24 individuals, 14 females and 10 males. The mean age was 
22. The sample was an opportunity sample and was made up of 21 students, the 
remaining three included one nurse and two shop assistants.
Stimuli
From the pilot study, two within and two across category tastants were selected from 
the boundary regions for each continuum and two same-category and two cross­
category stimuli around each prototype were selected (Figure 9.6 and 9.7). For 
example, the orange/lemon continuum has 100% / 0% concentrations at both ends; the 
category boundary is at 55% orange, 45% lemon. Two stimuli are on the lemon side 
and two on the orange. The two closest to the category boundary were stimulus
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targets. Near the 100% concentrations, two more tastants are marked. When the three 
continua are linked together forming a taste-space triangle (Figure 9.7), it is clear that 
the same procedure conducted at the category boundary can be conducted at the 
triangle’s comers. The triangle’s prototype comers/apexes have been flattened out and 
are also shown in Figure 9.6a,b..
Category
boundary
{55%0,45%L)
T1 T2
70% 60% 50% 40%0 0 0 0
30% 40% 50% 60%
L L L L
Category
boundary
(40%B,60%0)
55%
B
45%
O
T3 T4
45% 35% 25%
B B B
55% 65% 75%
0 0 0
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Category
boundary
{50%L,50%B)
T5 T6
65% 55% 45% 35%
L L L L
35% 45% 55% 65%
B B B B
9.6a: Category boundaries
Prototype 
100% orange
T8 T7
85% 95% 95% 85%
0 0 0 0
15% 5% 5% 15%
B B L L
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Prototype 
100% lemon
T9 n o
85% 95% 95% 85%
L L L L
15% 5% 5% 15%
0 0 B B
Prototype
100%
blackcurrant
Til T12
85% 95% 95% 85%
B B B B
15% 5% 5% 15%
L L 0 0
9.6b: Prototype apex.
Figure 9.6a, b: The three binary taste-spaces with tastants identified along their length, four at 
the category boundary and two near each prototype apex. Tastants used in the prototype trials 
are also displayed. The diagram is not to scale. Targets are prefixed with a T, orange is shown 
with an O, lemon is L and blackcurrant is B.
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Design and procedure
This was a two-factor factorial within subjects design with the factors ‘region’ 
(boundary versus apex) and ‘category’ (within- or across- boundary or prototype.)
Each subject had two 'target' tastants, one near a category boundary and one near a 
prototype. It is important to remember that the 100% concentrations are assumed to 
be related to the mental prototype structures and need not in themselves BE the same 
thing as the mental strueture. That is to say the 100% orange tastant is likely to be a 
good example, or have many of the characteristies of the mental prototype structure. 
Larger numbers of targets per participant were not used as each had to experience 
enough number of trials per target. For each target, they were tested with two 'foils', 
one within-category and one between-category. Each of the four pairs was tested 
three times each, giving 12 trials per subject. For each subject, the two targets were 
paired such that the boundary target (e.g., Tl Fig. 9.6) was paired with one of the 
targets from the opposite apex (T12 or T il) . Each target was allocated to four 
subjects, and of the four, two had the target paired with one of the opposite targets 
(e.g., Tl and T il)  and two had the other opposite target (Tl and T12). Table 9.1, 
presents all the targets, foils and who tasted what.
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Tastant Tastant
concentration
Within Across Participants
1 (Tl) OL 60% 0,40%  L 70% 0 , 
30% L
50% 0 , 
50% L
1,7, 13,19
2 (T2) OL 50%O, 50% L 40% 0 ,
60% L
60% 0 , 
40%L
2, 8, 14, 20
3 (T3) BO 45%B, 55% 0 55% B, 45 
% 0
35% B, 
65% 0
3, 9,15,21
4 (14) BO 35% B, 65% 0 25% B, 
75% 0
45% B, 
55% 0
4, 10, 16, 
22
5 (15) LB 55%L, 45% B 65% L, 
35% B
45% L , 
55% B
5,11,17,
23
6 (T6) LB 45%L, 55% 
B
35% L , 
65% B
55% L , 
45% B
6, 12, 18, 
24
7 (T7) Proximal to 0  
proto
95% 0 , 5% L 85% 0 ,
15% L
95% 0 , 5% 
B
6,11,18,
23
8 (T8) Proximal to 0  
proto
95% 0 , 5% B 85% 0 ,
15% B
95% 0 , 5%
L
5, 12, 17, 
24
9 (T9) Proximal to L 
proto
95%L, 5% 0 85% L , 
15% 0
95% L , 5% 
B
3, 10, 15, 
22
10 (TIO) Proximal to 
L proto
95% 1, 5% B 85% L ,
15% B
95% L , 5% 
0
4, 9, 16,21
11 (T il)  Proximal to 
B proto
95% B, 5%L 85% B, 
15% L
95% B, 
55% 0
1,8, 13,20
12 (T12) Proximal to 
B proto
95% B, 5 % 0 85% B, 
15% 0
95%B, 5% 
L
2, 7, 14, 19
Table 9.1: the first column lists all the targets. The first six are located at the operational 
category boundaries; the last six are located at the prototype. The third and fourth column show 
the associated foils for each target. The final column list which subjects had which targets.
Lemon is labelled as L, blackcurrant as B, orange as C. The location of boundary targets is 
shown with the two letters following the target, i.e. targets 3 and 4 are on the blackcurrant 
orange continuum.
The testing environment was the same as the preceding study. Lighting levels were 
very low and tastants administered via cups. Water was used between tastants as in 
the first study.
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Key
B = Blackcurrant 
O = Orange 
L = Lemon 
T = Targets
T11112
13
76
14 1540% 50%
55%
18 710
71 72 7977
Figure 9.7: Taste-space triangle illustrating all targets and relative positioning of aU stimuli in 
relation to each other (not drawn to scale). Two targets are located at each operational category 
boundary and two targets are located near each prototype (triangle apex). Note each target can 
also be used as a foil for the adjacent target, the unlabelled marks are foils.
In summary, each person was tested using an X A-B task to identify what they had 
tasted before with a mixture of within and across category boundary items and 
similarly at a category prototype, located at the triangle’s comer.
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Results
Table 9.1 shows the mean correct scores across subjects for each combination of 
location (boundary versus apex) and category (within- or across) collapsed across 
boundaries and prototypes. It appears that accuracy is higher for across-category than 
for within-category, but this is less pronounced for apex scores than the boundary 
scores.
Region Categorical status 
Within Across
Category boundary 1.21
(SD .72)
2.42 
(SD .58)
Prototype apex 1.33
(SD .64)
1.79
(SD .66)
Table 9.1: Mean number of correct responses for the four conditions
Two way ANOVA -  region (category boundary or prototype apex) by category status 
(within and across) revealed that accuracy was greater around the boundary (1.82) 
than around the apex (1.56); F  (1,23) = 531; p <  .05), and that across-category (2.1) 
was more accurate than within-category (1.27; F  (1,23) = 33.82; p  <.0005). The two- 
way interaction was also significant (F (1,23) = 11.71; ^  <.005).
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Figure 9.7: Mean number of correct responses for the four conditions. Within group 95% 
confidence intervals are shown.
The interaction reflects the stronger category effect for the boundary condition (f(23) 
= 7.8, p  < .0005) than for the apex condition.
Planned comparisons were conducted to confirm the sets of differences that are 
displayed in the Figure 9.7. Firstly the difference at the category boundary was 
significant between within and across, t (23) = 1.60; p  <.001, two tailed; this confirms 
the preceding study and supports traditional CP theory. Additionally t test showed a 
significant difference at around the prototypes, t (23) =2.70; p  = 0.013, two tailed. 
This contradicts the PM theory. However this result could be considered similar to a 
prototype style boundary effect. Next there was no significant difference between the 
within boundary item and the within prototype item, t (23) =.72; p  >.05, two tailed. 
This contradicts PM theory, the within prototype score was slightly higher than the 
within boundary but this was not a statistically significant difference. The two across
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scores were significantly different, t (23) =4.73; /><.001, two tailed, the across 
boundary was superior to across prototype. The mean scores for each condition were 
also compared against chance i.e., 1.5. Neither within score was statistically different 
from chance at the 0.05 level, across prototype was significant at the 0.05 level and 
the across category was significant at <0.001 level. Within boundary and within 
prototype were not significantly different at the 0.05 level.
The data presented so far were collapsed across continua and across prototypes. To 
check that this is not obscuring important differences. Figure 9.8 shows the mean 
scores for each of the targets for within- and across pairs. It can be seen that for every 
case across-category at the boundary was more accurate than within-category, and 
that the variability of the two conditions is relatively low. In contrast, for the 
prototype targets, there is no difference between across- and within-category scores 
for two targets (T7 and T9) and the difference is modest for two others (TIO and 
T il) . There is also little variation among within-category scores. It is of note the 
mean number for correct for three of the within target performances were below 
chance. Performance at the prototype tends to be near chance, only the T8, T i l  and 
T12 across and T il  within were above chance.
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Figure 9.8: Within and across scores for each target (T il all scored 2)
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Discussion
This chapter was divided into two parts: the taste-space pilot study followed by the 
main study which investigated the category boundary effect and the possibility of a 
prototype category effect. The pilot largely replicated the taste-space of the first pilot 
study although the boundary was slightly shifted. This, however, could be accounted 
for by the higher number of intervals being tested in pilot two. The results revealed 
that the 100% concentrations were always perceived as what they truly were, e.g. 
100% lemon is perceived as lemon. This suggests that they could resemble a 
prototypical taste or at least can be considered as example of prototpes. The pilot also 
revealed that, on average, correct categorisation gets weaker as the boundary is 
approached. The two new continua produced similar results. This suggests that 
binary taste-spaces can be categorically perceived and that there is a change of 
category within the taste-space.
The main study showed that a CP effect was apparent (more accurate across- than 
within-) at the category boundary. This is consistent with the earlier findings and 
those of the literature and supports traditional CP predictions. An effect of region was 
also demonstrated, with overall correct identification in the X A-B task being superior 
near the category boundary than proximal to the prototype. Next the area around the 
prototype showed an interesting effect, this was not consistent with the perceptual 
magnet effect, which predicted items at the prototype should be harder to identify e.g 
around chance. What was found was an effect similar to a CP effect normally found 
at the boundary. Although the predominant taste is that of the prototype, the 
secondary tastes differ each side of the prototype. Provided the two secondary tastes 
can be distinguished (as in these cases), it is possible that discrimination of stimuli
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straddling the prototype could be easier than discriminating two stimuli close to the 
prototype, but both on the same side. This ‘prototype-category’ effect therefore does 
contradict the PM hypothesis as on average the cross-category stimuli would be closer 
to the prototype than the within-category pair. Additionally the within scores did not 
decrease near the prototype, this contradicts PM account. In other words the key 
difference around the prototype, is the nature of the minority taste: it looks like orange 
with a touch of lemon is categorically different to orange with a touch of blackcurrant; 
but the effect is not as strong as the switch in dominant taste around the category 
boundaries.
Interestingly shift towards prototype predicts that across prototype should be worse 
than both of the within scores. The study revealed both within scores were worse than 
across prototype. The within scores were not significantly different from chance, the 
across scores were, especially at the average category boundary.
The main weakness of this study is the same as the first CP study, in that an 
individual’s category boundary could not be produced for each trial as it would not be 
practical. This means that the average category boundary had to be used and it is 
possible that an individual’s category boundary may have been different to the mean 
and as such the selection of tastants by the experimenter may have all fallen within 
that participant’s one category and not crossed it preventing a true CP effect being 
shown. However the CP effect was clearly demonstrated yet again. In addition to the 
weakness just mentioned the sample size could have been better. However because
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these effects are shown with pretty small samples it may suggest these effects have 
substantial size and robustness.
Overall this study shows a clear categorical perception effect for three binary tastants 
mixtures. Performance overall is superior at the category boundary. A CP like effect 
was also found at the prototype (within more difficult than across) which contradicts 
the theoretical reasoning behind the PM approach. It also contradicted STP. The 
results are more suggestive of superior ability with more novel stimuli. This would 
make more sense when considering the taste literature. Our sense of taste has evolved 
to detect differences rather than similarities. From an evolutionary perspective for 
example, being able to tell how similar two berries are is not overly adaptive or 
usefiil, however being able to detect a distinctive off taste could be a sign of it being 
poisonous.
One of the important issues to question here is what are the prototypes and the 
assumptions that the study is based on. The 100% concentration drinks were almost 
always correctly identified with the correct name more so than other tastants. This 
was taken as evidence that 100% lemon, 100% blackcurrant and 100% orange are all 
sufficiently good examples of lemon, orange and blackcurrantness, or that they have 
lots of the key characteristics of lemon, orange and blackcurrantness. These real life 
stimuli were therefore assumed to occupy space within the mental prototype 
structures. This assumption will be addressed again later.
This study does not confirm that these so called categorical perception effect(s) are 
purely related to initial perceptual distinctiveness among the tastants. It is possible
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that rather than (or maybe in addition to) retained some kind of ‘taste memory’, 
participants retained labels for the tastes, and the decision was based on comparison to 
the label. However this is difficult to imagine as it is very difficult to put distinct 
labels on not very distinctive tastants (see for example Marshall, Laing, Jinks. & 
Hutchinson, 2006). The next chapter presents the final study that was conducted to 
investigate what would happen when the delay between target and test was increased 
by 30 seconds to further explore the parameters affecting CP. The experiment was 
essentially a replication of study 1, but with target-test interval added as a variable. If 
CP relies on taste-memory, then it is likely that this will have attenuated considerably 
after over 30 seconds, and CP should be reduced or eliminated. However, if labelling 
contributes to CP, it should be possible to retain labels over this interval, and CP 
should persist. Moreover, if CP is based on a shift towards prototype, as the stimuli 
were from the boundary region, CP should survive. The extent of the shift towards 
prototype should increase as memory fades and in the extreme, all target memory 
representations would default to the prototype, resulting in the across-category foil 
always being further from the target memory representation than the target at test. In 
the within-category case, STP at first reduces within-category distances; in the 
extreme case, as memory fades, distances could even start to increase again as the 
memory representation shifts beyond the foil’s location towards the prototype.
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Chapter Ten: Is the Categorical Boundary effect for 
taste just perceptual? The effects of a time deiay
Introduction
Early memory research was largely shaped by Atkinson & Shiffnn (1968) multi-store 
modal model. Their model segregated memory into three structures; firstly, the 
sensory register then short term memory and finally long term memory. As was noted 
in the section introduction the sensory information stores were the focus of much of 
the early research; however, they were tricky to investigate due to their short duration 
of retention (Groeger, 1997). However, computer based research allowed numerous 
studies to examine the echoic (sound) and iconic (vision) store. These studies have 
largely been convergent in their findings and supported the earlier researcher results; 
iconic memory was shown to decay within 0.5 seconds (Sperling, 1960). Treisman 
(1964) showed the temporal duration of unattended auditory information in the echoic 
store is around 2 seconds.
In addition to the iconic and echoic stores, presumably there is a flavour sensory store, 
or at least taste and olfactory stores that are highly integrated. Investigating the 
chemical senses is more troublesome than visual and auditory studies and the benefits 
of using computers do not easily extend to the chemical senses. Research looking at a 
taste store has to take into account that taste can be weakened via prior exposure, 
adaptation and taste modification caused by the presence of another stimulus. 
Additionally, it is difficult to wash out the mouth completely; think of the aftertaste of 
garlic or the persistence of the minty taste of toothpaste or the highly pungent chilli.
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Most of the food we eat can be ‘tasted’ after it has left the month as particles remain 
in the saliva and possible after-effects and aftertaste can be strong and long-lasting. 
Any study investigating a memory effect for taste would have to take into account that 
it is almost impossible to remove fully any after-effect and that the delay needed to 
test for sensory/perceptual decay would need to be longer than with visual or auditory 
stimuli.
In the section introduction, it was noted that there is a debate as to how much of the 
categorical perception effect is due to the perceptual differences among the stimuli, or 
whether, as Roberson and Davidoff (2002) argue, it is based primarily on comparing 
the memory of the target label with the labels for the test stimuli. As target and test 
would have the same label in the within-category case, but different labels in the 
across-category case, labelling differentially benefits the latter leading to apparent CP. 
If the target-test delay is increased, taste-memory should become less precise, and at 
some point, cease to be informative and performance should approach chance levels. 
In contrast, if  CP is based on comparison of labels, it should be possible to retain the 
target label across an increased target-test interval, and across-category performance 
should still be better than within-category. The stimuli used in this experiment were 
from the boundary region, and accordingly, STP would also predict that CP should 
survive the increased target-test interval.
Unfortunately the literature does not provide any direct evidence or suggestions about 
time delays for taste, smell or flavour. With little to go on a 30 second delay was 
chosen. This study could have developed into another direction by testing various and
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systematically different time delays. A 30 second delay is the ‘proper experimental 
delay’ in this study, within which perceptual decay should have removed the sensory 
memory from the sensory memory store. Thirty seconds was a practical sensible ’long 
time’ for a memory decay to occur. Longer delays just would not have been practical. 
Shorter times could arguably be considered too short and therefore invalid: the basic 
10 second delay is enough to remove tastant residue from the mouth but the sensory 
representation/trace may still be stored in the sensory register. Longer times such as a 
minute or more would have extended the experiment far too much. Thus in the 
experiment the following times were used: 10 seconds initial tasting, lOseconds 
practical delay (mouth swilling time) plus the 30s experimental delay (to decay 
sensory memory from sensory register) plus the time it takes to do the recognition 
task. The mouth swilling time and initial tasting times were based on time recording 
conducted earlier in the thesis. On top of this, a gap between trials was also needed to 
prevent people from feeling queasy from tasting too many tastants too quickly.
Method 
Subjects
Thirty two participants were recruited. Some participants responded to advertisements 
and were paid; some were not paid and were recruited by a mixture of snowball 
sampling and opportunity sampling. No participants were rejected in this study. The 
sample included 14 males and 18 females. The average age was 21 years (SD 3.56).
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stimuli
This study is essentially the first CP study repeated with the addition of an 
experimental time delay. The four stimuli were 01 80% orange/20% lemon, Tl 70% 
orange/30% lemon, T2 60% orange/40% lemon and finally LI 50% orange/50% 
lemon. The category boundary was 65% orange/35% lemon.
Design and Procedure
This study was of mixed design. It included a within subjects factor of within and 
across category and a between subjects factor of immediate test versus delayed (plus 
30 seconds) test.
Half the sample had Tl ‘orange’ and the other half had T2 ‘lemon’ as their target. 
Each participant tasted four within and four across trials, thus each participant tasted 
24 tastants. This gives a maximum score of four correct for within and four correct for 
across boundary. Initial tasting time for each target was 10 seconds; and they then 
swilled their mouths with water for 10 seconds. Then half did the recognition task (no 
delay) while the other half waited 30 seconds before the recognition test (i.e. from the 
initial target tasting). Stimulus order was randomised and the recognition times for 
the four within and four across trials was recorded for each participant. This was 
measured from the moment the second tastant in each trial left the mouth to the time 
an answer was given with a verbal response.
Results
Table 10.1 and Figure 10.1 display the mean scores for each combination of delay (0 
or 30 seconds), and category (within- or across). It appears as if there is a CP effect
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as would be expected without a delay. With a delay it appears as if scores are less and 
the CP effect vanishes.
Delay condition Within category Across category
Delay 2.93 (SD .68) 3.13 (SD .62)
No delay 3.06 (SD .68) 3.63 (SD .62)
Table 10.1: Mean total correct scores in all four conditions.
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Figure 10.1: Scores achieved on all four conditions of the experiment.
Two-way mixed ANOVA showed that across scores were higher than within-scores; 
F  (1, 30) = 7.35, /? = .011) but there was no effect of delay (F (1, 30) = 2.90; p  = 
.099) or the interaction (F (1,30) = 1.84 > .05).
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When the CP effect was considered separately in the delay and no delay conditions, 
there was a significant mean difference without delay of .56, (SD .96), {t (15) = 2.33, 
p  = 0.034, two-tailed). With a delay, the mean difference was not significant (mean = 
.19 (SD .54); t (15) = 1.38, j? = .188, two-tailed). The main change with delay is the 
superior ability across category without delay becomes similar to both within scores. 
The across scores in the two conditions were statistically different, {t (30) = 2.28, p  = 
0.030, two-tailed)
The lack of a main delay effect may not be as it appears. From Figure 10.1, there 
appears to be a ‘ceiling effect’ in the across-category no delay condition. Eleven out 
of sixteen participants scored the maximum of 4 in the no delay condition but only 4 
out of 16 scored 4 in the across-category delay condition. This ceiling like effect 
however is not likely an experimental artefact but is predicted by CP theory
Table 10.2 and Figure 10.2 display the recognition times for the four conditions. It 
can be seen that response times in the delay condition are substantially longer than in 
the no delay condition {F (1,15) = 315.360; p<  .0001) this suggests it takes longer to 
respond. ANOVA showed no main category effect (F (1,15) = 1.08; p>.05), nor an 
interaction between category and delay (F (1,15) = 1.133; p > .05).
Delay condition Within category Across category
Delay 16.02 (SD 5.35) 17.37 (SD 6.76)
No delay 9.92 (SD 2.85) 10.1 (SD 2.84)
Table 10.2: Response times (seconds) in all four conditions.
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Within
Across
No delay
Figure 10.2: Recognition times for ail four conditions, Within group 95% confidence intervals as 
error bars.
Discussion
As in study one, which used the same stimuli, accuracy was greater for cross-category 
than within-category trials. Moreover, there also appeared to be no effect of 
increasing the target-test delay. However, there are three issues to address. First, the 
performance with the ‘within’ measures as it is greater than chance. Second, the 
category effect was clearly significant in the no delay condition, and clearly not 
significant in the delay condition. Third, comparing the two across-category 
conditions suggests that the increased delay reduced accuracy (Figure 10.1).
Assuming the forgoing conjecture is correct, this would be evidence against both the 
labelling and STP accounts. Both positions predict that CP could survive the 40 
second gap, provided for example, that subjects rehearse the target label. However, 
the data do not offer unequivocal support to taste-memory being the basis for CP. 
While across-category accuracy may have declined, it was still well above chance.
216
suggesting that useful information can survive in taste-memory for at least 40 
seconds. Moreover, within-category accuracy, did not fall, and it too was clearly 
above chance, and at about the same level as across-category with a delay. It appears 
that whatever confers the across category advantage over within-category, has been 
lost over the additional 30 seconds, without within-category accuracy being affected. 
These findings do not fit a traditional CP effect as the within-category performance is 
too good.
In terms of recognition time, that is the time it takes a participant to decide on their 
choice in the X A-B task, there was no CP effect but there was an effect of delay. This 
could imply that the delay decayed the record in the sensory register and as such the X 
A-B task becomes more challenging. This increase in difficulty could explain why 
with delay recognition took longer.
One concerning feature is that compared to CP study one, which this one largely 
replicates is that the within scores were at chance level (>.05) in study one, the across 
performance was better than chance at the 0.05 level. In this study all conditions 
produced scores well above chance, even with the within conditions. The only 
explanation I can give for this is due to sampling. At least half of the people involved 
in this study had been involved in one of the preceding studies. The length of time 
between was always a few months at least. However, it is possible that even with just 
one previous experience of the study months or even a year or more ago they may 
have developed the performance either by skill or by intentional learning, anticipating 
that the task demands of this study would be similar to the one they had previously
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completed. This explanation is very unlikely as it is difficult to see that such an effect 
would happen.
One possible issue of concern is that this study in replicating CP study one used the 
category boundary found there, 65% Orange, 35% lemon. The second CP study was 
55% orange and 45%. In hind sight using the CP boundary of study two would have 
been more accurate. Future studies may wish to use the data from the second study.
In the next chapter the nature of the prototypes will be discussed in more detail 
including the assumptions made and possible associated limitations.
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Chapter Eleven 
Categorical perception: Synopsis and discussion
This section investigated categorisation within the taste domain. Categorisation of 
items and entities in the other sensory domains have been well established, including 
for speech sounds (auditory), colour and faces (iconic). Examples of each respectively 
include; Liberman et al. (1957), Roberson & Davidoff, (2000), Campanella, 
Hanoteau, Seron & Bruyer. (2003). Three studies were designed, conducted and 
analysed in the course of the investigation. Section Three investigated binary taste- 
space mixtures (i.e a drink made from two different flavours) for a categorical 
perception effect, the impact of a delay on this effect and if there is a prototype effect. 
Traditional CP theory, STP theory and PM theory were all brought into question.
The key findings of section three are as follows:
A binary tastant mixture can be perceived and categorised. The tastespace is 
perceptually divided (category boundary) near the middle of the continuum. On one 
side of the boundary the tastant will be named one thing and on the other something 
else. Additionally 100% concentrations are perceived (and named) as what they are. 
That is to say a 100% lemon drink would be labelled as lemon. This all makes logical 
sense and was as expected.
A CP effect can be found at the category boundaries. This was found in all three 
studies (but not with a delay) for a lemon-orange mixed drink. The effect was also 
demonstrated on two other binary mixtures. This suggests that CP can be
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demonstrated fairly easily and that it is not special to an orange-lemon mixed drink. 
This makes logical sense. It supports CP theory that the category boundary may be 
perceptually warped.
The addition of a time delay in the X A-B recognition tasks resulted in the removal of 
the CP effect. This contradicts STP theory. It may suggest that there is a taste or 
flavour sensory register as has been found for sound and vision and that the taste 
representation has just decayed to a level that is not as useful. It is possible that even 
if a labelling strategy was used it has only limited helpfulness following a delay. 
Although this does still remain above chance.
It takes longer to do an X A-B task on taste following a time delay. This would 
suggest that the task is more difficult with a delay.
In addition to a CP effect at the category boundary a similar effect was found at the 
prototype. Performance was better crossing over the prototype in a separate 
continuum than within the same continuum. This contradicts PM and STP. 
Additionally within category performance was not found to reduce near the prototype 
again providing evidence against PM.
Performance overall is superior at the category boundary and worse near the prototype 
supporting CP and PM. However a CP like effect is also found at the prototype 
(within more difficult than across) which contradicts the theoretical reasoning behind 
the PM approach. The key difference around the prototype is the nature of the
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minority taste: it looks like orange with a touch of lemon is categorically different to 
orange with a touch of blackcurrant; but the effect is not as strong as the switch in 
dominant taste around the category boundaries. The results are more suggestive of 
superior ability with more novel stimuli. That is to say our sense of taste is better at 
distinguishing differences (which could be dangerous) than similarities. Anecdotally 
being able to detect even slight off tastes or hints could be very important in survival 
terms. See Figure 11.1.
Orange
Primary tas tant 
quality
Hints of lemon Hints of blackcurrant
Hints of some secondary flavours 
added to  primary tastants may 
make the  drink more distinct than 
hints of ano ther  secondary flavour
Figure 11.1: When more of the secondary tastant is added to the mix it may have an effect on 
perception. Even with a near 100% concentration of one taste, the addition of even a hint of 
another taste may make it distinguishable from the 100% concentration. Some secondary 
tastants are likely to have greater impact than others.
The second CP study investigated the full continuum along binary taste spaces from 
for example 100% orange to 100% lemon. The area proximal to the 100% 
concentrations were investigated in the same way as at the so called category
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boundaries with within and across decisions being made. This was based on the 
assumption that 100% concentrations are the prototype of that quality or substance. 
So that 100% orange is the most orange you can get and would be the central 
prototype or at least a very good example of the prototype. It would not be surprising 
for orange squash and real orange juice to have similar but distinct prototypes or have 
close proximity to each other as examples of a broader orange concept. With 
traditional CP the boundary is mostly considered to be pretty sharp and clear. The 
second study made a similar assumption about the prototypes (100% concentrations) 
with tastants made up of 95% primary flavour and 5% hint of secondary flavour in 
the tastants near the prototype. These were assumed far enough from the prototype 
for within and across prototype comparisons to be made. Prototype effects were found 
in the study and support the above assumptions although this would benefit jfrom 
more studying. It is possible that the area of the ‘real’ prototype could actually extend 
much further than the 100% concentrations as in Figure 11.2. This would have a 
similar effect on interpretations as a fuzzy category boundary in that the experimental 
prototypes while intended to be within and across might not necessarily be so. One 
interpretation is whether the prototype zone is relatively small or large may not be the 
only important factor, it could be the impact of the secondary flavour even very close 
to a ‘prototype’ which has a substantial effect especially if it is a very distinctive 
secondary flavouring. It would be easy to imagine an almost pure orange drink with 
just the slightest amount of garlic or chilli would taste distinct but an orange drink 
with a reasonable amount of lemon might still be considered to be orange.
2 2 2
Just how far does the prototype  
extend? Is the 100% concentration just 
one exam ple w ithin the prototype.
100%
1
T “
100%
W hile prototype effects were found is was possible th a t the tastants may have been 
within or outside the prototype zone and therefore having an im pact on the results.
Figure 11.2: How expansive is the prototype?
If the CP effect is aided by labelling, then there should be no effect of a time delay as 
a 'useful' label should enable subjeets to still perform a task despite a delay. The delay 
effeet suggests that even if labelling was used, it was not very suecessful; this is not 
surprising as tastants are very diffieult to label in a meaningful manner (Marshall et 
al., 2006). Just think how difficult it would be to have a useful label that eould 
distinguish between a seleetion of orange and lemon drinks. The ability to produce 
useful labels is even more difficult in the CP studies as squash was used and not juiee 
drinks. At least with real juice drinks there is more variability such as viscosity, 
texture and pulp.
Overall this seetion has clearly indieated CP for flavour. CP has been demonstrated 
for three tastant binary mixtures, two citrus and one berry flavour. The obvious next
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step would be to replicate the study using more simple easier to control stimuli or 
alternatively to turn to complex real juice drinks and then work towards even more 
complex foods such as soups and then on to complex solids. An interesting effect 
around the prototype was found, with items crossing a prototype being easier to 
identify than those within prototype (along another continuum). This is in 
contradiction with prototype magnet theory. Finally a delay effect was demonstrated 
suggesting that CP is redueed with time and may be a more perceptual effect than one 
aided by labelling or memory. While it is easy to see how labelling could be used as a 
suceessful strategy with some visual and auditory material it is less clear how it could 
be suecessfully used with the ehemical senses where the ability to name flavour 
features is more difficult.
One unexpected result is that performance overall was above chance in the final 
study, this might be due to at least half of the sample having taken part in previous 
studies. This would suggest that even with minimal X A-B style training with taste 
over an extended period of time a ‘skill’ can be developed.
The methodology used in the CP study was fairly robust. The counterbalancing 
method should have removed any order or praetice effects. The selection of squash as 
tastants was for pragmatic reasons. Items which are more complex would have been 
difficult to produce, store and importantly control. Solid tastants would have been 
especially difficult as they would have been more difficult to wash from the mouth 
completely. This would have been most troublesome in the delay study.
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The third study had two main problems relating to it. Firstly the ceiling effect made 
the full strength on an effect difficult to find. However this did not prevent the CP 
effect showing itself. The more concerning issue was the selection of the tastants. 
The taste-space from study two produced a more accurate understanding of the 
category boundary. These should have been used as the tastants in study three. 
However because study three was essentially a replication of study one, the ‘less 
accurate' selection of tastants were used. It would be interesting to see what would 
have happened if the delay study had been conducted on one of taste-spaces of study 
two. In hindsight the use of CP study two tastants would have been preferable.
This section has demonstrated for the first time that CP exists for tastants. It has also 
addressed the theoretical explanations for the observed effects and what would 
happen when a time delay was applied.
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Section 4 
Chapter Twelve: Basic cognition in food psychology. 
General discussion
General models of eating psychology have been developed over the years and 
innumerable factors have been identified as being involved in food choice. Numerous 
models exist either focusing on specific aspects of food choice or at a more integrated 
level (Shepherd & Raats, 1996) reflecting the complex array of factors involved, 
including beliefs, expectations and attitudes. These models have been based on three 
main perspectives. The psychophysiological approach focuses on the biological 
aspects of hunger and satiety and the role of neurotransmitters and hormones. At the 
other end of the spectrum are sociodevelopmental models. These models of eating 
psychology and food choice include such factors as exposure, social learning and 
associative learning. They emphasise the importance of learning and exposure (Birch, 
1989). The third collection of models are mostly described as ‘cognitive’; these 
include attitudes, social norms, perceived control and ambivalence (Ogden, 2003). 
These ‘cognitive’ approaches are invaluable as they forge a link between the socio­
developmental and the biological (Rozin, 2006).
All the cognitive approaches have focused on what can be called ‘complex 
cognitions’ relating to beliefs and attitudes. Few have paid any attention to the basic 
cognitions: sensation, perception, attention and memory which form the bedrock of 
mainstream cognitive psychology. Ignoring the role of such basic cognitions seems 
rather short-sighted, as it fails to ask fundamental questions such as how are flavours 
perceived and how are flavours categorised? Is there a taste sensory register? Do the
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numbers of taste papillae have any impact on taste memory? Is there a levels of 
processing effect for taste?
The knowledge of tasting (sensing) basic tastants (i.e. sweet, sour, bitter and salt) is 
fairly good. The taste perception literature has huge gaps. Very little has been 
scientifically tested about the role of attention or memory in eating behaviour. To 
understand the psychology of eating it is equally essential to understand the anatomy 
(structure) and processes (fimctioning) of the mind including its basic cognitions.
The purpose of this thesis was firstly to acknowledge that there is a massive gap in 
our understanding of the psychology of eating. This gap is most evident at the 
cognitive level, specifically at the basic cognitive level, i.e. perception, attention, 
memory (language).
Secondly, the thesis aimed to ascertain whether the evidence and theories of 
mainstream cognitive psychology are transferable to the psychology of eating and the 
chemical senses. This was important as designing experiments on the chemical senses 
is firaught with difficulties which are not normally encountered in most cognitive 
research. These include the fact that participants could be allergic to stimuli; stimuli 
can go off and need frequent replacement and cannot be as easily controlled or 
produced as those on a computer. Participants having had food prior to the study and 
colds and influenza interfered with the running of the studies. Most importantly the 
number of trials is limited due to amount of tastants a person can reasonably be 
expected to taste without becoming bloated or queasy.
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The focus of the thesis was at a basic cognitive level, investigating the cognitive 
processes involved in the psychology of eating. The majority of past research into the 
basic cognitions has focused at the level of sensation, as has been customary in 
psychophysics, and as such the focus of this thesis beyond sensation through 
perception and memory (mnemophysics) for foods. The thesis main topic areas 
covered a number of issues:
Is there an effect of papillae density on the memory for tastants?
Is there a categorical perception effect for taste?
Is there a prototype effect?
How well do the traditional CP theory, STP and PM accounts transfer to the world of 
taste in explaining phenomena?
If there is a categorical perception effect is it purely perceptual or does memory have 
a role in it?
Is there a levels of processing effect for tastants as there is for other modalities?
How well does the levels of processing framework and theory transfer to the world of 
taste?
The initial aim of this PhD and its final plan substantially changed and evolved based 
on the studies conducted. At the end of Section Two, it was decided to change 
direction based on the lack of clear findings from the levels of processing studies. 
This resulted in expanding my search on the basic cognitions in taste to categorical
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perception. This required understanding yet another big branch of cognitive 
psychology. As a result this thesis clearly has two distinct subject matters.
Taste buds and levels of processing
One of the factors addressed in the first study was whether differences in taste 
papillae numbers had any effect on performance on a taste recognition task. This was 
based on the rationale that people with superior perceptual abilities may also have 
better perceptual memory performance. For example a person with normal vision is 
likely to perform a visual recognition task better than someone with poor vision. 
Theory and research shows taste perception is very variable, some people are super 
tasters and some are normal tasters and some are non tasters. Superior taste ability 
relates to more taste papillae (Bartoshuk, 1980). When put to the test, no effect of 
papillae was found on a recognition task. This suggests that while there may be great 
differences in taste perception abilities relating to papillae number, i.e. more papillae, 
better taste perception, these effects do not carry over to taste memory. Accepting the 
null hypothesis in this case could have been over conservative with the use of two- 
tailed tests. Sample size may have also had an impact on power in this study.
The main focus of the first half of the research was on levels of processing (originally 
proposed by Craik & Lockhart, 1972). Levels of processing states that items are 
better remembered if they are processed deeply. It also states that LOP can be 
manipulated experimentally via the use of orientating tasks. The first LOP study used 
orange juice pulpiness assessment (involves the processing of the sensory 
characteristics of the drink) as its shallow orientation task and liking as its deep task
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(involving deep semantic/meaningftilness judgements). LOP research has shown the 
effect to be pretty robust, highly replicated and found across a broad cognitive range 
(motor information, Nyberg Petersson, Nilsson, Sandblom, 2001; visual. Reingold, 
2002; auditory, Wheeler, Petersen, and Buckner, 2000), thus making it a perfect 
candidate to research within a new cognitive domain. The study failed to show any 
LOP effect. However when the orientating tasks were analysed, they were found to be 
correlated. This suggested that the two tasks were utilising the same or similar 
processing and were not distinctly different in their processing demands. The follow 
up study aimed to investigate LOP by going deeper and shallower using ‘liking by a 
significant other’ and ‘sip size judgement’ as its new orientating tasks. It was essential 
that the orientating tasks were uncorrelated, or any lack of a LOP effect could just be 
due to the orientating tasks not utilising distinctly different levels of processing. 
These tasks were found not to be correlated (and therefore involved unrelated 
processing) but still no LOP effect was found.
Faced with two studies that failed to show any significant results and no obvious ways 
ahead it was necessary to decide whether to continue with LOP or change direction to 
another area. The absence of an effect is a difficult position to be in, as the absence of 
the effect could be due to experimental problems occluding the effect, essentially the 
levels not being sufficiently deep or shallow. This unfortunately is a possibility as 
this has been the first time LOP theory and method have been applied to flavour. 
However (as discussed) all normal precautions and controls were utilised and no 
‘conclusive’ experiment could be formulated as the next step. No clear very deep and 
very shallow orientating tasks be identified. If an effect had then been found, would it 
have really been a LOP effect or would it have been a post hoc application of a
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tautology? As seen in the LOP section, this is a criticism that has been placed at 
LOP’s feet. There is little to gain from saying ‘x’ is deeper than what was tested in 
studies one and two because it seems to be deeper- that is just tautology! The 
alterative point of view is that the LOP effect just does not exist for taste. 
Psychophysiological studies such as those by Rolls and others (see Chapter Two for 
full details) suggest that with taste, the semantic/‘deep’ style processing occurs after 
and separate (neurologically) from basic shallow/sensory characteristics processing. 
This would suggest that LOP should occur for taste. However it could be that while 
the processing does occur in stages, with taste the ‘qualia’ experience of tasting a 
flavour always involves both deep and shallow processing. This anecdotally seems 
very plausible. The levels of processing involved in the classic studies seem very self 
evident, a person can count the number of letters in words (shallow), assess for 
rhyming (middle depth) or read the words for meaning (deep). The nature of distinct 
depths of processing seems unclear with taste, as it appears when we taste we 
automatically mentally process in both a deep and a shallow manner, i.e. the chocolate 
is very sweet and creamy and pleasurable. It is interesting also that many people are 
influenced in their preference (liking) of juice drinks on whether or not the product 
has pulp or not. This would suggest that LOP does not exist for taste/flavour. This 
does not however imply that a LOP effect has also been ruled out for foods at a higher 
level, such as the concepts, categories or brands of foods.
Another alternative interpretation using transfer appropriate processing theory 
(Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977; Roediger, Weeldon and Challis, 1989) could 
suggest that we have a tendency to process things in a certain way. People tend to 
process written words for meaning and semantics but few would look at an ECG for
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meaning unless they were medically trained. It could be that either through evolution 
or experience or a combination of the two we have a tendency to always perform 
some level of semantic/deep processing as liking/pleasure is so important a quality 
when it comes to tasting as food is essential for survival and poisons could kill you. 
Related to this principle it could be that processing for liking is just not a deep task 
when it comes to taste in the way it is when listening to music or assessing the 
pleasantness of words.
The number of tests needed to strongly support the absence of an effect and support 
the reliability of the experiment was beyond the time limits of this PhD. It was 
therefore decided to move onto new territory and investigate another area of basic 
cognition.
The above interpretations and conclusions of null effects in hindsight have to be taken 
with some caution. Because LOP had not previously been applied to taste and the 
papillae effect never previously been extended to memory a conservative approach 
was taken using two tailed statistical tests as the research in many ways felt 
exploratory and there was some lack of confidence to only look for effects in the one 
predicted direction. Fife-Schaw (2002) argues that the one-tailed test should only be 
used when there is very strong reason to do so. In this case the choice of two-tails may 
have been overly cautious. Fife-Schaw then goes on to say that one should not swap 
between two and one-tailed probabilities just to get a significant effect and that this 
decision must be made a priori. With this in mind there were two directions to take 
either abandon LOP or carry on with it despite two studies with mainly null results. A
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change of direction was chosen. If a third study had shown a LOP effect how would 
this have been interpreted against two that did not?
The most important issue relating to the null effects and interpretations related to 
sample size and power. Under other situations and with enthusiasm still in place for 
LOP another experimental could have been conducted using the strict directional 
predications of the theories. These would result in a priori one tailed statistical tests. 
Additionally and most importantly the study would need substantial increase in 
sample size with which to identify effects. While changing the tail’s of the statistics 
post hoc is not approved of, rerunning a study to question a possible Type II error is a 
very good idea. This is especially true considering the fact that both studies had very 
small sample sizes.
The interpretations on LOP and papillae are therefore provisional and allegations of 
possible Type II error are fair and future studies could address this issue with a large 
sample size. While this is true, one study alone can not prove anything and more 
studies would be needed to confirm the results. Given the lack of findings and the 
amount of time left in the PhD it was felt by all to be better spent on a new line of 
enquiry.
The focus for the second half of the PhD could have been virtually anything, as so 
little is known about basic cognition in taste. Having researched an early basic 
cognitive effect (papillae effects) and a late cognition effect (LOP/memory) it was 
decided to focus on the intermediate level of perception. One interesting area relating
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to perception is categorisation and categorical perception. Categorisation is also of 
interest as there is a literature on how memory and language is categorised (e.g. 
network theories, Collins and Quillian, 1969; schemata, Schank, 1980). Additionally 
the idea of perceiving categories has a long history both within psychology and 
philosophy. Very little is known about taste categorisation. Categorical perception 
was decided a good candidate for the second half of the PhD as it has not been tested 
before with the chemical senses and the effect is normally very robust, showing itself 
in other sensory domains on a variety of stimuli. Pursuing a subtle effect following 
the troubles of finding a LOP effect would have been unwise.
Categorical perception for flavour
Categorical perception relates to the superior ability to recognise a target from a foil 
that crosses a category boundary compared to a foil which falls within the same 
category. The first aim was to clarify that binary tastants mixtures (a drink made fi'om 
two flavourings) can be categorised for example in the way people can categorise 
blue/green tiles into green or blue in standard CP studies.
The first pilot study established the topology of orange/lemon taste-space from its 
100% concentration poles through to the category boundary near the middle of the 
taste-space. Taste-space essentially is the flavour (oral stimulation of taste and 
texture with olfaction) equivalent of colour space. However unlike colour space or 
sound space, taste-space is very complex to control without the assistance of 
computers. Colour space has hue, brightness and saturation but the four basic tastes of 
sweet, sour, salt and bitter do not adequately explain all the flavours. Flavours are
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influenced by an extraordinary array of taste and aroma chemicals, alongside other 
factors such as temperature. The taste-spaces investigated in this study were orange- 
lemon binary tastant mixtures. A boundary was found, on one side of which most 
people called the tastants by one name and on the other by the other name. The shape 
of this boundary was not the clear distinct divide of traditional CP. Next the main 
study using an X A-B recognition task showed that correct recognition was superior 
across category than within. This established that CP can exist for the chemical sense 
of flavour.
The second CP study was designed to test for CP on two more taste-spaces. 
Additionally the second CP study investigated what happens near the 100% 
concentrations. Within this thesis the 100% concentrations have been assumed to be 
representative of a prototypical taste, in that it is difficult to think of anything that can 
be more lemon than 100% lemon. The study also tested for a prototype style effect, 
comparing items within and cross prototype. CP study two revealed a CP effect for all 
three tastant continua including those with the non citrus blackcurrant flavour. This 
shows that taste CP is not limited to citrus flavours. The study revealed that the
sensitivity was superior near the category boundary than near the prototype,
supporting CP theory. However an interesting effect was demonstrated at the
prototype. According to perceptual magnet theory the taste-space around the
prototype should be condensed in a similar way as the category boundary space is 
stretched (Guenther et al., 1999). This means items near the prototype should be very 
difficult to distinguish from each other. However when items cross prototype a CP 
like effect is found.
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The prototype effect is arguably more suggestive of superior ability with more novel 
stimuli. This would make more sense when considering the taste literature (see, 
Koster, Prescott and Koster, 2004; Mojet and Koster, 2002, 2005; Sulmont-Rosse, 
Issanchou and Koster, 2003). Here the suggestion is that our sense of taste has 
evolved to detect differences than similarities. As already explained from an 
evolutionary perspective, being able to tell the how similar something is to apples is 
largely meaningless, but being able to detect a difference from what has previously 
been tasted is potentially lifesaving as the apple may be poisonous. It is important to 
note here that this does not mean a CP effect at a category boundary is not adaptive, 
as being able to distinguish via tasting the difference between two identical looking 
berries, one type edible and the other poisonous would prevent the organism 
consuming the poisonous berry.
The preceding studies and findings on CP also have to be assessed critically. 
Returning to the literature discussed in chapter seven we are reminded that the 
definitions of concepts and categories are inconsistent (Murphy, 2002). However for 
the sake of simplicity concepts were defined as mental representations of classes of 
objects within this thesis. It was also noted that classification of items is like a 
botanist’s taxonomy tree, with concepts forming the trunk or large branches and 
objects of each kind at the furthest twigs, likely with associated kin nearby. The ways 
these objects are organised seems to be due to their attributes or features. Rosch and 
Mervis (1975) showed that there are at least six categories based on a prototype 
approach. They showed the most prototypical item of a category was considered the 
most typical of its kind, which is sharing most of its features with its kind. Thus a sofa 
or table are more typical of furniture than a lamp and an apple or orange more typical
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of fruit than an olive. A reading of Persaud (2003) highlights that what is included in 
the concept of food varies considerably. Next two main umbrella approaches were 
discussed. Exemplar approaches state that categories are made up of a collection of 
instances of examples rather than an abstract representation. Instances are grouped 
relative to each other by some mental metric. In this approach categorisation is the 
mechanism that retrieves examples from memory given a particular cue. When exact 
matches are not found in a person’s memory the nearest neighbour is selected. As an 
example, when cued with a tiger, we are most likely to recall tiger first then other 
felines or other similar mammals if we do not have the tiger stored in our mind. As 
such a child might say ‘dog’ when seeing a tiger. Prototype approaches are different. 
Prototypes have their own structure, it is either a collection of characteristics or the 
best examples of the concept all merged together. What exactly this is remains 
unclear. It was also noted that there is no delimited set of necessary and sufficient 
features for determining group membership. Eysenck and Keane (2005) go on to say 
that in essence, category membership is determined by the similarity of an object to 
the category prototype. Chapter seven went on to describe that prototype models have 
a similar representation space to exemplar approaches. In recognising a stimulus it is 
compared to the prototype. If it is considered similar it is considered in category or if 
not similar then it is out of category. This also allows for some items to be not clearly 
one thing or another, which is clearly the case when encountering novel or unusual 
entities. But what exactly are prototypes? The answer is unclear. The mental 
prototype was assumed to be related to the most convergent kind of a thing, or a good 
example of it or one of a set of good examples. That is to say a 100% orange squash 
tastant is likely to be strongly associated with the mental prototype or orange squash, 
and maybe even associated with the - wider mental prototype of ‘oranginess’. It is
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likely that real orange juice and orange flavoured squash have related but slightly 
different mental prototypes. It is important in evaluating the studies to know whether 
the assumed stimuli prototypes were representative of the mental prototypes. This 
issue is relevant to both the experiments using binary tastant mixtures near the 
category boundaries and the second CP experiment where discrimination around the 
100% concentration ‘prototype’ was measured. In particular the assumption that 
100% categorisation of a stimulus as a particular flavour can apply to multiple stimuli, 
but that the prototype is usually defined as the ‘best example o f  and may not 
necessarily be the most concentrated version of a stimulus.
As we are reminded from the discussion of prototypes in chapter seven exactly what a 
prototype structure is, is unclear. However it most likely sits within a multi­
dimensional mental space. It also has either real-world examples of, or 
characteristics of, the entity gravitating around the prototype core structure. The 
heart of this mental prototype structure does not need to be identical to any real world 
entity. After all what would a prototypical piece of furniture, finit, food or cat be like? 
In these studies we are either dealing with prototypes of orangeness, lemonness and 
blackcurrantness or orange squashness, lemon squashness or blackcurrant squashness. 
The latter of these two sets seems most likely. Throughout the bulk of the thesis so 
far, the 100% concentrations have been assumed to be related to the mental prototype 
structures of orange(ness), lemon(ness) and blackcurrant(ness). However that does not 
mean that is necessarily the case or that the 100% versions are the only or best real 
world examples (or associates) of the mental prototypes. At the simplest level for 
example, it clearly is not the case that every human being has the No added sugar 
Sainbury’s Orange Squash as their best/only mental prototype structure of orange
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squash(ness). However is it too much to assume that it would not be a good example 
or part of the mental prototype structure?
Another issue in all the CP studies is that the category boundaries were not all clearly 
classic CP in shape, but this most likely relates to the fuzzy taste-space that was 
identified by the taste-space pilot studies. This will be discussed shortly. However it is 
important to note from chapter seven that not all categories are clear cut, therefore 
some things surely would have less distinct category boundaries. Returning to the 
prototype stimuli it was assumed the 100% concentration was associated with the 
mental prototype and that either side of it tastants were less associated with the mental 
prototype. The area around the 100% concentration was treated experimentally like a 
category boundary with two tastant stimuli either side of it with which an X AB study 
was conducted. It should be noted that the 100% may not correlate perfectly with 
every person’s mental prototype structures. Also the size of this structure and its 
relationship to the real world tastants is not known. As such it is not 100% clear that 
all decisions on the prototype tasks were definitely within or across. However, it is 
reasonable to say some items were more likely to be more proximal than others to the 
heart of the prototype mental structure. After all would 100% lemon tastant be more 
likely to be similar to the mental prototype structure than one which was 95% lemon 
and 5% blackcurrant? In summary the assumptions on the prototype tastants is only 
that they may be associated with a good example of the mental prototype structure for 
most people or that they are associated with the characteristics of the mental prototype 
structure.
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The next question which was addressed in CP study three , was whether the CP effect 
would decay with a time delay. It was found to decay (but maybe not as much as may 
have been assumed). This suggests that the CP effect may be utilising a flavour 
sensory register. This register however is short lived. If the CP effect had been 
significantly influenced by top down labelling, then the CP effect should not have 
vanished with the delay. As mentioned before, the labelling of flavours is extremely 
difficult; it is not surprising that even if such strategies were used the CP effect still 
diminishes. If the shift towards prototype theory (STP) such as in Huttenlocher, Heges 
& Veveas (2000) had been correct and that its effect would be as far as the category 
boundary then the CP effect should have remained following a delay. The STP would 
have also made the CP effect stronger than normal after a delay. This was not the 
case. If STP is real for taste its effect does not extend to the category boundary.
When evaluating the findings of study three the sample size was not large and the 
power may have been limited in a similar way as discussed previously.
As discussed in the CP literature chapter the concept of CP really being a perceptual 
effect was questioned. There were likely to be memory effects and maybe an impact 
of labelling which could aid ‘online’ processing even if the perceptual aspects have 
reduced/decayed. Some experimental tasks on CP have used explicitly memory tasks 
(Heider, 1972; Roberson et al., 2000, 2004). Others have utilised an inter-stimulus- 
interval:, same-different judgements (Bomstein & Korda, 1984; Ozgen & Davies, 
2002), 2-AFC (Franklin et a,L, 2004) novelty preference and habituation (Bomstein et 
al., 1976; Franklin & Davies, 2004). We also saw that same-different tasks and
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delayed X-AB tasks, could potentially be influenced by the ‘on-line’ employment of 
language and the effects could therefore be due to remembering labels.
One interesting study by Roberson & Davidoff (2000) addressed these issues. Their 
study was on faces and colours and employed an 2-AFC method with visual, verbal, 
interference or no ‘interference’ in the 5 second ISI. The study showed normal CP in 
the no interference condition. In the visual interference condition performance was 
weakened. However cross-category performance was still superior than within 
category (i.e. CP remains but weakened). But under the verbal interference condition 
cross-category accuracy was reduced thereby removing the so called categorical 
perception effect. This study among others has suggested a non perceptual aspect to 
CP. It also suggests that visual stimuli might be assisted by verbal processing. Also 
work by Wigget and Davies (2008) using Stroop has shown interference in CP. They 
showed that target name generation may be important for CP because it acts as a 
category prime, which, in turn, facilitates cross-category discrimination.
A possible explanation of the apparent reduction in CP with a memory delay could be 
due to a mixture of the above average performance over all (even in the within 
condition) and the idea that mental labelling of tastants is most likely difficult to do, 
partly due to their complexity and our general lack of training to be able to label, 
name or identify specific tastants. With visual or auditory stimuli it is easy to imagine 
how the stimuli are re-heard or re-visualised with these dominant senses that we are 
arguably most attuned (via evolutionary and social/educational factors) to use. It is 
also interesting to restate that the chemical taste cortex is far smaller than the auditory 
and visual cortical areas.
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The thesis has investigated and highlighted a wide range of topics; papillae, taste- 
space, category perception, categorical perception, flavour prototype effects as well as 
(flavour) sensory register and levels of processing and transfer appropriate processing. 
The thesis has produced the first piece of evidence to suggest that the effect papillae 
numbers have on taste perception does not carry over to memory. This however needs 
to be judged with the caveat of the measuring method as discussed in the discussion 
section of chapter four, namely that it was difficult to accurately count the papillae. 
Secondly binary taste mixed drinks are categorised by people and a CP effect exists 
for flavour (smell and taste combined) at least for the stimuli used. The thesis has 
also provided evidence which suggests that a CP like effect occurs when crossing the 
prototype contradicting perceptual magnet theory. The thesis also shows that CP for 
taste is more perceptual than a product of top down labelling. CP is weakened with a 
delay condition. Finally the thesis has shown that LOP theory does not seem to apply 
to flavour.
Basic cognition and the psychology of eating
Our understanding of eating, and related issues of food choice and diet has come on 
considerably in recent years. Within the introduction we saw that there are three 
overarching approaches and areas of research. Firstly there is a psychophysiological 
approach. This has investigated issues of neurochemicals, chemical senses, mood etc. 
At the other end were developmental models. These highlighted the role of exposure, 
social learning and associative learning. The final main approaches then were 
cognitive models. However these focused on complex cognitions, such as attitudes,
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social norms and perceived levels of control. What they missed out were any attempts 
to understand the role of the basic cognitions such as perception, attention, memory 
and language. In almost every other area of psychology the role of basic mental 
functioning (i.e. basic cognitions) has been very helpful. Understanding these basic 
cognitions may one day help us in understanding the psychology of eating. It may 
well answer such questions as how we learn to distinguish and categorise food. And 
how to make foods that are categorically/perceptually the same but are far healthier. 
Are there anyways of helping children to leam to like a broader and healthier range of 
foods? This thesis has not answered any of these high level questions. However it 
highlights that there is indeed a massive gap in our understanding. It also goes some 
way to starting to answer some basic exploratory questions, test theories and 
methodologies within new areas. It also highlights the difficulties that can be 
encountered in researching the chemical senses.
The tastants used within the thesis have all been products that people do use in the 
real world, providing a degree of ecological validity. The juice drinks of the LOP 
study were complex liquids and the most complex stimuli used in the study. Future 
studies could use more complex stimuli, such as soups, ice-cream, or a pie. To 
investigate more complex tastants and foods would require full food technology 
laboratories and food production skills (these were not available for this thesis). The 
alternative direction would be to investigate simpler stimuli such as simple sweet, 
sour, salt and bitter. The conclusion that LOP does not exist for taste was shown by 
two studies but it is possible that the null effects were due to a lack of power relating 
to sample size. Future research would most certainly benefit from clarifying this issue
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with studies with more power. While the thesis provided reasonably good provisional 
evidence that LOP does not exist for flavour it could still exist for more complex 
foods such as a McDonald’s Big Mac, a Christmas dinner or a birthday cake as these 
stimuli are all chemically/structurally more complex and importantly are products that 
are more semantically loaded than orange juice. Branded items such as colas or 
chocolate bars may provide evidence of a LOP effect. However in all these examples, 
would the LOP effect be due to LOP or easier labels? One of the problems with juice 
is that its flavour can change very fast; this is very true of fresh juice. Juices go off 
and have to be replaced often. But what effects does this have on liking? And is this 
important when liking is one of the independent variables? It should be noted 
however that ascorbic acid in orange juice is a natural preservative and should prevent 
this. The use of a very cold refrigerator kept at a stable temperature and presentation 
to participants in a temperature controlled room should have helped control for such 
issues. The CP studies all used squash (fruit concentrate drinks). This has a greater 
shelf life and does not present the same problem of perishing as do the juices. These 
stimuli did include some real juice concentrate but can be considered in some ways 
artificial. The taste of orange squash after all is very different to the taste of real 
orange. Future research could retest the taste-space and CP effects on real juices as it 
is very possible that the topology of their taste space may be different. However this 
would be technically very challenging as changing from one juice to another involves 
a considerable change in chemistry in many different ways. The research by Mojet 
and Koster, (2002, 2005); Sulmont-Rosse et al. (2003), Koster, et al. (2004), Dijkster 
et al. (2006), has shown the memory for different aspects of flavour are processed and 
remembered differently. As such it would be worthwhile to test very different foods. 
The alternative approach in future studies could be to investigate the taste-space of the
244
basic tastes such as sweet, sour, salt and bitter. While this would be theoretically 
interesting it would have very little ecological validity. The use of tastants in research 
can be very difficult in a pragmatic way; most notably a person can only taste so 
much within a set amount to time and this inevitably produces small trial numbers. 
The amount of control over stimuli is influenced by the food production/storage 
facilities available and the presentation of stimuli is very complex. The amount of 
exposure and delivery times cannot be as well controlled as those using computer 
presented images or sounds.
The sampling methods in the studies were all opportunity sampling and snowball 
sampling. Snowball sampling is when participants get their friends/family or work 
mates to do the study. Traditionally psychophysics has used these methods as human 
perception is considered to be fairly similar between people. It is unlikely the sample 
would have been skewed in any way due to the sampling. As noted on a number of 
occasions already the sample sizes throughout the study were not large. Future larger 
samples would provide greater power. One of the factors that could have been 
recorded throughout but was not was the number of papillae people have. This would 
have established whether people were super tasters on non tasters. This factor could 
have then been used in all the studies. The reason it was not used was the method of 
counting papillae is very time consuming, potentially messy, and most importantly 
subjective and as such not overly reliable. The alternative method of testing for 
taster ability would have been to use PROP but this can leave an unpleasant aftertaste 
in tasters and supertasters and is often described as sickening by tasters to the extent 
that it can make people feel physically ill. This would have ethical implications and 
practical experimental implications such as liking was used as a variable and even in
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the studies where it was not, disgusting aftertastes for two thirds of potential subjects 
would cause problems. Ideally future studies would use some form of accurate and 
reliable method of recording the papillae. One simple method might be a high quality 
digital camera or a medical/dental oral camera. This would allow the number to be 
counted by more than one researcher.
The methodologies used were based on those traditionally used in LOP and CP 
research. Overall the methods transferred to use on the chemical senses with ease. 
One of the difficulties confronted with running the studies in this thesis was that none 
of the literature related directly to the chemical senses and therefore many decisions 
had to be based on a large number of pilot studies. The design and running of the 
research also was dependent on educated assumptions. For example it was impossible 
to predict beforehand that Tiking’ a traditionally deep task should be correlated with a 
sensory analysis task, traditionally conceptualised as shallow. In hindsight it is 
possible to see why they are related. The development of future studies will be 
dependent on the selection of non correlated orientating task. However what these 
should be is unclear. Additionally if an effect of LOP is found it could all be due to 
tautology. The CP studies suffered unexpectedly high levels of above chance 
performance, no definitive reason can be offered, maybe the task was not overly 
difficult and more subtle differences would bring the performance closer to chance. 
The taste-space for each individual on each continuum should ideally have been tested 
before running their CP study on them as there is a great deal of individual difference 
in the placing of category boundaries. It is quite possible that in some trials all 
tastants were within category for some individuals and as such no CP effect would be
246
found. Fortunately the CP effect throughout seems robust and this caveat is hopefully 
acceptable.
The analysis of the data was largely conducted in two phases. The LOP results were 
calculated before the research on CP had started. The LOP studies utilised signal 
detection theory. This approach proved troublesome when it came to analysis as the 
traditional measures were not appropriate and the nonparametric alternative is 
controversial. For this reason signal detection theory was not employed in the CP 
section. While signal detection theory could have proved an interesting way of 
conducting the CP studies the method used is satisfactory and can be interpreted with 
standard statistics which are easier to interpret and hopefully more valid too.
The studies made use of repeated measures throughout. This made more efficient use 
of time and resources; this required fewer participants and made more use of their 
time. This was especially useful considering the need to run numerous pilot studies. 
Additionally it cuts down data noise, resulting in greater power in relation to number 
of participants used. As with all within subjects designs and statistics there is a range 
of potential problems but with the careful use of counterbalancing this should have 
been accounted for.
The main limitations of the studies have already been discussed in their respective 
sections and repeated briefly above. Further minor weaknesses and caveats have been 
acknowledged along the way. The most significant difficulty involved in this thesis 
was that the research did not benefit from any preceding literature on the chemical
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senses; therefore the design had to be creative and pragmatic. Taken as a whole the 
experiments were reliable, valid and well controlled within the limits of testing 
flavour. The thesis has introduced a number of new questions, which have not been 
addressed before. The experiments have been successful in providing evidence to 
suggest LOP does not exist for flavour (although more research may be required) and 
has established CP as an effect that can be found with flavour. The research on CP 
was more fruitful than the LOP section, this allows for many possibilities for future 
research, using different stimuli; more or less complex than those used in this thesis. 
Further possibilities include investigating LOP for foods as products, and not just at 
the level of tastants and simple taste, but using brands and concepts. The stimuli here 
could be the food product, maybe even boxed or the adverts associated with the food 
product. Would deep or shallow processing of an ice-cream wrapper make a 
difference and would that transfer over to how well the product is liked or sells?
Another line of enquiry could re-examine the prototype style CP effect including 
the assumption used in this thesis. This could be conducted on other stimuli or 
possibly test to see whether differences in the basic tastes modifies the effect; 
assuming bitter or sour tastes (the taste of poisons or the taste rancidity) would 
according to the evolutionary explanation given, be better identified beyond the level 
of just being novel. The concept of taste-space as a multidimensional space also can 
be developed. The triangle shaped taste-space of study two must be a tiny part of 
multidimensional taste space; where do the basic tastes fit in? How do complex tastes 
combine within the taste space, and will that help us understand the nature of taste 
prototypes. Is it possible to develop a taste-space similar to a Munsell colour space? 
Another development on the research on categorisation would be to see how people
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label tastants and investigate whether they are used or not. The role of delay could 
also be further investigated on the CP boundaries and at the prototype areas. This 
would continue to provide fiirther evidence to support or reject key theoretical 
positions such as perceptual magnet theory and shift towards prototype.
This thesis like all research has needed to balance the risk of Type I and Type II 
errors. The value of the research and interpretations of it is always are always 
provisional and limited by the weaknesses of the assumptions or methods of the 
research. However the progress so far can lead to future research programs that can 
hopefully answers questions raised by this thesis in greater reliability and validity.
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Summary
Our understanding of the psychology of food choice and eating has gaps when it 
comes to the understanding at the basic cognitive level, i.e. sensation, perception, 
memory, language. This thesis aimed to start addressing this weakness.
Research has shown that papillae numbers affect perception ability. This thesis has 
shown that this effect does not extend to affecting memory performance. The number 
of papillae does not relate to memory performance.
The very influential LOP framework states that memory is dependent on the mode of 
processing engaged in, and this varies in depth. Despite best efforts no LOP effect 
could be found for flavour using orange juice as the stimuli.
A categorical perception effect for flavour was identified in all three binary tastant 
mixtures. This effect was similar in each continuum. The effect was replicated three 
times for the orange-lemon tastant mixtures.
A prototype effect was also identified at the orange, lemon and blackcurrant 100% 
concentrations. The pattern of results at the prototype resembled the pattern at the 
category boundary. This does not support perceptual magnet theory. It may support 
the notion of novel tastant detection as demonstrated by Mojet and Koste (2005).
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While there was a CP effect this diminishes with time. This contradicts STP theory.
The thesis included a discussion of theories, methodologies, interpretation of results 
and suggestions for further research alongside limitations of the work.
The thesis aimed to provide a distinct contribution to our current knowledge of the 
psychology of eating/taste. The thesis included a systematic study/investigation of the 
role of basic cognition in taste. This endeavour was undertaken with originality using 
methods and theories in new areas. Through critical evaluation of my methods and 
interpretations I have aimed to provide a user friendly account of my work in an 
integrated and coherent fashion. Logical and rational links between component parts 
have been highlighted and discussed as the series of empirical studies built 
cumulatively towards supporting or refuting issues of taste perception, categorisation 
and memory.
The thesis has reviewed the relevant literature highlighting key original sources, 
relevant critical appraisals as well as my own interpretation of the literature. The 
main theory and methodological issues were discussed including the interesting 
intellectual friction of applying theories and methods into a new area.
Throughout I have aimed to use appropriate and reasoned methodologies reflecting 
the changing needs of the project. This was especially so following the lack of a LOP 
effect. Analysis has been justified, limitations tacked, issues of control, reliability, 
error and bias, and validity considered. The project has been evaluated in the light of 
its contribution to our scientific understanding.
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